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Abstract 
A quantitative risk analysis (QRA) should provide a broad, informative and balanced 
picture of risk, in order to support decisions. To achieve this, a proper treatment of 
uncertainty is a prerequisite. Most approaches to treatment of uncertainty in QRA 
seem to be based on the thinking that uncertainty relates to the calculated 
probabilities and expected values. This causes difficulties when it comes to 
communicating what the analysis results mean, and could easily lead to weakened 
conclusions if large uncertainties are involved. An alternative approach is to hold 
uncertainty, not probability, as a main component of risk, and regard probabilities 
purely as epistemic-based expressions of uncertainty. [6] 
In this work, we have relied on the latter approach and have limited our scope to 
investigating one sources of uncertainty in QRAs; assumptions made for QRAs. We 
have pointed out the main components of risk description in a QRA and later 
defined them with respect to assumptions made. We emphasize on the role 
assumptions play in a QRA and the impacts they have on the total risk level and 
what consequences they cause if they are not valid. 
An important issue addressed is how to communicate the shortcomings and 
limitations of presenting results only by probabilities and expected values. 
Sensitivity analysis plays a key role in this regard. Finally the intention is to rank the 
assumptions based on their importance according to their corresponding degree of 
uncertainty and sensitivity in a QRA. 
In order to achieve this goal, we have selected some examples of assumptions from 
current QRAs provided by Statoil ASA for our review and study. We have discussed 
the assumptions description and their impacts on other parts of the QRA. Based on 
the investigation of assumptions and their relation to the results of QRA and by 
following a checklist suggested by Aven [6][7] we have assigned an importance 
factor to each assumption and ranked them accordingly. 
The suggestion for further work is that assumptions will be presented in detail and 
preferably together with a sensitivity and uncertainty analysis to provide cleared 
pictures of risk results. This will help the stakeholders in a QRA to understand and 
interpret the results beyond just probabilities and expected values. 
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Chapter 1 
“It is beyond a doubt that all our knowledge begins with experience: 
Experience without theory is blind, but theory without experience is mere intellectual 
play! 
(And eventually)  
All our knowledge begins with the senses, proceeds then to the understanding, and 
ends with reason. There is nothing higher than reason.”  
         
Emanuel Kant 
 
1 INTRODUCTION 
In this chapter, we will introduce some background information on risk, 
uncertainties and assumptions, relevant for this work. The purpose, the approach 
and the content of the work is also mentioned.  
1.1. Background Information 
Quantitative Risk Assessment plays an important role in HSE management in the oil 
and gas industry especially for offshore installations. A QRA should provide a broad, 
informative and balanced picture of risk, in order to support decisions. To achieve 
this, a proper treatment of uncertainty is a prerequisite. [6] The main issue in any 
risk assessment is that risk is related to possible future events and their 
consequences. As of today, the human mind has not proven to be able to possess 
absolute certain knowledge about future phenomena meaning that there are a lot of 
uncertainties with respect to occurrence of future events and their potential 
consequences. On the other hand, in a risk analysis, the intention is to know about 
the future event because the future consequences can be influenced by the actions 
we take now. Therefore we have to make some assumptions and foresee the 
possible future consequences in light of these assumptions and suppositions. 
Therefore, the only tool we have in order to predict the future events is probability. 
Yet the interpretation goes beyond that.  
Many still believe that risk is primarily concerned with calculated probabilities and 
expected numbers based on historical data. However, while evaluating what can 
happen in the future, one must think more about surprises and uncertainties than 
on mere historical events. [6] In that matter, there have been different approaches 
towards uncertainty and probability in the concept of risk. (See section 2.2). 
However, in this work, while we are using probability as a tool to express 
uncertainty, it means that we have accepted uncertainty as a main component of 
risk. In that case, probabilities will just be regarded as epistemic-based expressions 
of uncertainty. So there have been identified uncertainties associated with risk and 
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this uncertainty therefore lies beyond all the calculations of risk being done in a 
QRA. In order to be able to make a starting point for some uncertain quantities or 
events assumptions have to be made. 
In time the importance of the uncertainty in risk analyses has been brought into 
attention and an extra emphasis has been put on assumptions made in QRAs. 
Sometimes it may be argued that assumptions are more important in a QRA than the 
results, at least in the long run. The importance of role of assumptions in a QRA goes 
to the extent that according to Odd J Tveit, former Chief Engineer Safety Technology, 
Statoil ASA, a risk analysis can be interpreted as “Consequence analysis of the 
assumptions”. 
In summary, the risk description in a QRA depends on a number of assumptions. 
[6]These assumptions made form part of the background knowledge and they are 
themselves based on the assessor´s background knowledge, which might differ to a 
great extent from that of another assessor. This difference originates from the 
difference human beings have with respect to background knowledge and the ways 
of interpreting it, reasoning and evaluating capabilities and various ways of 
cognition and perception.(For more information see section 2.6) 
In conclusion, it should be acknowledged that uncertainties could be hidden I the 
background knowledge. The assumptions may to a greater or lesser degree 
constitute to uncertainty factors in the sense that assumptions might not be valid. If 
assumptions turn out to be wrong, the result could be that the actual outcome of a 
predicted quantity is surprising relative to the assigned probabilities.[6] However, 
assumptions are an inevitable part of any risk analysis and the final risk description 
must be seen in light of this basis. In a risk picture presented in a QRA, what is seen 
is rigid numbers, frequencies and fancy diagrams that might look very accurate in 
terms of calculations. What is NOT seen in the results is the basis for all those 
calculations; the assumptions. Therefore, to make a QRA a “living study”, a concrete 
section in a QRA report for documenting assumptions should be considered. 
[4]Since assumptions and premises have a considerable influence on the results and 
invalidity or misinterpretation of them could eventually lead to poor judgments and 
decisions. It is worth mentioning once more, that the main purpose of a risk analysis 
is decision support because life is mainly about decisions and poor decisions cost a 
lot! The cost that is intended to be minimized to an acceptable extent. 
1.2.Purpose of the work 
The main purpose of this work is to emphasize on and define the importance of the 
role of assumptions in a Quantitative Risk Analysis for oil and gas industry. We 
intend to apply a suggested method [6][7] for ranking and comparing some 
examples of assumptions. We will further investigate how uncertainties associated 
with assumptions might affect different parts a QRA especially total risk level. The 
focus is to justify the importance of a classified, detailed and ranked assumption 
section being included as part of a QRA report. This is to mention that uncertainties 
are always present in a QRA, yet sometimes hidden in different parts of it and hence 
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they need to be considered and presented along with the results. An effort has been 
made to present the importance of an assumption based on uncertainty and 
sensitivity of each assumption to provide a broader view on risk description beyond 
just the results. 
We intend to answer the following questions: 
1. What role assumptions play in a typical QRA study? What are the uncertainty 
factors associated with them? 
2. Why is it critical to have a very detailed and classified assumption section? 
3. How should assumptions be presented in a standard formal QRA and why? 
4. What are the consequences if some assumptions are ignored, misinterpreted 
or not being valid? What parts of a QRA are affected by different kinds of 
assumptions? 
5. How to rank an assumption as being “important” and how could one see 
beyond the risk calculations? How should uncertainties be revealed along 
with assumptions made in the report? 
1.3. Approach of this work towards reaching the objectives 
We shall first describe risk description in a QRA and discuss the basis and different 
interpretations of uncertainty and assumptions in theory. We will then develop our 
theories into practical work (applied QRAs) and make a comparison. We use 
different approaches in combination with our own background knowledge as a tool 
to understand and justify the importance of assumptions in QRAs and the 
consequences of them being invalid or disregarded. 
Specific examples of assumptions from some QRAs chosen by Statoil are being 
reviewed in an effort to understand the criticality of them. The basis for forming the 
selected assumptions and the potential consequences of them being misinterpreted 
and invalid is also being discussed. All discussions are in light of the purpose of a 
QRA that is to help provide decision support. The impact of poor assumptions or 
documentation of assumptions would be considered in the basis for decisions that 
will lead to fatal or destructive consequences. 
Eventually, for evaluating the role of assumptions in a QRA, we need to perform an 
uncertainty analysis since assumptions are in fact considered uncertainty factors. In 
order to define an importance degree to the selected assumptions we adopt Aven 
and Flage`s[6][7] suggested approach to hold uncertainty , not probability as a main 
component of risk.  Therefore, to reflect uncertainty factors we use a semi-
quantitative method as presented by Aven [6][8]; adjusted to include consideration 
of both risk and vulnerability. Uncertainty factors are analyzed with respect to effect 
on risk and vulnerability. The effect on risk and vulnerability depends on two 
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dimensions: 
 Degree of uncertainty. 
 Sensitivity of the relevant risk and/or vulnerability indices to changes in the 
uncertain quantities. [6] 
 
According to this approach and based on discussions and our own background 
knowledge about the assumptions selected, we will assign sensitivity and an 
uncertainty degree to each assumption. The assumption`s importance is then 
defined by the combination of these two degrees. And that is how we will rank the 
examples and we further suggest that all assumptions would be more efficiently 
presented if they are documented and ranked by more or less the same approach. 
1.4. Contents of this work 
This work consists of 9 chapters. In this work, in the first chapter we start with the 
introduction part. Some background information and the approach are introduced. 
In chapter 2, we will thoroughly discuss and introduce the basics of risks and risk 
conceptions and misconceptions. In later sections of this chapter we will then 
continue introducing uncertainties and assumptions different perspectives in QRA. 
We will also emphasize on importance of assumptions in current QRAs based on 
background knowledge, similar experiences and philosophic approach. We will end 
this chapter by defining what an assumption in a QRA means and how they should 
be treated. 
In chapter 3, an introduction to a QRA and its main steps is given with emphasis on 
criticality of assumption section in a QRA report. We shall review some examples of 
assumptions documentation about how assumptions were presented previously in 
QRAs. We will go through some examples and then we will introduce Statoil´s 
guideline and NORSOK Standard on how to present assumptions in a QRA. 
We introduce the suggested classifications of assumptions and then in the next 
subsections we shall introduce two valid and recent QRAs done for Statoil which 
comply to an acceptable extent with the presented guideline by Statoil and we will 
then discuss how this new approach have helped organize and process the result of 
the analysis. The two selected QRAs are Kalundborg Refinery TRA in Denmark and 
Valemon Field TRA in Norway, northwest of Bergen. 
We will continue the discussion by an introduction to Kalundborg refinery 
description and the QRA method used and we will point to some examples of 
assumptions that have been presented in this QRA. We will end this chapter by an 
introduction to Valemon TRA and the selected examples of assumptions we intend 
to review and discuss in detail in chapter 5. 
Chapter 4 is a thorough introduction to Valemon system description and the TRA 
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methodology and steps applied for this field. The results of the QRA have also been 
presented. 
In chapter 5, which is the data input chapter, we will focus on Valemon field as the 
main source of examples of Assumptions followed by the Statoil guideline. We have 
thoroughly introduced the field and the QRA method in chapter 4 and then in this 
chapter we will go through the assumption section (which seems to be 
informatively presented for readers` review, based on the writer’s background 
knowledge) and we will discuss in detail and study further some assumptions that 
we have chosen from different categories and emphasize on the importance of them 
being presented and the misunderstanding they will lead to if ignored/invalid. 
In line with our objective of this work, we will use the detailed discussions we have 
made as background knowledge to rank the assumptions according to the degree of 
uncertainty and sensitivity they hold inside. The results are presented after each 
assumption discussions. 
Chapter 6 will cover the general discussions of the examples discussed in chapter 
5.Some comparisons between those examples of assumptions mentioned in chapter 
3 with the currently presented ones are also considered. The total ranking and 
comparison of assumptions are also presented in this chapter for final discussions.  
Chapter 7 and 8 include the conclusion and further recommendation for this work. 
Chapter 9 is the final word. 
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Chapter 2 
2. Risk description, uncertainties and assumptions in a QRA 
In this chapter, we will describe what we mean by risk in a QRA and what the objectives of a 
QRA are. The concept of risk in a risk analysis and the main components of a risk 
description in a QRA are also discussed. Some misconceptions of risk have also been 
brought into attention. The main focus would be on uncertainties and assumptions with 
respect to risk results. In order to better understand the concept of an assumptions and 
uncertainties several approaches have been considered including Terje Aven´s suggested 
viewpoints towards interpretations of probabilities and an introduction to epistemology 
from different philosopher´s perspectives.  
 
2.1 Introduction to risk analysis and associated challenges  
The objective of a risk analysis is to describe risk that is to present an informative risk 
picture. [1]As for a QRA which is the concern of this work, a broad, informative and 
balanced risk picture is required as a result in order for the decision making support. 
Risk analyses are often performed to satisfy regulatory requirements. It is, of course, 
important to satisfy these requirements, but the driving force for carrying out a risk 
analysis should not be these alone, if one wishes to fully utilize the potential of the analysis. 
The main reason for conducting a risk analysis is to support decision-making. The analysis 
can provide an important basis for finding the right balance between different concerns, 
such as safety and costs. [1][2] 
We need to distinguish between the planning phase and the operational phase. In the 
planning phase, at first, the fact that we have many possible decision alternatives and 
limited detailed information implies, as a rule, that one will have to use a relatively coarse 
analysis method. As one gradually gains more knowledge regarding the final solution, more 
detailed analysis methods will become possible.  
In the operating phase, we often have access to experience data, for example, historical data, 
on the number of equipment and systems failures. In such cases, one can choose a more 
detailed analysis method and study these systems specifically. Risk analyses are useful in all 
phases, but the methods applied must be suited to the need. [1] 
2.1.1Risk analysis versus risk management and risk assessment: 
The mentioned terms cannot be used interchangeably and each of them stands for a 
somewhat different concept which we will introduce in the following.  Risk management is 
defined as all measures and activities carried out to manage risk. Risk management deals 
with balancing the conflicts inherent in exploring opportunities on the one hand and 
avoiding losses, accidents and disasters on the other to protect people, the environment and 
assets.[5][2] 
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The risk analysis process is a central part of the risk management, and has a basic structure 
that is independent of its area of application.  
However, a clear distinction has been made between the terms risk analysis, risk evaluation 
and risk assessment as shown below: 
Risk analysis + Risk evaluation = Risk assessment 
The results from the risk analysis are evaluated. In this work, we use the term risk 
assessment to mean both the analysis and the evaluation.[1] 
Generally, the main concern for this work is to deal with uncertainties and assumptions in 
quantitative risk analysis so we would not go into much detail for risk management and 
assessment but we will introduce the main components of Risk analysis especially a 
quantitative one.  
Risk analysis is a methodology designed to determine the nature and extent of risk. It 
comprises the following three main steps: 
1. Identification of hazards/threats/opportunities (sources) 
2. Cause and consequence analysis, including analysis of vulnerabilities  
3. Risk description, using probabilities and expected values.[2] 
Figure 2.1 shows the main steps of the risk analysis process. We will frequently refer to this 
figure in the forthcoming chapters.  
 
Figure 2.1.  The main steps of the risk analysis process[1] 
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2.1.2Main challenges with Risk Management, Assessment and Analysis 
The main challenge present yet most of the time hidden in all different steps of risk 
assessment, management and analysis is the issue of uncertainty. 
Uncertainty is an inseparable part of risk yet it is hidden at a superficial evaluation of any 
risk assessment. The impacts of uncertainty, however, are revealed if one takes a more close 
attention. 
As an example, the main challenge of risk management is Decision-making under 
uncertainty. 
Risk management often involves decision-making in situations characterized by high risk 
and large uncertainties, and such decision-making presents a challenge in that it is difficult 
to predict the consequences (outcomes) of the decisions. 
In high-risk situations, various decision-making strategies can form the basis for the 
decision. By “decision-making strategy” we mean the underlying thinking and the principles 
that are to be followed when making the decision. (for more information about decision 
making under uncertainty, cautionary and precautionary principles See Appendix C) 
Additionally, according to Aven[2], Risk analysts know that the assessments are often based 
on selective information, arbitrary assumptions and enormous uncertainties. Nonetheless 
they accept that the assessments are used to conclude on risk acceptability.  
Conclusion: We should consider uncertainty as one inevitable and inseparable component 
of risk which reveals its effect in all steps of a typical risk analysis. And in order to mitigate 
these challenges, it has been suggested that sources of uncertainties be defined to a possible 
extent for a risk analysis and results of the analysis be then presented along with 
uncertainty factors and sources. 
Quantitative Risk analysis is the main focus of this work and there are lots of calculations 
based on assumptions and background knowledge which conceal a great deal of 
uncertainties. It is therefore useful to take a closer look at different concepts and 
perspectives on risk description for a QRA in the next section for better treatment and 
interpretations of uncertainties. 
 
2.2 Risk Perspectives: Concepts and Misconceptions 
The objective of a risk analysis is to describe risk. To understand what this 
means,we must know what risk is and how risk is expressed.  
Risk is related to future events A and their consequences (outcomes) C. Today, we 
do not know if these events will occur or not, and if they occur, what the 
consequences will be. In other words, there is uncertainty U associated with both A 
and C. How likely it is that an event A will occur and that specific consequences will 
result, can be expressed by means of probabilities P, based on our knowledge 
(background knowledge), K. The main concern through this thesis is the main issue 
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associated with this background knowledge: hidden uncertainties which weaken the 
results of the analysis. 
2.2.1 Risk Description 
There are different approaches of describing risk. In this work we have concentrated on 
uncertainty and hence we choose to accept uncertainty as a main component of risk which 
is mainly derived from the background knowledge and needs to be addressed along with 
other aspects of risk description. One approach of looking at risk would then be in terms of 
these dimensions that we have used inthis work. 
Risk Description= (A, C, P, U, K) 
Or if we would like to emphasize more on the fact that the probabilities are based on some 
background knowledge we could then rewrite the expression above as this: 
P (A|K) 
We should then note that there is a great deal of uncertainty associated with and hidden in 
this background knowledge. The uncertainty derives from the variety of sources of 
background knowledge (different persons, databases, etc.) and also in terms of 
interpretation of these background knowledge and previous experiences. We will highlight 
this matter more deeply throughout this work. 
Since we have emphasized on the role of uncertainty in the concept of risk and serves as a 
challenge to risk assessment as mentioned in section 2.1.2, we have chosen that probability 
is a tool to express uncertainty with respect to A and C. However, it is an “imperfect tool.” 
Uncertainties may be hidden in the background knowledge, K. The main point is to always 
acknowledge and express these uncertainties.  
We will outline the main components of risk description in a QRA in detail in the next 
chapter but for now, we would like the reader to acknowledge the uncertainty factor in risk 
description. 
 
 
 
2.2.2 Misconceptions of risk 
As it was stated previously, risk is traditionally introduced by expected values and 
probabilities. But there is more to it as uncertainty is always a hidden yet very critical factor 
when it comes to describing risk. According to [9], Many still believe that risk is primarily 
concerned with calculated probabilities based on historical numbers and average 
considerations; when evaluating what can happen in the future, one must think more about 
surprises and uncertainties than on historical events. This is the pillar in modern risk 
assessments. 
Consequently, an emphasis has to be made to look beyond just the expected values and 
probabilities. As we will explain further in the following chapter, we will see that sometimes 
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uncertainty can be very important that we often consider it as the third element of 
describing risk. As much as expected values and probabilities are considered building 
blocks of a risk description, they should not be mistaken as the risk concept itself. We will 
have a through discussion about this in the next section based on Aven`s misconceptions of 
risk Book.[3] and we will state the reasons why some misconceptions cannot be replaced 
with the term risk itself. 
2.2.2.1 Misconception 1: Risk is defined with Expected Values 
According to [3], the concept of risk is not captured by the expected value due to the 
following reasons: 
 The consequences or out comes could be so extreme that the average of a large 
population of activities is dominated by these extreme outcomes. 
 In addition, the probability distribution could deviate strongly from the future 
observed outcome distribution. 
2.2.2.2 Misconception2: Risk is defined through probabilities 
The discussion about this misconception is the basis for our work since that is how we 
relate to uncertainties and assumptions in risk concept.  There is a typical definition risk 
widely accepted as “Risk is the combination of probability and extent of consequences.” [2]. 
There exist many other definitions that limit the description of risk to probabilities. This 
definition of risk is, however, not meaningful without an interpretation of the probability P. 
There are generally two ways of interpreting a probability [2][3] and when describing risk 
via probabilities, we should distinguish between these two approaches. 
 
 
1. Relative frequency interpretation or frequentist probability (objective 
approach, introduces aleatory uncertainties) [2][3] 
 A probability is interpreted as a relative frequency Pf: the relative fraction of times the 
event occurs if the situation analyzed were hypothetically “repeated” an infinite number of 
times; Pf is referred to as a frequentist probability. The “true” underlying probability is 
unknown and needs to be estimated. We then have to take into account that the estimates 
could be more or less close relative to the underlying true probability.  We say there is an 
estimation uncertainty! This approach mostly involves classical statistics methods. 
  
2. Knowledge-based probabilities (subjective approach, introduces epistemic 
uncertainties)[2][3] 
For this approach, one compares the uncertainty and likelihood of an event with drawing a 
ball from an urn. Probability is a measure of uncertainty about future events and outcomes 
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(consequences), seen through the eyes of the assessor and based on the background 
information and knowledge.(k).  It is a probability in light of the current knowledge. There 
are always uncertainties in our future interpretations of background knowledge (k) since 
history never repeats itself the very exact same way. So we can never be certain what has 
happened in past will happen the very same way in the future- not to mention IF it happens 
in the future. Objective probabilities do not exist in a sense! If k denotes the knowledge the 
probability is based on what we refer to as background knowledge. 
The advantage with these kinds of probabilities is that knowledge-based probabilities can 
always be defined, and they are introduced as the recommended tool for describing the 
uncertainties. The disadvantage on the other hand is that these probabilities cannot be 
compared to a universal reference point meaning that they could vary to a great extent 
based on the different background knowledge. That is why they are sometimes called 
“subjective” by definition. Each and every individual could come up with a probability of 
this kind and no one could challenge whether it is “true” or “false”. This nature of 
knowledge-based probabilities justifies the requirement for the assessors to document their 
background knowledge together with the assigned probability for help provide better 
clarifications of the results. 
According to the above discussions, one could write the probability as follows: P(A/k): 
Probability P is a subjective measure of uncertainty about future events and consequences, 
seen through the eyes of the assessor and based on some background information and 
knowledge 
This approach is mainly based on the Bayesian perspective. (See App.D) 
 
Summary of misconception of probabilities: 
It is common to define and describe risk using probabilities and probability distributions. 
However, these perspectives have been challenged. The probabilities could camouflage 
uncertainties. The estimated or assigned probabilities are conditioned on a number of 
assumptions and suppositions and depend on background knowledge. Uncertainties are 
often hidden in that background knowledge so by limiting our vision to probabilities only, 
important uncertainty aspects are easily ignored leaving potential deviation and surprises 
unnoticed.[3] 
In the next section, when we are going to discuss the term “uncertainty”, we would refer to 
these two approaches mentioned about probabilities in order to understand what sort of 
uncertainty they set the basis for. 
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2.2.3 Uncertainties as a main component of risk 
 
Based on 2.2.2, and according to the two approaches towards probability interpretations, 
we will reach to the following argument about uncertainties in risk descriptions: 
For the first definition of probabilities, we produce estimates of the underlying “true” risk. 
This estimate is uncertain, as there could be large differences between the estimates and 
the correct risk values. The variation in the outcomes of the “experiment” generates the true 
value of Pf, is often referred to as aleatory (stochastic) uncertainty. On the other hand, 
following the Bayesian approach (the second approach of defining probabilities), we assign 
a probability by performing uncertainty assessments, and there is no reference to a correct 
probability. A probability is always conditional on some background knowledge, and given 
this background knowledge there are no uncertainties related to the assigned probability, 
as it is an expression of uncertainty by itself. [ 44] The latter uncertainties are known as 
epistemic uncertainties since they are by definition based on the analysts’ (experts’) 
knowledge (epistemology). (See Appendix A.) 
The background knowledge could be based on hard data and/or expert judgments. 
Assumptions are also included, for example related to the use of specific models. The 
background knowledge needs to be reported along with the assigned probabilities. 
In conclusion, probability is just a tool used to represent or express the uncertainties. 
Hence, risk should not be limited to (A,C,P). The uncertainties should be highlighted and 
presented.[1] 
According to the approach we have defined for this work to investigate the assumptions in 
QRAs, we have defined that the aim of the risk assessment is to describe the uncertainties 
about the unknown quantities of interest. 
Consequently, we have adapted the knowledge based probability assignment and hence 
when we are talking about uncertainties we mean specifically epistemic uncertainties. 
(Bayesian approach which is based on background knowledge). It is worth mentioning that 
frequentist probabilities are not measures of uncertainty. The uncertainty description 
therefore cannot be frequentist probabilities. Focusing on epistemic uncertainties in this 
work, we will therefore, treat assumptions in QRAs as uncertainty factors since they are 
based on analysts` diverse background knowledge and past similar experiences. We finally 
intend to point out and rank the importance of assumptions based on the degree of 
uncertainty they constitute. 
 
 
 13 
2.3. Assumptions, Basis and concepts  
 
We like to start this section with an example: 
One may assign a probability of fatalities occurring on an offshore installation based on the 
assumption that the installation structure will withstand a certain accidental load. In real 
life the structure could however fail at a lower load level. The probability did not reflect this 
uncertainty. [6] 
The above statement is considered an assumption in a risk analysis. Risk analyses are 
always based on a number of such assumptions. 
 
The concept of assumptions especially in quantitative risk assessments is in close relation 
with comprehending the uncertainties in a QRA based on previous discussions. In other 
words, the concept of uncertainty and assumptions are interrelated. Since assumptions are 
normally based on some background knowledge and there are inherent uncertainties in 
that background knowledge. The assumptions are then themselves constitute uncertainty 
sources. In order to identify the importance of an assumption in a risk analysis report, it is 
very critical to understand which part of risk description is being influenced by these 
assumptions. In this section we shall discuss the relation of uncertainties and assumption in 
a QRA and then we will have a discussion on different interpretations of assumptions. 
 
2.3.1 UNCERTAINTY FACTORS in a QRA 
According to Aven [6], the risk description in a QRA depends on a number of assumptions. 
For example, the assumptions in QRAs of offshore oil and gas installations commonly relate 
to: 
− Time to detection of abnormal situation.  
− Number of persons in the area (module) at the time of an accident.  
− Number of immediate fatalities.  
− Impact energy that a structure will be able to withstand.  
− Etc.  
  
The assumptions made form part of the background knowledge, and the risk description 
must be seen in light of this basis. Then it should be acknowledged that uncertainties could 
be hidden in the background knowledge. The assumptions may to a greater or lesser degree 
constitute uncertainty factors in the sense that the assumptions might not be valid. If 
assumptions turn out to be wrong, the result could be that the actual outcome of a predicted 
quantity is surprising relative to the assigned probabilities. [6] 
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Generally, all assumed probabilities are conditional on a background knowledge k, which 
includes assumptions and suppositions. This background knowledge is an integral part of 
the results of the analysis and all probabilities need to be considered in relation to K. The 
probabilities produced are conditional on this assumption. [2] 
These assigned probabilities, are in fact, knowledge-based probabilities that assessors have 
assigned and therefore they reflect epistemic uncertainties. Hence, we are required to look 
beyond just the probabilities and consider uncertainties in assumptions as well. 
 
From a theoretical point of view one may think that it is possible to remove all such 
uncertainties from the background knowledge but we certainly know that it is not possible to 
do so in a practical risk assessment. Unless we are God, we should all agree that future and 
what happens in it is unknown to us. And the only thing we can do to conquer it is be 
prepared for it. As we will later see in this work, we have applied some basic uncertainty and 
sensitivity analysis (based on some criteria suggested by Aven [6][7][8] to rank each 
assumption`s degree of importance. And that is only one way of acknowledging uncertainties 
and looking beyond the solid probabilities. What is important to notice is that, always the 
uncertainty assessment goes beyond the probabilistic analysis. 
 
 
2.3.2 Main challenge with establishing assumptions: background knowledge 
So far we know that we need to look beyond the probabilities to express risk but the first 
step is for an analyst to assign some probabilities that form the basis of the rest of 
calculations in a QRA. There are of course a number of challenges related to the assignment 
of (knowledge-based) probabilities for example related to the use of expert judgments and 
the fact that different individuals (analysts, experts,...) have different source of background 
knowledge and for approved results of a QRA, a consensus has to be made between all 
assessors and stakeholders involved in the process in any way.  
After having described that we need to address the background knowledge, the main 
challenge with establishing assumptions appears: What is the source for this background 
knowledge? How do we normally establish assumptions? 
The main point is a typical QRA is normally carried out by some analysts and is reviewed by 
some other experts. Hence, the background knowledge of each and every one of the 
assessors could substantially differ from others so it is very important to provide this 
background knowledge and subjective views along with the results of a risk analysis to help 
understand the ideas and thoughts behind the results, probabilities and calculations. In 
other words, the data source should be clear and open to change if necessary. That is why 
assumptions need to be clearly stated and the source they have been based upon is also 
essential to be acknowledged. These sources could be hard data, personal experience, 
expert judgment, historical databases, similar experiences, assessor´s degree of belief, etc. 
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In the next section we will  have an in-depth discussion about the basis of assumption from 
a philosophical view on perception and knowledge. 
For better understanding what is meant by knowledge and the different sources of 
knowledge and conceptions based on different philosophers we will have a discussion on 
epistemology in the following sections and we will later relate this to understanding the 
basis for assumptions in QRAs. 
2.3.3. Epistemology and Philosophical approaches towards it (For more 
complete discussions on this see appendices A and B) 
Defined narrowly, epistemology is the study of knowledge and justified belief. It 
addresses the questions: 
 What is knowledge? 
 How is knowledge acquired?[40] 
 
In Appendix.A we have introduced 6 philosophers and then reviewed their ideas 
and suggested approaches and proposals towards epistemology. We ended up 
dividing them into two groups of   
 Empiricists: Aristotle, Hume who believed in senses and experiences in the 
only source of knowledge. 
 Rationalists: Plato, Descartes, Spinoza who believed reason alone can provide 
knowledge. 
And eventually we introduced Immanuel Kant who gained a label of a synthetic 
philosopher implying that he combined some points of empiricism with rationalism. 
Meaning that he suggested for a complete knowledge both reason and experience 
should be combined. 
In this work, the approach towards knowledge about assumptions, is that we use 
past experiences (background knowledge) to establish the assumptions, yet we 
need reasoning and evaluation to justify the assumptions to maybe conform to 
future events. We need reasoning and expert judgments to apply assumptions 
efficiently. Accordingly, we have decided that we would (to some extent) follow 
Kant`s approach in this work for describing assumptions. Kant aimed to unite 
reason with experience to form knowledge.  
He argued that while it is correct that experience is fundamentally necessary for 
human knowledge, reason is necessary for processing that experience into coherent 
thought. He therefore concludes that both reason and experience are necessary for 
human knowledge.[47] 
We have further discussed Kant´s ideas and works in Appendix B.  
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We will explain more on how some of the above discussions make the basis for 
introducing assumptions and uncertainties in a QRA. 
Based on the above discussions and Appendix A, we would like to rewrite the two 
approaches towards uncertainty and probability interpretations. 
 Objective approach (frequentist probabilities, chances, and aleatory 
uncertainties and based on classical statistical approach) 
Could be rewritten as: Plato`s perfect world, Descartes`s concepts of 
self,(true values for underlying probabilities), implies the use of 
reasoning to reach to knowledge, use of estimation – rationalist 
approach 
 Subjective approach (related to knowledge based probabilities and epistemic 
based uncertainties based on Bayesian approach) 
Could be rewritten as: Kant`s proposed use of senses or past 
experiences, develop different reference points for further reasoning—
empiricist and rationalist approach 
For the subjective approach to be accepted to count as “objective”, a consensus has 
to be made and an agreement to be reached by all parties and members involved in 
a special case 
 
In this work, we have adapted the second knowledge-based approach while 
addressing probabilities and uncertainties about possible future events in a QRA. It 
should also be noted that that there are uncertainties hidden in the background 
knowledge, not in terms of the knowledge in itself since it had already happened but 
uncertainties lie in interpretation and communication of the knowledge and its 
further application to future events. 
 
 
 
2.3.4 Philosophical views and “assumptions” 
So far, we have stated the role of different assessors´ background knowledge in 
establishing assumptions in a QRA. In this section we would like to discuss the 
possible sources of these differences between individuals.  
According to our previous conversation we have decided that knowledge-based 
probabilities, Bayesian approach and epistemic uncertainties constitute the main 
framework of this work for introducing uncertainties and assumptions. Therefore, 
we could use some of Kant`s proposals and ideas with respect to our discussions 
about assumptions. We will  relate Kant´s combination of reason and experience in 
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developing knowledge (experienced) based uncertainties and the role they play in 
establishing background knowledge for assumptions. 
 
The relation between assumptions, Epistemic uncertainties and Kant`s views 
 
Based on Kant`s approach while we are referring to the background knowledge that 
assumptions in a QRA are based upon (analysts degree of belief) and the 
background knowledge these assumptions serve to base for others (reviewers, 
other than the analysts), we mean the knowledge that is based on past experiences 
which has to be justified with reason and further evaluated, and hence, we allow the 
subjectivity of the knowledge introduced in assumptions and assigned probabilities. 
 
 
Kant`s propositions and their relation to assumptions in this work (App.A) 
[43][45][47][48][49] 
 According to Kant :“All our knowledge begins with the senses, proceeds then 
to the understanding, and ends with reason. There is nothing higher than 
reason.”  
This statement in fact sets the grounds for the approach we have decided to 
choose when discussing how uncertainties are being handled and how 
assumptions will be made and what they are actually based upon 
(background knowledge). The knowledge about assumptions begins with 
past experience (historical data), proceeds to the understanding and then 
needs to be justified and evaluated with reasoning. 
 
 Kant’s emphasis on the role our mental faculties play in shaping our 
experience implies a sharp distinction between phenomena and noumena. 
Noumena are “things-in-themselves,” the reality that exist independent of 
our mind, whereas phenomena are appearances, reality as our mind makes 
sense of it. According to Kant, we can never know with certainty what is “out 
there.” Since all our knowledge of the external world is filtered through our 
mental faculties, we can know only the world that our mind presents to us. 
That is, all our knowledge is only knowledge of phenomena, and we must 
accept that noumena are fundamentally unknowable.[49] 
With respect to our work, since we are not aware of future events and the 
nature of future is unknown to us, we have to accept the uncertainties and 
include them in all aspects of the QRA, especially assumptions that are the 
main focus of this work. We should always address and present uncertainties 
associate with assumptions made. 
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 There are tow terms in philosophy (appA) that we briefly introduce here. 
The terms a priori ("from the earlier") and a posteriori ("from the later") are 
used in philosophy (epistemology) to distinguish two types of knowledge 
[43].A priori knowledge is independent of experience, a posteriori 
knowledge on the other hand is dependent on experience or empirical 
evidence. Analytic a priori is defined by Kant as something (some statement) 
that the conclusion is contained in the definition with no reference to 
experience; it is basically the way it is. These analytic a priories according to 
Kant are therefore non-informative. Synthetic a priori is however when some 
new information has been added to the definition of a fact; therefore adding 
new information to those already accepted facts. And finally, a synthetic a 
priori has its source on experience. Kant, then, the category of the synthetic a 
priori is the key to explaining how we gain substantive knowledge about the 
world.[49]  
 
Generally, in a QRA, a distinction has to be made between describing what 
has been accepted as facts, system description and assumptions that cannot 
be accepted as facts since they are not universally true and they have some 
references to experience. Those that are in turn called assumptions or 
premises in a QRA, which have references directly, based experience.   
 
In the writer`s opinion, according to Kant, facts can be explained with 
analytic a priories; system descriptions can be justifies with synthetic a 
priories and eventually by assumptions, however, one uses a synthetic a 
posteriori by adding some new information on the basis of observations 
(experiences) to an already accepted a priori. (See app.B) 
 
In general the truth or falsity of synthetic statements is proved only by 
whether or not they conform to the way the world is (experiences) and not 
by virtue of the meaning of the words they contain. Note that the role of 
deduction and reasoning has not been denied here; it has been applied in 
evaluating the added information to the accepted fact. [49] 
 
   
2.3.5 Necessity justification of assumptions in QRA  
It has been mentioned that some past experience and background knowledge are 
used to assign some probabilities about uncertain future events. But the 
uncertainties also exist in applying the background knowledge to future events. If 
we do not look wisely enough, it seems that we are entangled in a loop with 
uncertainties. Uncertainties exist. Yet, we have the power of thinking, reasoning and 
justifying! This power saves us to get out of the uncertainty loop. It is the reasoning 
and evaluation capabilities of responsible parties who have to decide to what extent 
uncertainty and assumptions could be acceptable and justified and make a stop in 
this confusing loop if uncertainties, assumptions and background knowledge. 
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Figure 2.2. Uncertainty,Experience and Assumption loop 
 
In other words, this subjective approach and synthetic application of experience and 
reason (according to Kant) serve as a basis for justifying and comprehending the 
assumptions. It actually helps define the assumptions by providing the necessary 
tools.  These assumptions based on some background knowledge then need to be 
reasoned, justified and accepted by all influenced participants in a QRA in order to 
provide clear picture of the result for decision support.  
To make sure that the risk analysis is based on valid information, it is important to 
document the assumptions made during the risk analysis process. Also, when design 
changes are made, or new information becomes available, the assumptions may no 
longer be valid. This is part of the safety follow up system in the project, where the 
effect on the risk picture is stated. In some cases, compensating measures will be 
necessary.[4] 
 
And that is why the assumptions in a QRA should be listed, considered and 
approved so that all involved participants could deal with the challenges of the risk 
level being influenced in case of assumptions not being valid. 
 
 
 
Subjective values 
Knowledge-based values, 
And assumptions 
Uncertainty 
Background knowledge, 
Experience, 
Historical data 
Reasoning 
and  
Evaluation  
Capabilities 
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2.3.6. Assumptions: Definition 
In this section an effort has been taken to answer this question:  What is an 
assumption after all? 
According to Terje Aven, Professor of Risk Analysis at UiS, one general description 
for assumptions can be stated as: 
 
An assumption is a statement that is used as the premise of a particular argument. 
 
There are many different possible definitions for assumptions. According to the 
discussions presented in this chapter, we have also developed a definition as 
follows: 
An assumption is a subjective opinion experienced and developed by an assessor 
that may or may not reach the status of a fact.  
An assumption is basically a simplified tool to overcome uncertainties hidden in 
background knowledge in any kind of work. It itself will then serve as a new source 
of uncertain background knowledge in further investigations. 
 
In other words; assumptions or how we would like to see the world! 
 
It is beyond our knowledge to know what the world really “is”, therefore we make 
assumptions and will try to conform to them and see the world in light of them. 
 
In the previous section, we had a philosophical approach to understand the term 
knowledge, and mostly based on epistemological terms developed by Kant we 
suggested a coarse definition for an assumption. Before we begin to explore the 
world of assumptions and uncertainties in existing QRAs, it is very important to 
differentiate between what we will from this point on consider an assumption and 
what does not fall in our framework of assumption definition; something that we 
can call on the other hand a fact or as Plato would have addressed as a FORM not an 
IDEA (assumption)(App.A). System descriptions also need to be separately 
mentioned. For further information about system description in a QRA, see section 
3.3. 
We will not discuss the details of what can be called a ‘fact’. However, a coarse 
definition could be something that is considered a concept that has been agreed 
upon or according to a dictionary: something that is indisputably the case. A concept 
that cannot be proven wrong or interpreted in several other ways is usually referred 
to as a “Fact”. Facts do not belong to assumption section and should be very clear in 
nature. 
 
For instance, while performing a QRA for an offshore platform, the statement that 
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“we are somewhere in the middle of a water” is considered a fact. We know by 
definition of offshore that it is not solid ground we are talking about. (See section 
2.3.4 analytic a priori). On the other hand, if the water depth is assumed to be deep 
or shallow is something that needs to be justified and therefore counts as a 
knowledge-based assumption and the definition varies subjectively. In addition, if 
the water depth has been measured according to accepted standards and 
documented in a report by value, it usually will not be considered as an assumption 
and it preferably falls into the system description category of that offshore field.  
One way of possible relations between these three definitions has been shown in 
figure 2.3 below.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2.3. The relation between facts, assumptions and system description in a QRA based on 
the writer`s background knowledge 
As it is shown from Figure 2.3, some assumptions and systems descriptions have a 
potential to be counted as facts, we just are not sure about them yet. But the 
opposite is not the case i.e. facts cannot be considered as assumptions. They are 
‘true’ by definition and do not need a reference to experience. (See section 2.3.4) 
What we here in this work intend to carry out is to address and clarify the different 
ways of documenting assumptions in different QRAs made for Statoil, make a 
comparison between them and state the pros and cons of each way of presentation 
based on the impacts different assumptions have on the total risk picture of each 
QRA. And more importantly, according to selected examples impact assessment on 
other part of the system, we will assign an uncertainty and sensitivity degree to each 
of them and will eventually rank them in the sense of being more `important` for the 
system. 
Now that we have defined assumptions and uncertainties hidden in the background 
knowledge for establishing them, in the next chapter, first we will introduce the 
standard steps for a QRA and them discuss the role of assumptions and 
uncertainties with application of some examples in QRAs.
 
 
      FACTS 
ASSUMPTIONS 
.AnalyticalTechnical/Operati
onal/…. 
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                                         Chapter 3 
3. Introduction to QRA and Review of some examples 
In this chapter we will review some selected examples of QRAs chosen by 
Statoil (Source: Espen Fyhn Nilsen, Risk Analysis Specialist, Statoil ASA) 
and will investigate and comment on some assumptions and their 
presentation format in these reports. But first, we will introduce what is 
generally meant by a Quantitative Risk Assessment and the steps that 
should be included in the report. 
What is a QRA? 
QRA also referred to as Probabilistic risk assessment is a key tool used in 
these new approaches systemizes the present state of knowledge including 
the uncertainties about the phenomena, process, activities and systems 
being analyzed. It identifies possible hazards/threats (such as a gas leakage 
or a fire), analyses their causes and consequences, and describes risk. A 
QRA provides a basis for characterizing the likely impacts of the activity 
studied, for evaluating whether risk is tolerable or acceptable and for 
choosing the most effective and efficient risk policy, for example with 
respect to risk-reducing measures. It allows for the calculation of expected 
values so that different risks can be directly compared.[2][4] 
In other words, Quantitative risk analysis (QRA) is a systematic approach 
for evaluating likelihood, consequences, and risk of adverse events.[2]  
A typical QRA normally includes numerous calculations and assessment 
methods. The starting point for the assessment should be measurement of 
some historical accidental events. As far as possible these data should be 
objective [4]. It is acknowledged, however, that assessment of the safety 
level could not be based on hard data only. As safety is more than 
observations, it was necessary to see beyond the data and incorporate 
additional aspects related to risk perception. A full risk picture cannot be 
established in an objective way. A broad perspective is required. [6] We 
need: 
 Observational data 
 Risk analysis description 
 Perceived risk description 
 Judgments made by people with special competence 
 Expert groups 
 Group of representatives from the various interested parties to 
build trust and consensus 
Basically, there are three categories of data that can be used to provide 
different types of information: 
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 Losses expressed for example by the number of fatalities 
 Hazardous situations expressed for example by the number of major 
leaks and fires 
 Events and conditions on amore detailed level, reflecting technical, 
organizational and operational factors leading to hazards 
 
But each of the categories shows just one aspect of the total safety picture, 
and seen in isolation, data from one category could give a rather 
unbalanced view of the safety level. It was therefore decided that data from 
all three categories should be incorporated. [5] 
 
 
3.1 QRA components [1][2][3][4] 
Before we actually start to review and look through the examples of 
existing QRAs chosen by Statoil, we would like to give an introduction to 
what a QRA is in general, and what are the main steps that have to be 
applied or presented in the QRA report. 
Consequently, we will take a closer look into the different activities 
required for a quantitative risk assessment, including identification of 
initiating events, cause (frequency) analysis, consequence (impact) analysis 
as well as risk description (risk picture). The methodology for a typical QRA 
is more or less the same, but the techniques for implementing various parts 
might be different. For example commonly used methods for cause and 
consequence analyses are FTA and ETA respectively but those are not 
necessarily the case for all QRAs. In this work, we will not discuss the 
different techniques for carrying out a risk analysis. What is important for 
us is the concept of the whole QRA methodology with a special emphasis on 
uncertainty and assumption section. Since later in chapter 5, we intend to 
investigate the impacts of assumptions on different components of a QRA 
report. Therefore, we will only point out the main steps of a risk analysis. 
See figure 2.1  
3.1.1 Identification of initiating events [1][2] 
The first step of the execution part of a risk analysis is the identification of 
initiating events. If our focus is on hazards (threats), then we are talking 
about a hazard identification (threat identification). It is difficult to avoid or 
to reduce the consequences of events that one has not identified. For this 
reason, the identification of the initiating events is a critical task of the 
analysis. However, care has to be taken to prevent this task from becoming 
a routine. When one performs similar types of analyses, it is common to 
copy the list of hazards and threats from previous analyses. By doing this, 
one may overlook special aspects and features of the system being 
considered. 
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It is therefore important that the identification of initiating events be 
carried out in a structured and systematic manner and that it involves 
persons having the necessary competence. Figure 3.1 illustrates how such 
an activity can be carried out with respect to hazard identification. 
Figure 3.1 Hazard Identification [1] 
The development of the list of initiating events is based on different types 
of input, including similar types of analyses as mentioned above, general 
experience, databases, inspections and assumptions. Special techniques are 
often used, for example Hazard and Operability studies (HAZOP). A 
common feature in all the methods is that they are based on a type of 
structured brainstorming in which one uses checklists, guide words, etc., 
adapted to the problem situation being studied. [2] 
3.1.2.Cause analysis [1] 
In the cause analysis, we study what is needed for the initiating events to 
occur. Several techniques exist for this purpose, from brain- storming 
sessions to the use of fault tree analyses and Bayesian networks (see 
App.B). In Figure 3.2 we have shown an example using fault trees. Experts 
on the systems and activities being studied are usually necessary to carry 
out the analysis. An in-depth understanding of the system is normally 
required.  
 
Figure 3.2.Use of fault trees 
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3.1.3 Consequence analysis[1] [2] 
For each initiating event, an analysis is carried out addressing the possible 
consequences the event can lead to. See the right side of Figure 3.2.  
An initiating event can often result in consequences of varying dimensions 
or attributes, for example, financial loss, loss of lives and environmental 
damage. In the consequence analysis we study the effects the initiating 
events A may have on human beings, the environment and financial assets 
(or something else that humans value). Scenarios are developed showing 
how the initiating events could lead to specific consequences. 
The event tree analysis is the most common method for analyzing the 
consequences, but other methods such as Bayesian belief networks are also 
used. The number of stages in an identified scenario depends on the 
complexity of the safety and control-systems (barriers). 
According to NORSOK standards[10], the following are the objectives of 
consequence analysis: 
             a) to assess possible outcomes of identified and relevant initiating 
events that may contribute to the overall risk picture;  
            b) to analyze potential event sequences that may develop following 
the occurrence of an initiating event, determine the influence of the 
performance of barriers, the magnitude of the physical effects and the 
extent of damage to personnel, environment and assets, according to 
what is relevant given the context of the assessment.  
 
3.1.4 Probabilities and uncertainties in a QRA [1][2] 
A QRA normally develops several scenarios with respect to frequency and 
consequence analysis. However, how likely are these different scenarios 
and the associated consequences? Some scenarios can be very serious 
should they occur, but if the probability is low, they are not so critical [1]. A 
sensitivity analysis is often required as well. 
Probabilities and expected values are used to express risk. In a quantitative 
risk analysis/assessment (QRA), risk is typically described using 
probabilities and expected values. For example, commonly used personnel 
risk indices in offshore QRA include IR, PLL, and FAR values. [6][4] 
However, all types of uncertainties associated with what will be the 
consequences are not reflected through the probabilities. As discussed in 
Chapter 2, a risk description based on probabilities alone does not 
necessarily provide a sufficiently informative picture of the risk. The 
probabilities are conditional on some certain background knowledge, and 
in many cases it is difficult to transform uncertainty to probability figures. 
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3.1.5 Risk picture: Risk presentation [1][4] 
This part depends mainly on the type of risk analysis. The risk picture is 
generally established based on the cause analysis and the consequence 
analysis. Generally, the risk picture will cover: 
 Predictions (often expected values) of the quantities we are 
interested in (for example, costs, number of fatalities);  
 Probability distributions, for example, related to costs and number 
of fatalities;  
 Uncertainty factors;  
 Manageability factors.    
 
The point here is to reveal uncertainties and manageability factors that can 
give outcomes that are “surprising” in relation to the probabilities and 
expected values that are presented.  Depending on the objective and the 
type of analysis, the risk picture can be limited to some defined areas and 
issues. In many cases, it will be appropriate to present risk by means of a 
risk matrix and to discuss uncertainties and manageability factors.  
Of importance in this context is the recognition that risk is more than just 
the numbers in the risk matrix. All probabilities and expected values are 
characterized by a certain background knowledge K. The probability P(A) 
should be written P(A|K). The background knowledge is a part of the risk 
picture and the risk presentation. And uncertainties associated with this 
background knowledge should be acknowledged as well. 
According to Norsok z013u3[10] 
Calculations needed to establish the risk picture 
For the calculations needed to establish the risk picture, the following 
requirements apply (if included in scope): 
 a)  the following fatality risk contributions shall be considered and, 
when applicable, calculated and presented separately:   1) immediate 
fatalities;  2) offshore transportation fatalities including shuttling; 3) 
escape fatalities;  4) evacuation and rescue fatalities;  5) off-site risk.  
 b)  the fatality risk contributions shall be split into areas or exposed 
employee groups and, if relevant, between 1st and 3rd party;  
 c)  when required, the probability of loss of main safety functions is 
established in accordance with guidelines given in Annex B;  
 d)  the environmental risk shall as a minimum be calculated for the 
environment in general, but it is recommended to calculate risk for 
identified environmental risk indicators or specific sensitive resource.  
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However, for a typical QRA, as we will see in this chapter and chapters 4 
and 5 mainly, the risk picture mainly consists of: [17] 
 Personnel Fatality Risk, first and third party,  
 Impairment Frequency of Main Safety Functions 
 Environmental Impact, usually oil spill and emissions 
For Personnel risk, Individual and Group risks are mentioned both for first 
and third parties. This is usually done with calculated (estimated) values of 
FAR and PLL and they are compare with RAC defined for each case and 
major contributors of FAR and PLL are usually presented in diagrams.(per 
area or per accident category,…).F-N curves  are sometimes presented as 
well.(See definitions page iv) 
For Impairment frequency of main safety functions, one could normally 
refer to: 
 Escalation Prevention 
 Main Load bearing structure 
 Safe areas 
 Escape and evacuation routes 
 
3.1.6 System Description in a QRA[4] 
According to Vinnem [4], a risk assessment should always start with a 
system description. A precise definition of the system being analyzed 
assists both the analyst and more importantly those who will review or 
evaluate the study and the results. The system description should include: 
 Description of technical system, relevant activities and operational 
phases 
 Statement of the time period to which the analysis relates 
 Statement of the personnel groups, the external environment and 
the assets to which risk assessment relates 
 Capabilities of the system in relation to its ability to tolerate failures 
and its vulnerability to accidental effects 
 
 
The purpose of the system description is to make the analysis sufficiently 
transparent, so that other personnel are able to review and comment on it. 
Another important aspect is to ensure a comprehensive documentation of 
assumptions and premises for the analysis. Assumptions and premises 
need to be documented where they belong in relation to calculations. In 
addition, there should be a summary of all assumptions and premises as a 
reference source. We will discuss this matter in the next section. 
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3.1.7.Assumptions and Uncertainties 
A number of assumptions are made during the course of the analysis process. 
These assumptions must be documented in a systematic way, and they must be 
presented to those who use the risk analysis for decision-making support. The 
results obtained from the risk analyses must be viewed in the light of the 
assumptions made. Operational personnel should be aware of these assumptions, 
and it is essential that the assumptions be incorporated into the maintenance 
program and the emergency preparedness planning, etc. In practice, it is a 
challenge to achieve all this successfully. 
According to Norsok z013[10]: 
 e)  assumptions and presuppositions shall be clearly and explicitly 
documented and categorized in the following groups:   1) analytical; 2) 
technical;  3) organizational/operational.  
 f)  assumptions and presuppositions which imply restrictions to the 
operation of the facility, the activities assessed or to modifications/changes 
in the system basis shall be described in a manner which is understandable 
and easy to use for the various users of the risk analysis. This includes a 
description of the implication of deviations from these assumptions and 
presuppositions. The need for sensitivity analysis in order to identify and to 
assess the implications of changes in the study basis shall be considered and 
performed when necessary. For quantitative risk analysis see also 5.6.3.4;  
 g)  results, premises and assumptions shall be documented in a manner 
which enables easy use as input to planning of operational activities, 
maintenance and modifications;  
 h)  an evaluation of the robustness of the conclusions given in the assessment 
with respect to changes in study basis shall be presented;  
 i)  background for the choice of assumptions/presumptions shall be given;  
 
 
3.1.7.1 Influence of uncertainty  
 
There will always be uncertainty as to whether certain events will occur or 
not, what the immediate effects will be, and what the consequences for 
personnel, environment or assets may be. This uncertainty reflects the 
insufficient information and knowledge available for the analysis, in 
relation to technical solutions, operations and maintenance philosophies, 
logistic premises etc. There will always be some uncertainty about what 
may be the outcome of accidental events, even when the installation has 
been installed and put into operation. [1][4] 
The uncertainties are expressed by the probabilities that are assigned. 
There are as such no expressions of uncertainty. But it is nevertheless 
important to consider and reflect on what the sources of uncertainty are. 
[1] 
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According to [15]: 
 
Uncertainty is inherent and unavoidable in performing risk analysis since it 
belongs to the physical variability of a system response and also to the lack 
of knowledge about the system In general taxonomy, the uncertainty due to 
natural variation or random behavior of a system is named aleatory 
uncertainty, whereas the uncertainty due to lack of knowledge or 
incompleteness is termed epistemic uncertainty (see section 2.3.2). These 
two types of uncertainty can be introduced from any of the three different 
sources represented in Fig.3.3 below. According to the figure, the sources of 
uncertainty can be classified as data uncertainty, model uncertainty and 
quality uncertainty. Quality uncertainty refers to the complete and 
comprehensive evaluation of hazards, including the identification and 
description of their relationships in developing the fault and event tree.  
 
 
 
      Figure3.3 . Proposed Sources of Uncertainty in a QRA [15]. 
 
 
The extent of assumptions that have to be made will usually increase as one 
gets further into the accident sequence, and more and more uncertainty is 
introduced. There are more sources of uncertainty associated with 
calculation of fatality risk compared to physical accidental loads or 
consequences. This should also be considered.[4] 
 
3.1.7.2 Documentation of assumptions and Premises [4] 
 
Assumptions and premises for an analysis are important because these 
often have a considerable influence on the results, and because they are the 
best way to make a QRA study a `living document`. According to Vinnem[4], 
typical examples of assumptions and premises include: 
 
 Activity Levels on the installation, such as the number of crane 
movements, extent of hot work activities, etc. 
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 Manning level, distribution, work schedule 
 
 Operation of Safety systems 
 
 Performance of Emergency Response systems and actions 
 
Sometimes it may be argued that assumptions are more important in a QRA 
than the results, at least n the long run. Results are important for the 
immediate follow-up but the necessary actions have to be taken in a 
relatively short time span. The assumptions on the other hand, constitute 
perhaps most typically the `living, element of a study. The following are the 
important aspects in relation to assumption: 
 Assumptions need to be identified at an early stage and discussed 
with the organization in charge of the installation, for verification 
and acceptance. 
 Assumptions need to be collected and presented systematically and 
to appear in the documentation where they are relevant. It is also 
advantageous to indicate what the likely affects of changes to 
assumptions will be –which we intend to carry out in the following 
sections-Extensive cross referencing is important. 
 Assumptions need to be followed up and reviewed regularly when 
the study is completed, in order to make the study `living`. 
According to Vinnem [4] it may be a good solution to split the assumptions 
into three categories, because the persons must directly involved in the 
review and follow-up will be different. 
 Design basis 
 Operational Assumptions 
 Modeling Assumptions 
Almost the same categorization of assumptions has been suggested by 
Norsok z013 standard and Statoil Guideline GL0282.[10][11] 
3.1.8 Sensitivity and robustness analyses[1][4] 
Sensitivity studies could be claimed to be the main purpose of most QRA 
studies if the overall objective of the work is the comparison of alternative 
solution s or identification of risk reducing measures. One of the main 
efforts in planning and executing a QRA should be directed towards 
achieving efficient sensitivity studies, in such circumstances. It has been 
found that sensitivity studies are more effective and refined if attention is 
given to defining in detail the scope of the studies. When studies are 
planned with sensitivity modeling in mind, the modeling becomes more 
focused. [4] 
The risk picture is not complete unless we have carried out sensitivity and 
robustness analyses. These analyses show to what extent the results are 
dependent on important conditions and assumptions, and what it takes for 
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the conclusions to be changed. The depth of such analyses will of course 
depend on the decision problem, the risks that are analyzed and the 
available resources.[1] 
In practice, we often start with the conclusion, and ask what it takes for it 
to change. One can then “go backwards” in the analysis, and find out which 
conditions have a significant impact on the conclusions. We are talking 
about a robustness analysis. To carry out sensitivity analyses on all 
conditions is not feasible in practice. [1],[2] 
In this work, we have done a somewhat qualitative sensitivity analysis 
about some examples of assumptions to define their scope of impact on the 
total risk level. We then followed a checklist suggested by Aven [s1,2] to 
assign a sensitivity ranking to each assumption, combined the results with 
the assigned degree of uncertainty in assumptions and finally decided on 
an `importance level`. 
3.1.9 Risk evaluation 
It is normally the case that results of risk picture are compared with and 
evaluated against the RAC defined for the project. This is part of risk 
evaluation and the intention of risk analysis is that eventually the results 
could be evaluated and used for further decision support. Through the risk 
analysis and the discussion of the results, the analysts will be able to give 
their message (the risk picture and the risk presentation), and then the 
management and the decision-makers will become more involved. 
 
The mentioned steps have been identified to be the most important ones 
according to framework (especially NORSOK standards)[10], nevertheless, 
there have been several other categorizations as well, mostly because some 
parts were not practicable but the main steps have been the same. As an 
example we present a typical QRA steps in figure 3.4. 
 
Finally, it is important to mention that all steps of the QRA should be done 
in line with he whole framework (standards will be discussed further in 
chapter 5). As one can claim from the diagram in figure 3.4, a separate step 
for assumption and uncertainties has not been mentioned. Yet, these 
assumptions and uncertainties exist in all parts and steps and they become 
more critical especially in risk picture, calculations and evaluation parts.  
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Figure 3. 4. Main steps in a typical QRA [4] 
 
According to the discussions above, we have decided to provide a section 
for discussing the role and impacts of uncertainties and assumptions in a 
QRA.  
We will point out the risk components in a QRA and our main focus will be 
on uncertainties associated with risk description. 
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3.2 Background information on assumptions 
In this work, whenever we mention probabilities or uncertainties, we 
associate them with knowledge (epistemic)-based. Also, when it comes to 
assumptions these aspects are of great importance and the role of 
background knowledge which serves as an uncertainty source is 
considerable in assumptions in a QRA. The aim of risk assessment is 
therefore to describe the uncertainties about unknown quantities in this 
work, so the first task is to identify these unknown quantities. [3] Some 
typical sources of uncertainty in QRAs were outlined in section 2.2. 
In this context, the responsibility of the analyst is to predict these unknown 
and uncertain quantities and to describe uncertainties about them, which 
are the key component of risk in this approach. For prediction of unknown 
quantities, access to historical data is normally available for the analyst. 
Yet, the interpretation and application of this historical data depends 
mainly on the approach of the analyst himself. Based on the historical data 
and his own background knowledge, the assessor can then propose and 
document some assumptions regarding the unknown quantities .The main 
concerns in a risk analysis are the future events; the way they actually are 
going to happen could be different from the way we are prepared to 
manage them. And the way we see the future events via risk results of a 
QRA today, depends strongly on the assessor`s presented assumptions and 
how much deviation from reality lies in the assumptions depends on the 
validity of the assumptions. It is all traced back to the background 
knowledge. 
 
The hidden yet the most ruling factor in the discussion above is the role of 
uncertainty; the uncertainty which is inevitable in any kind of analysis 
when it comes to future events; the uncertainty which human minds have 
been currently proved to be incapable of conquering.  Having accepted this 
impotency of human mind in predicting future, efforts have been made to 
fill the gaps by some assumptions and presumptions towards the unknown 
quantities for future. The aim of risk assessment is to predict these 
quantities and to describe uncertainties to the most possible extent. 
The later experience would then either proves or denies the validity of the 
assumptions. In conclusion, past experience would serve as basis of 
forming the assumptions and future experiences will set grounds for 
validity of those assumptions. The results and possible discrepancies are 
always evaluated and justified are lessons are learnt for further studies. 
And that is the way knowledge about different phenomena is formed. 
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3.2.1 Approach for uncertainty treatment in assumptions 
It has been accepted that a probabilistic analysis is always based on a set of 
assumptions. The main issue would therefore be that “the assumptions 
could be wrong (leading to poor predictions)”. [6] 
 
According to Aven [2], an analysis based on the historical numbers could 
easily become too narrow and imply that extreme outcomes are ignored. 
Surprises occur from time to time, and suddenly an event could occur that 
dramatically changes the development, with the consequence that the rates 
jump up or down. In a risk analysis such events should ideally be identified 
(surprising events). However, the problem is that we do not always have 
the knowledge and insights to be able to identify such events; because they 
are extremely unexpected. 
 
Therefore, the risk perspective adopted motivates assessment of 
uncertainties beyond the probabilities assigned. [2] To achieve this, a 
practical tool used may be a list of uncertainty factors that could strongly 
influence the results to occur in the future.  
Each factor’s importance should then be measured using a sensitivity 
analysis to understand its importance in the analysis. We next address the 
uncertainty of this factor. If the uncertainties are assessed as large, the 
factor is given a high risk score. Hence to obtain a high score in this system, 
the factor must be judged as important for the risk indices considered and 
the factor must be subject to large uncertainties. [2][3][6] This uncertainty 
assessment goes beyond the probabilistic analysis. Aspects to be 
considered to judge the uncertainties to be high are outlined in table 5.10 
together with a checklist for sensitivity ranking checklists. This is the 
approach we intend to use to rank our examples of assumptions. 
 
 
3.2.2 Classification and Presentation of Assumptions in a standard 
QRA 
 
According to NORSOK z-013 and Statoil Guideline GL0282:[10][11] 
Assumptions and presuppositions shall be clearly and explicitly documented 
and categorized in the following groups: 
 
1) Analytical; 
2) Technical; 
3) Organizational/Operational. 
 
- Assumptions and presuppositions which imply restrictions to the operation 
of the facility, the activities assessed or to modifications/changes in the 
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system basis shall be described in a manner which is understandable and easy 
to use for the various users of the risk analysis. 
 
This includes a description of the implication of deviations from these 
assumptions and presuppositions. The need for sensitivity analysis in order to 
identify and to assess the implications of changes in the study basis shall be 
considered and performed when necessary.  
 
- Results, premises and assumptions shall be documented in a manner which 
enables easy use as input to planning of operational activities, maintenance 
and modifications; 
 
- Background for the choice of assumptions/presumptions shall be given; [11] 
 
In the following examples of QRAs chosen by Statoil for this work, it is 
important according to [10] that all assumptions and presuppositions 
be accepted by Statoil. Different units within Statoil will be responsible 
for different assumptions. Any presuppositions that are different from 
standard Statoil requirements or practices would need to be specifically 
emphasized. 
Care should be taken to assure quality in data/assumptions provided by 
Statoil. Communication might be necessary regarding level of detail and 
precision needed for various types of data.[10] 
Organizational/operational assumptions will normally imply restrictions to 
the operation of the facility. This might also be the case for some of the 
technical assumptions. The consequences of deviations from each of these 
assumptions should be described. 
As we have mentioned before, by evaluating assumptions, we are in fact 
performing a consequence analysis for the assumptions to define their 
degree of importance in the system. 
 
3.2.3 Traceability and reporting 
The results of the risk analysis should be traceable through the analysis, 
without access to comprehensive data tools. For all large risk contributors, 
it should be possible to identify the mechanisms/pieces of equipment 
which are the risk sources.[10] 
For quantitative analyses, it is important that the calculations can be traced 
in the report. This means that the basic data (incl. references) and a 
sufficient number of intermediate results should be tabulated so that it is 
possible to follow the calculations without having access to the 
spreadsheets and other models that have been used. The effect of 
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assumptions and other considerations should also be clearly presented, e.g. 
through sensitivity calculations. 
The above statements regarding traceability and reporting should be 
interpreted based on the purpose for the risk analysis, and an appropriate 
level of details should be applied. For analysis with long lifespan, like TRA, 
more details would be relevant than for short-term analyses that are done 
for one specific problem and within a limited timeframe.[10] 
In the following chapter, we emphasize on the importance of traceability of 
assumptions several times. It is very important the areas of influence of 
assumptions be detected as easily as possible. 
 
 
3.2.4 Main components of risk description in a QRA [6] 
There are several components of risk defined for QRAs based on different 
approaches. Here, we only mention the main components within the scope 
of this work. 
According to Aven [6], to describe risk we need to take into account both 
the potential consequences (or the severity of the consequences) related to 
the activity or system being considered, and the associated uncertainties. 
The risk description presented here takes as a starting point the following 
general definition of risk. 
By risk we understand the two-dimensional combination of (i) events A 
and the consequences C of these events, and (ii) the associated 
uncertainties U (about what will be the outcome), i.e. (C,U). For simplicity 
we only write C, instead of A and C.[1] 
The main components of a risk description in line with this definition are 
reviewed in the following.[6] 
Events (A): An event is defined by ISO (2002) as the occurrence of a particular set of 
circumstances. In a QRA some main categories of events can be identified: 
Consequences or outcomes (C): A consequence is defined by ISO (2002) as the 
outcome of an event. It is sometimes useful to distinguish between two levels of 
consequences or outcomes in a QRA: 
Uncertainty (U): Uncertainty is understood as lack of knowledge about unknown 
quantities, i.e. about A and C. There is uncertainty about the occurrence of events (A) 
and what will be the consequences or outcomes (C) if an activity is carried out or a 
system is put into operation. 
Probability (P): Probability is a tool used to express uncertainty about events, 
consequences and outcomes. Probabilistic expressions include probabilities, expected 
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values, probability distributions and prediction intervals. 
Background knowledge (K): The description of risk (i.e. the events and consequences 
considered and the description of uncertainty about these) depends on the 
background knowledge of the analyst. For an event A or consequence C the 
dependence of probabilities and expected values on the background knowledge K 
can be written as P(A|K) . The background knowledge covers inter alia assumptions 
and presuppositions, historical system performance data and knowledge about the 
phenomena involved. 
Sensitivity (S): The sensitivity of probabilistic risk indices can be investigated by 
altering the input parameters, or more generally the background knowledge. As 
pointed out by Bedford & Cooke (2001), sensitivity analysis is not the same as 
uncertainty analysis. Sensitivity analysis simply shows the effect on overall results of 
altered input parameters/values. By doing so it is possible to say something about 
the importance of assumptions and suppositions. A so-called backwards approach 
can be used to investigate how large changes in input parameters/values are needed 
to change conclusions. 
The last three components of risk description are in fact the main focus of 
this work when evaluation assumptions in chapter5, that is why we should 
pay attention to the description of them presented above. 
 
3.2.5 Final word on assumptions in a QRA 
So far, we have concluded uncertainty is seen as the main component of 
risk and the risk description. In conclusion, evaluation of uncertainty is a 
required aspect according to the regulatory requirements. The evaluation 
of uncertainty will be dependent on which statistical approach that has 
been used. [4] 
 
In the rest of this chapter as well as chapter 5, while discussing some 
examples of assumptions in different QRAs, we will define the uncertainties 
related to each example. However, in this chapter, the focus is mainly about 
commenting on the presentation of assumptions rather than their impact 
assessment. In chapter 5, we will cover both aspects. 
By presentation of assumptions, we will evaluate and comment on the 
examples according to Statoil Guideline (GL0282)[10] suggested 
categorization of assumptions (our reference) to maintain consistency with 
the rest of selected QRAs.  
 
As we will review some examples of assumptions in QRAs, we could easily 
notice that there has been no consistent way of organizing and classifying 
the assumptions in the selected examples. And almost none of the examples 
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in this chapter are totally in line with Statoil’s guideline on assumptions 
section (maybe only to some extent).  
On the other hand, it is also worth mentioning that not all these 
classifications (suggested by GL0282[10]) are always practical. Since there 
is sometimes a thin line between defining assumptions whether as to count 
as analytical for example or as technical. But this is another issue and needs 
to be stated as well. The unclear nature of an assumption by no means 
justifies its not being documented and classified, in our opinion.  
 
3.3.Review of Presented Assumptions in Existing QRAs 
In the previous sections of this chapter an emphasis was made on the 
importance of assumptions and uncertainties and the role they play in a 
standard QRA and how the assumption section serves as a basis for the 
efficient interpretation of results of a QRA. Assumptions in our idea could 
be interpreted as a way of presenting known unknowns with unknown 
being uncertainties and known being the background knowledge the 
unknown is best estimated, assigned or generally assumed upon. We 
cannot assume the things we do not know of, that is why unknown 
unknowns are not even listed in a QRA and when they occur (if they occur) 
as surprises, their occurrence will be added to the background knowledge 
afterwards. 
The assumptions in a QRA are highly associated with treating uncertainties. 
According to Odd J Tveit, former Chief Engineer Safety Technology, Statoil, 
risk analysis can be defined as: “ Consequence analysis of assumption”. 
Which is relevant for this thesis work, since what will basically go through 
is to discuss what consequences would occur in case of 
deviations/alterations from the documented assumptions. 
The approach in this chapter is that we start by introducing 4 QRAs and 
will comment on their way of documentations of assumptions and will 
make a comparison between them with respect to assumptions listed and 
based on criteria we mentioned in 3.2. (The 5th QRA example is introduced 
in chapters 4 and 5) 
During this thesis, we are basically concerned with some existing QRAs of 
some fields operated by Statoil ASA with the main concern on their 
assumptions presentation and importance. The various natures of the fields 
and status of their operation is not of interest of this work. What we are 
basically concerned about here is the concept of assumptions with respect 
to the previous chapter we have discussed and introduced. The main 
components of risk description in this work will be uncertainties, 
background knowledge and sensitivities. Probabilities are just considered 
as a subjective tool for presenting the results of risk picture. 
39 
 
 
We will in this chapter start by introducing some past QRAs done for Statoil 
and we will then introduce the current and more updated ones to compare 
how the assumptions were listed and presented before in comparison to 
current practice. Once again, we emphasize that in this chapter we will not 
be considering the scientific and systematic effect of the assumptions or 
their detailed effect on other parts of the QRA report. This chapter is 
basically has focus on the way of presenting assumptions in some QRA 
reports chosen as examples so there will be variety of different examples 
from different parts of the selected systems. We will mainly comment on 
how the assumptions are listed/mentioned and possible pros and cons of 
each different way.  
We will list the 5 current QRAs that we have chronologically: 
 Leismer CPF facility QRA report, Statoil Hydro Canada by Det 
Norske Veritas (15.10.2008) 
 Aker Spitsbergen- Risk Assessment for Riser Operations, Statoil 
Hydro by Scandpower (05.08.2009) 
 Concept Risk assessment for the Statoil Bressay Concept study 
Project for Worley Parsons Europe Ltd by Risktec solution Ltd 
(30.11. 2010) 
 Kalundborg Refinery QRA for Statoil AS by Scandpower As( 
23.06.2010) 
 Valemon EPC-TRA for Grenlad Group by Lilleaker Consulting 
AS(24.02.2012) 
 
 
 
 
3.3.1 Leismer CPF facility QRA (Example1) 
This report has been done in 2008 and in our opinion seems relatively thorough 
and informative. A spate part of the report has been assigned for documenting 
main assumption. Yet, there are many other important assumptions left unnoticed 
and undocumented. We are going to have a short introduction to the facility and 
the QRA methodology that has been used in this report. We have the following 
data according to the report [28]. 
3.3.1.1 Short introduction to the facility and the QRA methodology [28] 
StatoilHydro is currently the holder of oil sands leases in the Athabasca oil sand 
deposits close to Fort McMurray in northern Alberta, Canada. The oil sands leases 
will be developed through in-situ bitumen extraction by means of steam assisted 
gravity drainage ("SAGD") technology. The long-term goal is to produce more than 
200,000 bbl/day of bitumen. Steam Assisted Gravity Drainage (SAGD) is an 
enhanced oil recovery technology for bitumen. The intention is to expand the 
Leismer Hub in order to increase production capacity from 20,000 bbl/day up to 
approximately 37,000 bbl/day of bitumen.  
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Project development within Statoil Hydro requires a Quantitative Risk Analysis 
(QRA) to be developed in the detailed project development phase. Det Norske 
Veritas (DNV) has been requested by StatoilHydro to carry out the QRA for the 
Leismer Hub 1 Central Processing Facility (CPF) including expansion with 
production up to 37,000 bbl/day of bitumen. 
 
 QRA methodology[28] 
 
The objective of the QRA is to give the best possible understanding of the risk 
picture for the Leismer Central Processing facility, and to describe and 
characterize risks that are significant to the CPF. 
 
 
The methodology used in this report can be seen in figure3.5 below: 
 
 
Figure3.5 QRA methodology applied for Leismer CPF facility[28] 
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3.3.1.2 Assumptions 
 
In this QRA report that we have introduced, assumptions are mentioned several 
times in different ways, which we intent to address some of them in the following 
sections. 
According to the report, the risk of each event was estimated by combining the 
frequency and the consequence of the event. DNV has applied assumptions, 
methods and data sources widely accepted in the oil and gas industry to assign 
branch probabilities in established fault and event trees. 
 
One positive and advantageous point about this QRA is that even though it has 
been done in 2008, it has complied with the assumption presentation format 
presented in section 3.4 in this work to an acceptable extent. The assumptions are 
categorized and listed in one separate appendix after the results of the report has 
been presented. 
 
Although there is a separate appendix included in the current report where the 
assumptions are included, there are still some assumptions that are discursively 
referred to. In this section we will discuss some of these hidden and indirect 
assumptions in the text and then will proceed to select some of the examples of 
the assumptions presented in the general assumption section. 
 
3.3.1.2.1 indirect assumptions 
As mentioned above, there are several indirect and unnoticed assumptions in the 
text, which we will mention below in the original context. Nevertheless, in order to 
clarify what assumptions we mean, we present them in italics. Most of the text 
presented in the following chapter is extracted from Leismer QRA report. [28] 
 
Indirect assumption in presenting FAR value 
 
According to the report, the overall FAR value exceeds StatoilHydro’s acceptance 
criteria. A comparison to other StatoilHydro onshore facilities is done here to 
explain some differences. A factor that contributes significantly to the overall FAR is 
the manning distribution. All personnel within the onshore unit is to be considered in 
the assessment and the StatoilHydro onshore facilities Mongstad, Kollsnes and 
Kårstø have an administration building normally out of reach of any of the hazards 
from the processing plant/refinery. The manning distribution applied for the 
Leismer CPF are all within the process units and the control room/administration 
building is close to the process unit which means that all personnel are within the 
hazard zones of a large part of the hazards. 
 
The above implied assumption is a very important one when it comes to the total 
risk picture and FAR values. It has been presented as if it is known to the reader as 
part of the system description but in our opinion the stated statement could count 
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as an assumption related to manning level. There is also an assumption dedicated 
to manning level under the assumptions list that we will discuss in the next part 
but if this paragraph itself was supposed to serve as the only assumption on how 
to assign the manning level and its influence on calculated FAR value, the results 
would have been misleading as the reviewers might be confused about the 
sources of FAR estimation since it is not clearly pointed out. 
 
Indirect assumption in Leak frequency estimation 
 
According to the report [12], the basis of the leak frequencies is the Piping and 
Instrumentation Diagrams (P&ID) of the Leismer CPF. 
The frequency analysis was performed using DNV’s commercial software LEAK. 
The DNV LEAK program contains leak statistics from the UK HSE Hydrocarbon 
Release Database (HCRD) that is used to assign representative leak frequencies 
for each band of hole sizes. The hole size categories used in this analysis, and the 
hole size used as representative for each category, are shown in Table below: 
 
 
Table 3.1 Hole size categories according to DNV report[28] 
 
 
 
The HCRD data is collected from offshore platforms in the United Kingdom sector 
of the North Sea. Although providing the most comprehensive available failure 
data for a wide variety of equipment types and leak sizes, the HCRD data requires 
some interpretation to be used effectively. 
Experience shows that using the data directly, i.e., assuming that all releases occur at 
normal operating conditions, provides overly conservative inputs to a QRA study. A 
proportion of all leaks (and hence the leaks detailed within HCRD) occur at 
conditions that produce less onerous releases than would be modeled using standard 
QRA assumptions. For example, many of the recorded leaks occurred during 
maintenance, while equipment is depressurized, or where rapid isolation is achieved. 
 
The above paragraph in italics represents another way or presenting assumptions 
while introducing a topic (leak frequency estimation here). The source and 
background knowledge for the leak frequency estimation has been documented. It 
is appreciated that the assumption has been referred to even indirectly but this 
way of presenting assumption might be challenging for the reviewer to find and 
analyze. Another thing to be challenged here is the assigned terms to size of the 
holes in table 3.1 above. The assigned diameter size and the categorization based 
on that might be confusing for these kinds of interpretations are mainly subjective 
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and depend greatly on different individuals with different backgrounds according 
to chapter2.  
 
The size titles assigned to holes, are very important since they are mainly related 
to leak rate and duration risk. It is the one of the prerequisites to understand what 
is meant by small, medium, large and rupture leakages. This is the kind of 
assumptions that need to be certainly documented since it is greatly subjective. 
 
 
Indirect Assumption in Part Count[28] 
 
According to the DNV report, typically, the P&IDs are analyzed to determine 
appropriate isolation points and identify the process equipment within isolatable 
sections. An isolatable section is defined as all equipment between emergency 
shutdown valves (ESDVs). The maximum inventory available for release is 
defined assuming that shutdown will be initiated if a release occurs. 
Based on the P&IDs for the process plant at Leismer, a part count covering all 
potential release sources (e.g., flanges, valves, fittings, pumps, vessels) within 
each isolatable segment were performed. The results from this part count were 
then entered into the model for calculations of generic leak frequencies. 
 
In the paragraph above two types of assumptions are mentioned. The first 
assumption in italics sets the condition on which another definition has been 
established and the second assumption can be considered an underlying 
assumption for the source of equipment count, which is stated to be the P&IDs. 
The number of equipment contribute directly to process leak frequencies so here 
the underlying assumption could also be challenged whether it is the right choice 
or not for that matter. We will have a more detailed discussion about this type of 
analytical assumption in chapter 5. 
Therefore, the above quote in italics also serves as an indirect assumption on how 
the calculation of leak frequencies is done. If not mentioned and emphasized 
correctly, this assumption remains unknown and the results of leak frequency 
estimation would confuse the reviewers. 
 
 
 Discussions about the indirect assumptions 
 
As we revealed some examples of indirect examples of assumption in the main 
body of the risk analysis report, we gathered that: 
The whole report uses relevant historical occupational data and risk assessments 
from other StatoilHydro facilities as a basis for background knowledge for the 
Leismer CPF risk analysis; there are still a great deal uncertainties in applying this 
background knowledge to conclude about the future events. But this background 
knowledge and other assumptions the rest of the calculations and estimations are 
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based upon need to be mentioned as clearly as possible and in an organized and 
classified way. 
 
Another thing to observe was that it is always useful to state the sources of the 
information and the basis for calculations when the results are being discussed 
but it might also be challenging if we are talking about the results and refer back 
to the references at the same time. 
It could therefore be wise to dedicate a whole section (chapter) with all the 
assumptions the report is based upon. This might also be challenging but with 
great consideration the assumptions could be organized and classified according 
to their types (organizational/occupational, technical and analytical) and the 
specified areas of the report/facility they might influence/have influence upon. 
 
 
 
3.3.1.2.2 Direct/listed assumptions 
 
According to the main DNV report [28], assumptions for the Leismer CPF 
Quantitative Risk Assessment (QRA) are presented. These assumptions 
form an important basis for the assessment and may thus have a significant 
impact on the end results. It should be noted that changes in the 
assumptions might have an impact on the calculated risk levels. 
 
The intent of this document is to clarify the assumptions made by DNV related 
to how key information provided by the client has been interpreted in this study 
and what has been assumed when detailed information has not been available. 
[12] 
 
It is one of the advantages of this report including this assumption section 
and also the explanation and the clarification accompanied by it. However, 
as we ill see, the discussions around the assumptions do not seem extensive 
and informative enough. Analysts have used their experience and best 
judgment in establishing the required assumptions. 
 
The assumptions made are categorized as analytical, technical or 
organizational/administrative that are in line with Statoil GL0282 guideline 
as well. The Analytical assumptions are numbered starting with A. For the 
Technical and Organizational /Administrative assumptions, the numbering 
starts with T and O, respectively.  
 
 
Part of the assumptions used in this report is shown in figure3.6 below. 
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Figure.3.6 Part of Assumption List in DNV report for Leismer CPF[28] 
 
 
 
In the following we have selected some examples of assumption 
description from different categories of assumption with the intention of 
presenting the assumptions and briefly commenting on them. 
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An Example of Analytical Assumptions: Hole size distribution 
 
Table 3.2 Assumption Example for Leismer CPF QRA [28] 
 
 
As discussed in the previous indirect assumption section a lot of 
calculations and assigned probabilities are based on this way of 
categorization of hole sizes. Therefore, it is a very wise choice to dedicate a 
place for this assumption in the assumption section as well. Discussion 
about the basis of the assumption falls beyond the framework of this 
chapter but we encourage the reader to consider other possibilities of 
categorization of the hole size. The following questions might be good to 
think about: 
Are four categories (small, medium, large and rupture) sufficient enough 
for creating a clear image for the reader concerning the hole sizes? 
If the categories were further narrowed down, the calculations and 
assigned probabilities would probably be more exact but at the same time 
more challenging and time consuming. It is the job of the risk analysts, to 
choose the best compromise that leads to the most practical results and 
finally gives a more clear judgment basis for the decision makers. 
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An example of analytical assumption: Equipment Count 
 
This assumption falls into analytical assumption categories and as we will 
discuss it in detail in chapter 5, the importance of it is associated with the 
leak frequency; the more equipment in the system, the higher would be the 
possibility for leaks – the relation is not quite linear though. 
 
 
Table 3.3 Part count example [28] 
 
 
 
 
 
In this assumption the underlying assumption (counting equipment based 
on P&ID of the facility) has not been mentioned. The method of counting as 
well as some compensation, conservative factors are missing as well.  
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An example Technical assumption: Emergency shut down 
 
In Table 3.4  a technical assumption has been mentioned for design basis. 
  
Table 3.4. Technical (design) assumption for Leismer CPF QRA[12] 
 
 
 
In the description of this assumption, some other assumptions (hole sizes) 
have been used; meaning that the fire/leak detection system 100% detects 
the leak/fire if the hole size not considered “small”. Enough care should be 
taken when assigning these probabilities with respect to the underlying 
assumption of hole size. 
The assigned probabilities for other failure causes are mere assignments 
based on some background data or some already practiced standards such 
as OREDA or NORSOK. 
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Organizational/Administrative Assumption: Manning distribution 
 
In this part, a very important assumption has been mentioned. As we will 
later see in chapter 5, manning level is directly associated with results on 
the risk picture and is usually considered one o the most uncertain 
assumptions due to human being involved in it. 
 
Table 3.5. Manning distribution assumption for Leismer CPF QRA[28] 
 
 
We will discuss manning level assumption in a more detailed way in 
chapter 5. However, according to this assumption description, one could 
claim that the assumption requires further specification and it will not be 
enough just to classify areas into two categories of administration and on 
site and then assign a day and night value for manning. 
The basis for these assigned values for manning levels and the distributions 
on a facility is normally historical data and past experiences. Nevertheless, 
care should be taken when actually assigning the manning values since 
manning plays an important and basic role in calculations of fatality risk 
indices and therefore influences the risk picture of a QRA to a great extent. 
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Final Discussions on assumption presentation in this DNV report 
 
It is a good point that this report has dedicated a separate part for 
introducing and presenting the necessary assumptions. However, not all 
assumptions are listed as we have observed. There are several critical 
assumptions not outlined in the dedicated section and they are rather 
implied to in an implicit way during the report. This is something to be 
considered for future reports. 
 
In addition, for the assumptions listed in the assumption section, they could 
be discussed more thoroughly and with more precision, rather than just 
being limited to the extent of the assumption description. As we will see in 
the next chapters, it is very useful to mention the relevant QRA parts to the 
assumptions made as well as their influence on the total risk picture, their 
duration of validity, and other probable available information and 
assessment about the assumptions. In that case, the reader (reviewer) 
would be given a brighter and clearer picture about the sources and basis 
of the assumptions and their potential effects on the risk results. 
Consequently, an importance of an assumption could be established for 
further review and improvement of the assumption. 
 
 
 
 
3.3.2 AKER SPITSBERGEN - RISK ASSESSMENT OF RISER OPERATIONS 
(Example 2) 
Most of the definitions and descriptions for introduction has been extracted 
from the main Aker QRA report.[29] 
 
3.3.2.1. Introduction 
 
Scandpower is engaged by StatoilHydro to perform a risk assessment for 
various riser operations on Aker Spitsbergen in DP mode. The main scope 
of work is to establish the risk level for Aker Spitsbergen in DP mode when 
carrying out standard marine drilling riser operations. Dynamic positioning 
(DP) means to automatically maintain vessel position exclusively by means 
of the thruster force.[29] 
 
 
 
Aker Spitsbergen is a DP semi-submersible drilling unit as shown in figure 
3.7 below. 
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Figure 3.7 Aker Spitsbergen semisubmersible [29] 
 
 
3.3.2.2 Assumption Presentation in Aker Report 
 
In this report there is not a chapter especially dedicated to assumptions 
therefore the assumptions are not classified and listed as in the previous 
work. There is just one subsection mentioning some assumptions about DP 
systems and Riser Operations briefly. As a result, in the following chapter, 
we will outline some of the assumptions being implied in an implicit way in 
the report. 
Once again, the related technical sections of the assumptions are not of 
interest in this chapter. The focus is basically on the way the assumptions 
are presented. 
 
3.3.2.2.1 Indirect Assumption number 1 
 
In the middle of introducing the fault tree structure for vessel drive-off, the 
following quote has been detected: 
It is assumed in this study that the rig will operate in DP Class 3 mode for 
riser operations with all position reference systems and control stations 
operational at the time when the first failure occurs.[29] 
 
In our opinion, it is useful to state the assumption rather than not to 
mention it at all, but this sudden way of mentioning an assumption without 
further references on ´DP class 3 ´ seems absurd, in our opinion. 
 
There are several places where terms such as “It is assumed”, “It is 
considered”, and “It is assessed” have been used without any further 
references being mentioned. Most of these statements fit the description of 
assumptions and it would have been more practical for them to be listed as 
assumptions under their corresponding area of influence. Additionally, 
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they are required to be provided by a degree of importance as we will 
further discuss in chapter 5. 
 
Indirect Assumption number 2;  
Considering the fact that in this chapter we only deal with assumption 
presentation, in this section we will mention some wordings used in the 
report for assumption presentation in different parts of the report. 
 
Conditional Probability of Kick in Drive/Drift-off 
Based on the previous project experience, it is presumed the duration of a 
kick, i.e., the time to control the kick is estimated to be 1.5 days. And the 
average days for drilling and completion in contact with reservoir are 
conservatively estimated as 70 days per well. [29] 
(Assumptions are based on experience, conservative experience-based 
estimation.) 
 
Indirect Assumption number 3; 
As an example of an analytical assumption, we could refer to this table of 
planned well activities. This will be used as the base case in the risk 
analysis.( The numbers are assumed) 
 
Table3.6. Planned well activity [29] 
 
 
Drilling and completion activities using the standard marine riser will be 
performed in overbalanced condition. It is conservatively estimated that 
70% of the drilling and completion time (conservative) will be spent in 
contact with the reservoir. Based on the above discussion, the time for riser 
operations in contact with reservoir could be calculated.[29] 
 
In the above example some conservative assumptions have been made and 
serve as a basis for the rest of calculations. If the assumptions are not valid, 
the results may vary to a great extent. 
 
 
3.3.2.2.2 Directly Addressed Assumptions 
And eventually the assumption sub-section of the report is presented here 
for our review. In our opinion according to other extensive parts of the 
report, this assumption presentation is considered insufficient. We see the 
assumption section in Figure 3.8 below. 
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Figure 3.8 Assumptions in Aker Report [29] 
 
3.3.2.3 Discussions about the assumption presentation in Aker 
Spitsbergen riser operations QRA 
 
As we discussed and reviewed some parts of the report, it is easily 
discernible that the assumption presentation in this report is somehow 
chaotic and does not follow a standard organized pattern. Some 
assumptions have not been mentioned unless they were needed in some 
sections for some calculations or to form a basis for further discussions. 
This might be confusing and decreases the value of a good report. 
The terms given, it is considered, assessed, estimated, etc., have been used 
several times and that is mainly because the assumptions have not been 
classified and listed. In case of assumptions not being listed, the writer of 
the report has to pull his resources and addresses the necessary 
assumptions according to the requirement for each section. As a result, 
some assumptions might be mentioned several times while some others 
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(maybe even critical ones playing a great role in risk analysis) could be 
totally ignored.  
The positive point about this analysis is that most of the time the basis for 
assumptions (historical data, experience…) has been mentioned to avoid 
further confusion. However, the overall conclusion about the examples are 
that the assumption presentation needs to be more organized and all the 
assumptions could be categorized in one classified section dedicated for 
that matter. 
 
3.3.3. Design Accident Loads and Concept Risk Assessment for the 
Statoil Bressay (Example 3) 
 
We will not go through the depth of this study case, but we will only limit 
our work to find some forms of assumptions in the report. Since the report 
lacks the standard assumption section. 
 
3.3.3.1Introduction to the facility [30] 
 
Risktec Solutions Limited has been requested by Worley Parsons Europe 
Ltd. to prepare a Design Accident Loads (DAL) analysis and Concept Risk 
Assessment (CRA) for the Concept Bressay Offshore Platform, operated by 
Statoil.The objective of the DAL and CRA is to determine the best possible 
estimate of risk for the various concepts under evaluation.[30] 
 
 
Facility Description 
 
Concept design configurations are currently underway for the planned 
Bressay platform, a fixed jacket Production Drilling and Quarters (PDQ) 
platform located in the UKCS sector of the North Sea, standing in 
approximately 100m water depth.[30] 
The Bressay platform briefly comprises a wellbay and manifold area, a 
central process tower, a process utilities area, a utilities and power 
generation area, a living quarters module, a drilling support module and 
drilling facilities as illustrated in Figure 3.9 below. 
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Figure3.9. Bressay Platform Layout [30] 
 
 
 
 
3.3.3.2 Assumptions mentioned in this report 
 
All assumptions provided in this report are considered indirectly mentioned 
assumptions since there has not been a separate section for assumptions and their 
importance analysis. We will point out some of them in this section. The 
assumptions are mainly established to serve as some inputs for the method used 
in the report. According to the report [30], PHAST requires a number of specific 
inputs and conditions to run models. The inputs have been explained below: 
 
 
Assumptions regarding Inventory 
 
The mass inventory used in the models is the mass that could be lost in an event of 
full bore release that lasts for 1 hour. To remain conservative, no isolation credit 
was taken in the analysis. Hence, models were generated without any inventory 
limitations to allow any potential release to reach its steady state conditions. This 
implies that release rate stays constant at the initial value. This approach 
generates worst-case consequence results from inventory considerations. [30] 
 
The sentences in italics introduce a discreet way of presenting an assumption. 
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Assumptions regarding Scenario Type and Location 
 
Releases from the pipework / equipment were modeled as leaks from four 
different hole sizes are as follows  
 3mm      Pin hole leak 
 13mm     Small leak 
 35mm    Medium leak 
 105mm   Large leak, including full bore ruptures[30] 
 
The categorization for leaks is mainly subjective and thus needs to be mentioned. 
In the above examples, some inputs that had to be assumed for the PHSAT 
program have been mentioned to some extent. There might be still some other 
assumptions that the analysis has missed due to this not well-organized way of 
presenting assumptions. 
 
Assumption regarding Parts Count 
 
A Part count method was used to calculate an estimate of the leak frequency 
associated with each identified node. The numbers of major equipment items (i.e. 
vessels, heat exchangers, pumps and compressors) in each node were initially 
counted based on the PFDs supplied by the project. 
However, because no P&IDs were available at the concept stage an estimate had to 
be made to predict reasonable numbers for the pipe fittings, valves, flanges and 
instrument connections associated with each major equipment item. [30] 
 
This is a very important assumption dealing directly with the leak frequency, 
which is a major contributor to PLL and FAR values, and the underlying 
assumption here, which is the method for counting, has been introduced in a 
discreet way. If the reviewer misses this part, due to the assumption not being 
listed, the method and results of part count would be greatly confusing and may 
be even misleading when it comes to risk reducing measures and other 
recommendations.  Since if the method for part count is not understood, the 
results of leak frequency calculations will be misleading 
 
 
3.3.3.3. Discussions on Assumptions 
The same conclusions on the previous example will apply for this case as well. 
Generally, it is very important how to address and present the assumption in a 
QRA since the report should be well comprehensible by all participants involved 
and not necessarily all of the reviewers are experts in risk analysis. And one way 
of making the report more organized and “user-friendly” is by stating all the 
relevant assumptions in a dedicated chapter as well as with their criticality and 
importance. Categorization will also be of great value since there might be some 
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examples of assumptions directly affecting the other one, as we have now seen 
some examples of them in the sections above. 
 
3.3.4. Kalundborg Refinery QRA by Scandpower (Example4) 
On behalf of Statoil, a Quantitative Risk Analysis (QRA) of the Kalundborg refinery 
is performed. The QRA presents the risk picture during normal operation. 
 
3.3.4.1 Introduction to Kalundborg Refinery Process and QRA 
methodology[31] 
The Statoil refinery at Kalundborg in Denmark refines crude oil and condensate 
(light oil) to petrol, jet fuel, diesel oil, propane, heating oil and fuel oil.  
Kalundborg refinery is located in the northwestern part of Sjælland in Denmark. 
The production capacity is 5.5 million ton oil products per year. [31] 
A picture of the refinery is shown in Figure 3.10 below. 
 
Figure 3.3: Picture of the Kalundborg refinery. The process area is in the lower left 
corner of the plant. The dock is in the upper part of the picture. The six 
tanks just visible in the far right of the picture belong to Foreningen Danske 
Olieberedskapslagre (FDO), but are operated by Kalundborg refinery[15] 
 
Generally, the refinery processes crude oil and condensate into gasoline, diesel oil, 
jet fuel, fuel oil, propane and butane.  
 
In the figure 3.11 below, a coarse schematic of the process material in Kalundborg 
refinery has been illustrated. 
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Figure 3.11. Process material and products in Kalundborg[31] 
 
 
Methodology applied for this Risk Analysis 
The main steps of this Quantitative Risk Analysis are shown in Figure 3.12 
and are briefly explained below. 
 
Figure 3.12. QRA methodology and steps in used for Kalundborg[31] 
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3.3.4.2 Examples of Assumptions in this report 
This QRA report is considered to be one of the new and recent ones and separate 
independent chapters of assumptions are listed. Assumptions are listed according 
to their area of effect and do not comply with the categorization criteria presented 
in Statoil Gl0282 guideline.[10] 
The assumptions listed in this report are mainly related to: 
 Process leak Analysis 
 Probabilistic fire and explosion model 
 Accidents in offsite area 
And other areas of the facility have not been listed under the assumption section. 
We should also consider that Kaundborg refinery is an onshore plant and hence 
the general areas of the facility are different from those related to offshore 
facilities. This actually has a direct effect on manning distribution and therefore on 
the total risk picture; to be more precise, PLL values greatly differ from those of 
offshore platforms and so will the FAR and AIR values.( Personnel Risk Indices in 
general) 
It is generally expected that in a refinery the process area dominates the other 
sections in terms of risk analysis and therefore process leaks are of great 
importance and a great deal of assumptions are usually associated in process 
leaks calculations as it is the case in this report. 
Based on this mentioned QRA report, the Process leaks assumptions are 
categorized into two different groups: 
 Process Leaks Frequency 
 Process leak Duration 
 
Assumptions in Leak Frequency Estimation 
 
Leak estimation for Kalundborg is based on generic frequency data, counting of 
potential leak sources and on Kalundborg specific process data. During the 
segmentation and calculation of leak frequencies, several assumptions have been 
made. The most important assumptions are listed below. [31][33] [34] 
 
The nature of the assumptions is based on previous experiences. Investigation of 
the validity or importance of the assumptions is not the topic of this chapter so the 
focus will be mainly on the presentation of assumptions. 
 
As we can see in the table 3.4 below about examples of assumptions, there are two 
columns in the table; one describing the assumption itself and the other one is 
labeled as “criticality of assumption with respect to risk analysis” which ism 
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basically the effect it has on the risk level of the report or the `importance` of the 
assumption that we will further discuss in chapter5. 
 
Table 3.7 Assumptions in leak frequency estimation for Kalundborg[33] 
 
 
 
As with the first two examples, the assumptions have been identified as 
conservative; that is usually a term that have been used a reasonable amount of 
times in risk analysis parts. The term basically means that because we are not 
aware of the u certain event, we would usually try to choose the worst case 
scenario not to mention that surprising events might still happen but with the 
worst case, it is usually meant the worst case known up to now. 
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 Assumptions in Leak Duration Estimation 
 
Leak duration has a great effect on the future consequences of a possible leak, the 
longer the leak lasts, the higher the probability of ignition, heavier explosion and 
escalation of fire will be. Therefore, assumptions related for this section could be 
considered quite “critical”. 
 
Table 3.8. Leak duration assumptions for Kalundborg [33] 
 
 
 
In the assumptions above for leak frequency and duration, the positive point is the 
assumptions are listed with respect to their area of effect but the shortages in the 
way of presenting them could be that they are not classified to which category of 
classification of assumption they belong. Other possible features that could 
possibly add to the value of assumption presentation might be: stating which 
other areas of the QRA report they have effects on/are affected with, the duration 
of their validity and the background source they are based upon. Some of these 
features are stated with only few examples only. 
 
 
 Indirect Assumptions in Kalundborg  
Except for the assumptions presented in the assumption section there are some 
other assumption mentioned in an implicit and not classified way in the middle of 
the rest of the work and due to necessity. We will mention an example below. The 
indirect assumptions are presented in italics. 
 
Equipment Counting 
According to the report [34], the counting of different types of equipment 
was performed as part of the Kalundborg risk analysis work since a 
counting of equipment is necessary to provide the correct input for leak 
frequency calculations. The following components were counted: 
 
- Flanges 
- Valves (all types, both manual and actuated) 
- Instruments 
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- Process vessels (drums, separators, scrubbers, columns) 
- Pumps 
- Compressors 
- Heat exchangers (shell & tube, plate and fin/fan coolers). 
 
For equipment present in two different sub segments, i.e. present in both a 
liquid and a gas sub segment (this would, for example, be the case for a 
separator); the count was divided by a factor of 2 to avoid the equipment 
being counted twice. 
The estimated leak frequencies for the process area of Kalundborg were 
based on average values for various “large” equipment types, rather than a 
detailed equipment count. 
It was regarded to be too time consuming to perform detailed counting for 
the entire Kalundborg refinery. Instead, detailed counting was performed for 
a selection of large equipment types. These results were then used as average 
values for similar large equipment types at Kalundborg. [33] [34] 
 
The table below presents the estimated average number of valves, flanges 
and instruments for various types of equipment. All similar equipment 
identified during counting was assumed to have the same amount of leak 
points as the average equipment presented in the table. 
 
 
Table 3.9 Average number of valves, flanges and instruments for various types of large 
process equipment established by counting of 5-6 items of each component for 
Kalundborg QRA [34] 
 
 
 
During the counting of leak points at Kalundborg refinery, there were 
identified several components that could not be classified as any of the 
equipment types below. This equipment was counted in detail, or was 
assumed to be equal to other similar equipment. Examples of such items are 
heaters and compressors. [34] 
 
 
In the text above the sentences in italics represent another way of 
addressing assumptions in the report. The above examples are in fact 
important enough to be listed in a separate section. Since it could be quite 
challenging for the reader to get ahold of this assumption in the middle of 
the report. 
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For the equipment count, as we have observed in previous examples of 
different QRAs, it plays an essential role in leak frequency estimation and 
yet so far in none of the QRA reports were separately listed and fully 
discussed. As will later see in chapter 5 for Valemon examples, it is 
eventually listed under analytical group of assumptions with references to 
process leaks. The underlying assumption of the count is being mentioned 
to be P&IDs of the process facility. 
 
 
3.3.4.3Discussion on assumptions presented in Kalundborg 
 
In the section above mostly the description of the assumption has been 
stated. The areas affected are not exactly mentioned and there are some 
probability distributions assigned which are based on background 
knowledge and therefore may not be reliable for all time and need to be 
noted. Throughout the report, ambiguous terms such as small, medium and 
large have been used with no reference to the source 
 
The assumptions in this QRA form the basis for the results of the analysis. 
Therefore, changes in the assumptions will have influence of the presented 
risk level. There were some positive and negative points to the way of 
presenting assumptions in Kalundborg. The main positive point is that 
some rather important and more observable assumptions related to 
process leak duration and frequencies were listed in a dedicated separate 
section. 
The disadvantages could be stated that the assumption sections were not 
rather extensive. In most cases it was limited to only a sole description of 
the assumption however; some sections have come up with a criticality 
column as well, stating how important the nature of the assumption might 
be with respect to the presented risk level. But uncertainties and sources of 
background knowledge have not been stated. Generally a more detailed 
discussion and explanation of the assumption is more valued. Mentioning 
the related areas of effect the assumption, which has been done to quite 
some extent here, is also appreciated in a way of making the effected parts 
more traceable in case the assumption is not valid so that an improvement  
 
3.3.5 General Comments about all the four examples: 
Finally, our observations of these examples have been that most of the 
assumptions are listed and mentioned implicitly and indirectly in case of 
being needed only and not any time before that. Meaning no earlier 
classifications had been done in advance. The assumptions presented so far 
have been rather scattered and disorganized or not fully developed with 
respect to sources of background knowledge and areas of effect as well as 
associated uncertainties. 
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This general shortcoming has encouraged us to go through the Valemon 
TRA, which its assumption section is to a great extent established according 
to the mentioned standards and an acceptable classification has been done. 
It is not perfect, though and the aim of the following chapters is to mentions 
the flaws as well as learning from the advantages. 
 
  3.3.6.Valemon TRA Examples 
 
As we have mentioned in the beginning of this chapter, we will not review 
the assumption examples of Valemon in this chapter and we have 
dedicated the next two chapters for introducing and discussing the 
examples of assumptions of Valemon. After reviewing the scattered and 
not organized examples of some assumptions mentioned discursively in 
the main report and out of necessity only, we reached to the conclusion 
that example 4 (Kalundborg) has provided the best examples of 
presenting assumptions so far. Yet, Valemon TRA has apparently been 
done in a lot better way (regarding assumptions) and the documentations 
of assumptions seem to be better and more effectively organized in this 
perspective. In addition Valemon report is more up-to-dated and hence is 
expected to out rule the other examples. 
Therefore, we have chosen 5 examples of assumptions from the 
assumption section of Valemon and will in chapter 5 review the impacts of 
assumption on the whole QRA and will comment on the way they have 
been presented as well as the basis of their formation and some 
recommendations for improvement will also be provided. We will on top 
of all these, define an importance factor to each assumption based on their 
impacts on other parts of the QRA. 
The selected examples are: 
Group 1.Organizational/Operational  
Group 2. Technical Assumptions  
Group3. Analytical Assumptions 
 
 
1. Annual number of supply vessel visits to Valemon  
 
2. Lifting activity to/from supply vessel  
 
3. Collision resistance of jack-up rig legs  
 
4. Equipment count: Equipment count has been made on P&IDs. Main 
units, instruments and valves found are considered good estimates 
 
5. Manning level and distribution  
 
From the 5 chosen examples numbers 1, 2 and 5 belong to group1. Example 
65 
 
 
number 3 belongs to group2 and example number 4 has been taken from 
group3.  
 
 
The next chapter (chapter 4) is dedicated to Valemon field and TRA 
introduction. All selected examples of assumptions for investigating in this 
work have been selected from Valemon TRA. This is mainly because the 
Valemon TRA is one of the recent reports and complies to an acceptable 
extent with the Statoil guideline GL0282 [10]with respect to assumption 
documentation. The assumption section in this report seems quite 
extensive and the most thorough one of all the other examples we have 
already been through in this thesis. In chapter 5, we will have a discussion 
about the five examples chosen (mentioned above) out of the 65 officially 
listed ones in the Valemon report with respect to the objectives of this 
work and the discussions presented in chapters 2 about assumptions and 
uncertainties in QRAs. 
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Chapter 4 
4. Introduction to Valemon field and TRA methodology 
 In this section Valemon field and facilities will be introduced. Since this chapter is 
mainly explanatory, most of the text has been extracted from the main Valemon 
TRA report, reference number [17]. Only minor discussions have been made and 
distinguished. 
 
4.1 The Valemon field and installation (system Description)[17] 
 The development concept for Valemon will be a platform solution with process 
facilities with condensate export to Kvitebjørn and a rich gas export to Huldra-
Heimdal pipeline (a tie-in on Huldra to the existing pipeline to Heimdal). The 
Valemon field development can be seen in Figure 4.1. The plan is to start drilling 
wells in 2012 with production planned to start in 2014 
 
Figure 4.1 The Valemon field development, [17] 
 An overview of the Valemon topside layout is shown in Figure 4.2. The 
dimensions of the platform are 79 m x 26 m, excluding the LQ and including 
the cantilever on east side cellar deck. The height of the main deck is 15.5 m 
from cellar deck level. Platform west is the LQ side and east is the process & 
flare stack side. The jack-up rig West Elara shall be used for drilling 
operation on Valemon, using a cantilevered drilling rig above well 
intervention deck as seen in Figure 4.2. 
The platform will be designed with a Living Quarter for 401 persons, a 
wellhead area for 20 slots, a process area with process equipment and 
space and weight allowance for installation of a compression module and 
future tie-ins. [17] 
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Figure 4.2: Valemon topside with jack-up rig [17] 
4.1.1 Main areas and fire divisions on Valemon[16] 
The term ”main area” is used in Statoil’s risk acceptance criteria, with 
reference to NORSOK Z-013. Based on this, the following main areas for 
Valemon must as a minimum be defined: 
 
 
 
sers 
 
Figure 4.3 shows a sketch of the main areas defined for Valemon. 
 
Figure 4.3 Main areas on Valemon. (H-fire rated decks/walls are marked red. Note that the 
utility roof is also H-rated north and south of the workshop area. P1 and P2 are part of same 
main area). [17] 
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There is a plated deck between the process cellar (P1) and process 
mezzanine (P2) levels, however, P1 and P2 is considered part of the same 
main area. 
There will be a fire (and blast) division between the future process module 
and the process module below. There will also be a fire and blast division 
between the well intervention deck and the wellhead area below. Based on 
NORSOK[11], the future upper process area and the well intervention deck 
can be considered separate main areas. These areas have different 
functionality and risk level. 
Hence, for this TRA, it is chosen to consider each of the areas divided by fire 
rated decks as main areas. 
 LQ  
 Utility area (including workshop) (Q1/Q2/Q3)  
 Wellhead area (W1/W2)  
 Well intervention deck (W3)  
 Process area (P1/P2)  
 Future process area (P31)  
 
The future pig launcher area P11 located south of P1/P2 is considered part 
of the process area. (P1/P2). 
 
 
4.2 Valemon TRA methodology and Steps[17] 
 
A detailed quantitative risk analysis of Valemon has been performed in line 
with applicable regulatory requirements and Statoil requirements. A brief 
description of the applied risk analysis methodology is given in this section. 
The main elements of the methodology are as illustrated in figure 4.3. 
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  Figure 4.3. The Risk analysis Process for Valemon[17] 
 
 
 
The risk quantification is shown as a two-step process. The first step is an analysis 
of the frequency of initiating events, and the effectiveness of the barriers 
implemented to prevent that failures and situations of hazard and accident will 
occur. In the second step analysis of the effectiveness of the barriers implemented 
to prevent accident escalation and to minimize the accident consequences is 
performed. 
Identification and evaluation of possible risk reduction measures is performed 
until the risk acceptance criteria and HSE goals are met, and further risk reduction 
based on an ALARP evaluation is not practicable. 
Risk reduction measures may represent fundamental changes to the system, or 
may be limited to improved performance of safety critical design measures such 
as increased design accidental loads or a higher safety integrity level. Improved 
performance may refer to increased capacity, reliability, availability, efficiency, 
and ability to withstand loads, integrity or robustness. In this way, the risk 
analysis serves as basis for establishment of the performance standards for safety 
barriers and emergency preparedness. 
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4.3. Framework for Valemon (Regulatory basis)[17][11] 
 
The petroleum activity in Norway is based on the NPD Regulations of August 31st 
2001 “Regulations relating to Health, Environment and Safety in the petroleum 
activities” (the Framework Regulations). “Regulations relating to design and 
outfitting of facilities etc. in the petroleum activities” (The Facilities Regulations) 
was issued by the Norwegian Petroleum Directorate September 3rd 2001 and last 
amended in 2007.  
Several standards are referred in the NPD regulations, in particular NORSOK 
standards. Consequently, these are included as part of the regulatory basis. The 
NORSOK standards are developed by the Norwegian petroleum industry and are 
prepared and published with support of The Norwegian Oil Industry Association 
(OLF) and Federation of Norwegian Manufacturing Industries (TBL). The NORSOK 
standards are managed and issued by Standard Norge.[17] 
 
It is also worth mentioning that all the TRA steps should be defined and 
implemented within a total framework which is basically defined by generally 
applied sets of standards such as standards set by PSA, OLF, HSE, NORSOK 
standards and also the expectation of an operator company the QRA is being 
presented to such as Statoil in this case which has prepared some guidelines on 
how different parts of a risk analysis should be presented. As an example of which 
we could refer to GL0282, guideline for risk and emergency preparedness 
analysis, mentioned in this report for assumptions and presuppositions section. 
 
Figure 4.3 above could therefore be represented as the in the figure4.4. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Figure 4.4. Framework versus TRA methodology stages 
 
 
 
The framework therefore influences all parts of the analysis and usually sets the 
basis in risk evaluation for RAC. As underlying criteria all parts of the risk analysis 
have to comply with the set standards starting with the systems description to the 
risk evaluation step including any operations carried out on the facility. The same 
rule applies for our main topic of this work, assumptions. That is all the defined 
assumptions should not in any case be in conflict with the predefined framework 
of the analysis. 
 
Framework  
 
 Valemon TRA methodology 
(Figure 4.3) 
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4.4 Hazard identification for Valemon[17] 
The methodology used for hazard identification is in accordance with ISO 17776. 
This standard outlines a method for a systematic review of the design with the 
object of identifying all possible hazards associated with the systems and 
functional rooms. Those hazards considered to have the potential of developing 
into hazardous events are the starting point for quantification of personnel risk as 
reported here. Hazards considered having minor consequences and/or negligible 
frequencies of occurrence were identified and registered with hazard numbers 
but not evaluated further in the risk analysis. [17][18]  
 
Identified hazardous events  
The list of identified hazardous events that represent major accident risk or 
significant risk to personnel on Valemon is as follows: [17] [19] 
 
 Dispersion of unignited gas (the toxic effect of hydrocarbon gas)  
 Fires from HC releases (heat and smoke exposure)  
 Gas explosions  
 Blowout and well releases:  
 Topside blowout  
 Subsea blowout  
 Riser and pipeline leaks  
 Fire in utility areas  
 Collision risk  
 Supply vessel traffic to Valemon and Jack-up rig  
 Passing vessels- and fishing vessels traffic to the field  
 Dropped objects and swinging loads  
 Dropped objects due to material handling with main crane  
 Dropped objects from the Jack-up rig  
 Helicopter accidents  
 Extreme weather  
 Structural failure  
 Earthquake  
 Subsidence  
 Sudden drop/Punch through of jack-up rig  
 Jack-up capsize  
  Occupational accidents (personnel risk)  
  Fire in living quarter [16] 
 
We will later in chapter 5, investigate the relation of selected assumptions on 
these identified hazards. It is also worth mentioning that new hazards might be 
introduced during further development phases and one should not limit focus 
only to these hazards. 
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4.5.Risk Acceptance Criteria for Valemon [17] 
 
The purpose of the analysis is to present the risk level for Valemon and whether it 
is within acceptable limits or not. Acceptable here means that the Valemon risk 
acceptance criteria and regulatory requirements are met. 
 
Risk acceptance criteria (RAC) as given in framework are being described in this 
part in addition to how it applies to the Valemon installation. 
Beyond meeting the risk acceptance criteria, the risk shall be reduced to a level as 
low as reasonably practicable (the ALARP principle). Risk reducing measures are 
then required for this purpose. Statoil’s RAC are related to personnel risk and 
impairment of main safety functions. 
Personnel risk[17][11] 
The Valemon project’s risk acceptance criteria with respect to personnel risk are 
as follows: 
Individual Personnel Risk (Manned Phase): 
The mean individual risk, expressed by the fatal accident rate (FAR) – must meet 
the criteria FAR < 10. 
Group Individual Risk (Manned Phase): 
For specially exposed groups (Operation, Mechanic, Electric / automation and 
Maintenance Contractor, or as defined in TRA / EPA), the mean group individual 
risk, expressed by the fatal accident rate (FAR) – must meet the criteria FAR < 25. 
The criterion applies for groups existing of personnel that together constitute of 
minimum 3 positions in ordinary, regular service on Statoil installations. 
Personnel Risk (Normally Not Manned Phase): 
For installations that are normally not manned, the PLL per year shall be below 
4.0E-03, if annual manhours on the installation are less than 15000. If annual 
manhours exceed this, the FAR criteria shall apply. 
Personnel risk is expressed as FAR – Fatal Accident Rate –number of fatalities per 
100 million exposed hours. FAR is used as a measure for average risk, either for all 
personnel on a facility or for defined groups. 
FAR= PLL*1E8/ N 
where 
PLL expected number of lives lost per year 
n = number of people in the group 
h = hours of exposure per person/position per year. 
N = n * h = total number of hours of risk exposure per year 
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The criteria shall apply as a mean for any 12 month period. The FAR is a measure 
of the average risk for a group of individuals while they are offshore. The time off 
duty in the LQ and helicopter transport risk is therefore included. 
 
Impairment of main safety functions [17] 
 
This chapter describes how impairment of main safety functions is interpreted.  
The main safety functions are described in the PSA Facilities Regulations section 
7.[17] 
The Facilities Regulations states: 
Accidental loads and natural loads with an annual probability greater than or 
equal to 1x10-4 shall not result in loss of a main safety function. The requirement 
to loads applies to each individual type of load and not for the sum of these, as per 
guidelines to the Facilities Regulations, section 11. 
 
Statoil’s Design Basis, refers to NORSOK Z-013, edition 3 for definition of main 
safety functions. Further, it states: 
The probability of loss of defined main safety functions shall be estimated per year, 
per safety function and per accident category, as given in Norsok Z-013, edition 3, 
annex B. Accidental events within each of these categories having combined 
probability ≥ 10-4 per year shall be considered dimensioning. 
 
 
4.5.1 Interpretation for Valemon 
This section presents how the RAC applies to the Valemon installation. 
 Personnel risk[17] 
The Valemon platform shall be normally not manned. It is however required to be 
manned during drilling, well interventions, pigging activities and maintenance. 
Hence, both FAR and PLL criteria may be relevant depending on the operational 
phase. 
The relevant groups for calculation of Group Individual Risk for Valemon are 
assumed: 
 
 
 
tion 
 
 
Calculation of FAR for Valemon is based on exposure when manned, thus N (total 
number of hours of risk exposure per year) is the number of manned hours per 
year. The criteria shall apply as a mean for each 12-month period. Hence, in this 
calculation, the PLL value is based on the same number of manned hours per year 
as for FAR calculation. 
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 Assessment of loss of main safety functions for Valemon 
Valemon’s risk acceptance criteria refer to NORSOK Z-013, on how to estimate loss 
of main safety functions. With respect to fire and explosion accidents, it requires 
that for each of these accidental loads,  
 
a) The frequency for escalation from one main area to another main area shall be 
less than 10-4 per year. The requirement applies to each side of each division 
between two main areas.  
b) The frequency for impairment of main load bearing structures shall be less than 
10-4 per year. This is the sum for each type of accident for the complete 
installation, and not for each main area or structure.  
c) The frequency for impairment of each room of significance for combating 
accidental events shall be less than 10-4 per year. This is the sum for each type of 
accident for each room.  
d) The frequency for impairment of each safe area shall be less than 10-4 per year. 
This is the sum for each type of accident for the LQ and muster areas with 
lifeboats. [17] 
 
 
4.6.Risk Picture of Valemon[17] 
 
The total risk is presented on a format intended to facilitate comparison against 
the Statoil risk acceptance criteria. The base case activity level 5 (typical year 
2024) has been presented which is the year expected to have the highest total risk 
level. Personnel risk in terms of FAR is presented area wise. In order to be able to 
interpret the results of analysis presented in this section of risk picture, one 
should be aware of the 6 predefined activity levels considered for Valemon. The 
activity levels serve as an underlying assumption for all risk calculations in this 
TRA report. 
 
4.6.1. Activity Levels for Valemon 
 
The Valemon platform shall be normally not manned. It is however required to be 
manned during drilling, well interventions, pigging activities and maintenance. 
Hence a total of 6 combinations of different activities are foreseen as defined 
below: 
 
1. Simultaneous drilling and production (including jack-up drilling rig)  
2. Normal production (stand-alone, no well intervention)  
3. Simultaneous production and well intervention (stand-alone)  
4. Simultaneous drilling, production and wireline well intervention (including 
jack-up drilling rig)  
5. Stand-alone production including all known future modifications  
6. Stand-alone production and normally not manned installation  
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The total risk picture is presented for the activity level with the expected 
highest total risk; Simultaneous production and well intervention, stand-
alone (activity level 5, year 2024). This has been based on an evaluation of 
number of wells in production, number of drilling and well intervention 
operations, change in flowing wellhead pressure and inlet separator 
pressure during lifetime number of tie-in wells and introduction of future 
compression module.  
Further, the personnel risk, Potential Loss of Life (PLL), is presented for the 
normally not manned (NNM), normal production stand-alone phase 
(activity level 6). 
 
4.6.2 Personnel risk[17] 
The total PLL and FAR values per area for activity level 5 and 6 are presented in 
Table 4.1 and Table 4.2. 
Table 4.1Total PLL and FAR, activity level 5[17] 
 
As seen the FAR value is well within the risk acceptance criteria of FAR < 10 for 
activity level 5. 
Table 4.2 Total PLL and FAR, activity level 6 [17] 
 
 
As seen the PLL value is well within the risk acceptance criteria of PLL < 0.004 for 
activity level 5. 
The distribution of FAR between accident categories is shown in Figure 4.5. 
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Figure 4.5. Distribution of FAR between accident categories [16] 
 
It is seen that the vessel collision risk is high, since all personnel is assumed killed 
upon total loss of main structure. This is based on an impairment of main load 
bearing structure which is above the acceptance criteria. The figures for natural 
loads (earthquake and extreme weather) may be somewhat conservative, since no 
safety margins to the design criteria have been assumed. 
This figure in presenting FAR values per accident category is considered very 
important and serves as a reference point for evaluating the different assumption 
examples on the total risk picture. This has been done in chapter 5. 
 
4.6.3 Impairment of main safety functions 
The relevant result of this part of the Valemon risk picture for the assumptions to 
be discussed in the next chapter is the main load bearing structure. 
Impairment frequencies for main load bearing structure for activity level 1 (year 
2019) are shown in table 4.3 below. Based on the RAC defined for Valemon, 
regardless of the accident load, the 1E-4 applies for all categories.[17] 
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Table 4.3 Impairment frequencies for main load bearing structure [17] 
 
 
As it can be seen, the criteria are met for fire loads, environmental loads, and 
structural failures and jack-up capsize. 
The criterion for main load bearing structure due to impact load is not met. This is 
due to vessel collision on the jack-up rig, and is based on the assumption that the 
jack-up legs only withstand a 14 MJ vessel collision impact. In appendix C, it is 
shown that in order to be within the criterion, the jack-up needs to withstand a 45 
MJ bow impact. [17] 
 
The risk acceptance criteria for impairment of main load bearing structures due to 
impact load will be met for stand-alone phases (activity level 2, 3 and 6). This is 
going to be further discussed in examples of chapter 5. 
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4.6.4. Summary of overall risk results for Valemon [18][17] 
Personnel risk 
The total FAR for Valemon in activity level 5 is 6.73. This is the activity level 
with the expected highest personnel risk. The total FAR for Valemon is well 
within the risk acceptance criteria of FAR <10 for personnel risk. 
The personnel risk, expressed as PLL, for Valemon in activity level 6 (NNM) is 
8.4 ·10-4 per year. The PLL value for Valemon is well within the risk 
acceptance criteria of PLL < 0.004 for personnel risk in NNM phases. 
Impairment of Main Safety Functions  
The dimensioning year related to the impairment of main load bearing 
structure, prevention of escalation, rooms of significance to combat accidents 
and safe area is chosen to be 2019, which represents activity level 1. The 
dimensioning activity level for impairment of escape ways has been activity 
level 5 (year 2024). [17] 
We will only point out the topics under the impairment of safety functions in 
here. 
 Prevention of escalation  
 Main load bearing structure  
 Rooms of significance to combat accidents  
 Safe area  
 Escape ways  
 
The relevant parts of safety functions for each assumption example will be 
discussed in the next chapter in the discussions related to each assumption. 
 
4.7. Uncertainties in Valemon TRA [17] 
 
There is always a degree of uncertainty in the results from a risk analysis. 
Some of the uncertainties are related to the consequence models and 
statistical models used for calculating accidental loads, impacts and 
frequencies. Uncertainties will also be associated with design and operational 
assumptions, which are input for the study. Uncertainties related to generic 
accident data are also obvious when applying to a specific platform with its 
equipment. Some Uncertainty factors on this work have been mentioned 
below: [17]  
A number of results in this TRA are associated with quite some uncertainties. 
The main uncertainties are listed in the following.  
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 The input on manning level and distribution on areas is highly uncertain. 
The manning study by Statoil has not been finalized. The manning 
distribution on platform areas is based on the FEED study. The 
assumptions made for manning is important for calculating personnel risk: 
among other total FAR, Group risk and PLL (the latter for normally not 
manned phase). The assumed manning level and distribution is found in 
appendix K, operational assumption number 1.2.  
 
 Activity levels during lifetime: Production from the Valemon field is 
associated with a significant uncertainty. Therefore, there is uncertainties 
connected with production profile (and number of producing wells), 
required well intervention activities, required manning etc. Hence, as 
many as 6 possible activity levels have been defined for the period 2014 to 
2027, considering drilling, well intervention, production profiles, number 
of tied-in wells and future installations. The combination of such activities 
within each activity level is decisive for which activity level will be 
dimensioning for the installation, when considering the risk acceptance 
criteria. This is important for among other the design explosion loads.  
 
 Operational input on lifting activities in the different activity levels is 
uncertain. A number of operational assumptions have been made, like 
lifting routes, lifting heights, weights and number of lifts. Note also that it 
is uncertain whether the main deck above process area (or roof of the 
future area after this has been installed) needs to be used for storage. In 
particular, this is important for the structural design of the main deck (and 
possibly the assumed weight of the future module). It is also important for 
the conclusions on dropped object impact on subsea pipelines  
 
 The jack-up legs have been checked to withstand a vessel impact of 14 
MJ, which is an uncertain assumption. In order to meet the risk acceptance 
criterion for impairment of main load bearing structure due to vessel 
collision impact, with the current premises/assumptions for the 
calculations, the design load for the jack-up would need to be set to 45 MJ.  
 
 Further, there are uncertainties in the underlying assumptions for vessel 
impact loads. Such uncertainties may be operational assumptions, like the 
number of supply vessel visits per year, or whether any other risk 
reducing measures to prevent collision with the jack-up or the jacket can 
be used.  
 
 
These uncertainties are directly related to assumptions examples we are going to 
discuss in the next chapter. Therefore we will explain about them more in chapter 
5. 
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4.8. Assumptions presented in Valemon 
In line with the requirements on assumptions mentioned in chapters 2 and 3, the 
applied assumptions for Valemon QRA have been listed in one separate appendix. 
[18] 
A total number of 65 assumptions presented in 3 categories have been addressed. 
This section is normally supposed to include all assumptions and suppositions 
used in the report. However, as we will see in chapter 5, there are still some 
assumptions that are not listed in this chapter. 
 
The 3 categories of assumption consist of: 
1.Organizational/Operational 
2.Technical assumptions 
3.Analytical assumptions 
 
The list of all assumptions presented in Valemon report is shown in table 4.4. 
Table 4.4 Assumptions for Valemon TRA report[18] 
1 Organizational/operational assumptions ................................................................... 6  
1.1 Operational phases/activity levels .......................................................................... 6  
1.2 Manning level and distribution .............................................................................. 8  
1.3 Hot work .............................................................................................................. 16  
1.4 Number of wells being drilled and completed per year ........................................ 16  
1.5 Number of producing wells per year .................................................................... 16  
1.6 Number of coiled tubing and wireline operations per year .................................. 17  
1.7 Categorisation of well clean-up operations .......................................................... 17  
1.8 Overbalanced wells during drilling ...................................................................... 18  
1.9 Drilling prior to setting BOP ................................................................................ 18  
1.10 Annual number of supply vessel visits to Valemon ........................................... 18  
1.11 Annual number of supply vessel visits to jack-up rig ......................................... 19  
1.12 Presence time of supply vessel ........................................................................... 19  
1.13 Supply vessel arrival speed ................................................................................ 20  
1.14 Supply vessel displacement ................................................................................ 20  
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4.9 Final Comments on Valemon Description and TRA Methodology 
 
This chapter was an introduction to Valemon field and facility, the TRA method 
applied together with its final result of the risk analysis. Yet, there is a great deal 
of uncertainty involved in this report and some assumptions have been made and 
used. The assumptions made are based on background knowledge (experience) 
and there is always uncertainty hidden in application and interpretation of this 
background knowledge. This uncertain aspect of assumptions is quite challenging 
in the sense that invalidity or alteration of an assumption could lead to 
considerably different risk results. 
All the assumptions in a QRA should be listed, considered and approved so that all 
involved participants could deal with the challenges of the risk level being 
influenced in case of assumptions not being valid. 
In the next chapter, some examples of assumptions introduced in the table above 
will be discussed in order to help understand the importance of them in the QRA. 
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Chapter 5 
5. Evaluation of Examples of Assumptions in Valemon 
Report 
In this chapter we have selected 5 examples from the list of examples of 
assumptions in Valemon TRA and we will discuss the description, basis and 
different impacts of these assumptions. 
5.1 List of Selected Examples of Assumptions in Valemon Field 
 
Group 1.Organizational/Operational  
Group 2. Technical Assumptions  
Group3. Analytical Assumptions 
 
 
 
1. Annual number of supply vessel visits to Valemon  
 
2. Lifting activity to/from supply vessel  
 
3. Collision resistance of jack-up rig legs  
 
4. Equipment count: Equipment count has been made on P&IDs. Main 
units, instruments and valves found are considered good estimates 
 
5. Manning level and distribution  
 
From the 5 chosen examples numbers 1, 2 and 5 belong to group1. Example 
number 3 belongs to group2 and example number 4 has been taken from group3.  
5.1.1 Reasons for selection of the examples 
In selecting of the examples, the focus has been to include all three categories of 
assumptions. Another important factor in assumption selection has been the 
relation and impact the selected assumptions have upon one another. As we will 
see, some of the mentioned assumptions could be serving as an underlying 
assumption to others. 
And finally we will discuss manning level assumption separately because of its 
different nature with respect to personnel risk. Another reason for setting this 
assumption aside so that it would be the last one has been that to be able to 
identify its impact on the other four examples more easily. This assumption will at 
the end of this chapter provides a situation for comparison between the manning 
level distributions in Kalundborg QRA as well. 
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5.2.The approach towards assessment of the assumption examples 
According to the main title of this work which is importance analysis of 
assumptions, with this approach we would like to answer the following list of 
questions with respect to assumptions in our discussions: 
 
 How important is the assumption? 
 What are the effects of the assumption on the risk level? (Which areas are 
affected?) 
 Why the assumption is being made in such a way (reasoning and 
background knowledge) 
 Could it be made any other (better) way? And why? (Recommendations) 
 What changes may occur as a result of the assumption being 
changed/misinterpreted/ignored/not valid?  
 
The approach towards evaluating assumptions is that first assumptions shall be 
discussed in two different ways defined as follows and the proposed questions 
shall be answered in the following categories: 
 
I. General Aspect  
From this viewpoint, we look at the definition and explanation of the assumption 
in itself and the background the assumption has been based upon. The general 
impacts of the assumption are briefly addressed. 
 
II. Integrated and interrelated aspect: 
In this part we will evaluate the assumptions in an integrated level that is in 
comparison with other parts of the QRA and particularly the consequences and 
risk picture parts of the analysis. 
The different steps of Valemon TRA has been introduced in chapter 4, section 4.3 
as we could recall. We will discuss this part by explaining the impact of the 
assumption on each part.  
The challenge might be that sometimes the parts of are so correlated that it is not 
simply possible to distinguish where exactly the assumption takes effect. The main 
point of breaking down the QRA to its components is to be able to realize the area 
of effect for the assumption so that we could trace the impacts of assumption in 
the analysis in case the assumption changes or will be invalid.   
 
We then discuss how the variation, modification and misinterpretation of some 
assumptions could change the different aspects of risk level. We would comment 
on how the assumption affects and interacts with other parts of the assessment 
such as HAZID, cause analysis, consequences, risk picture and etc. In other words, 
which other parts of the analysis are influenced by the assumption and 
particularly what are the direct and immediate impacts of the assumption not 
being valid? This is mainly done to define a qualitative degree of uncertainty and 
sensitivity for the assumption. 
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The main steps outlined for Valemon QRA that the assumptions can be discussed 
upon are listed below: 
 
1. Framework 
2. System definition 
3. Hazard identification 
4. Cause analysis  
5. Frequency and consequences analysis  
6. Risk Presentation (Total Risk Picture)  
7. Risk Evaluation with respect to Risk acceptance Criteria/ ALARP Principle 
8. Uncertainties and Sensitivity analysis 
 
 
5.2.1Dimensions of Risk 
When evaluating the effects of assumption on some selected sections of the QRA, 
we shall always refer to risk in terms of: 
1. Risk to Personnel 
2. Risk to environment (presented as frequency and quantities of oil spills) 
3. Risk to Asset (presented as frequency of accidents) 
  
The following could also be included: 
 
4. Frequency of impairment of main safety functions  
5. Escalation potential towards Valemon from incidents on jack-up drilling rig also 
to be addressed; e.g. falling loads, ship collision giving collapse of jack-up rig, 
structure faults and earthquake. [16] 
 
5.2.2. Ranking of assumptions according to uncertainty and sensitivity 
 
In section 3.2(components of risk description QRA) we have introduced for this 
work, Probability, Consequence, Uncertainty, Background knowledge and 
Sensitivity as main components of risk in a QRA. We are therefore intending to 
evaluate our selected assumptions (uncertainty factors) in light of these 
components. 
In chapter 2, we had a through discussion for probabilities and consequences and 
we reasoned why we always have to look beyond the expected values and 
probabilities describing risk. 
We introduced the concept of background knowledge when some epistemic 
(knowledge)-based probabilities are assigned to some events which analysts have 
lack of knowledge about. 
In this chapter, while evaluating assumptions we would like to focus on 
uncertainty and sensitivity corresponding to each assumption. The intention is to 
provide some results about scoring uncertainty and sensitivity along with the risk 
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picture to basically look beyond the mere probability values and also provide an 
additional basis for decision support for managerial review. Therefore, in 
evaluating the assumptions which count as uncertainty factors, we will eventually 
rank the importance of assumptions according to their corresponding uncertainty 
and sensitivity based on our own background knowledge and supporting 
arguments and discussions that we shall provide after introducing assumptions. 
 
In line with Flage and Aven [6], the uncertainty analyses cover the following main 
tasks:[7] 
 Identification of uncertainty factors. (here assumptions) 
 Assessment and categorization of the uncertainty factors with  respect to 
degree of uncertainty.  
 Assessment and categorization of the uncertainty factors with  respect to 
degree of sensitivity.  
 Summarization of the uncertainty factors’ importance.  
 
The approach we will use for importance analysis of assumptions is based on 
uncertainty and sensitivity analysis and according to Aven [s1] is called a semi 
quantitative approach: 
 
To reflect uncertainty factors such as assumptions we suggest a semi-quantitative 
method adjusted to include consideration of both risk and vulnerability. By 
vulnerability we understand the two dimensional combination of consequences and 
associated uncertainties. The effect on risk and vulnerability depends on two 
dimensions:  
 Degree of uncertainty.  
 Sensitivity of the relevant risk and/or vulnerability indices to changes in the 
uncertain quantities.   
 
For example, a high degree of uncertainty combined with high sensitivity could lead 
to the conclusion that the uncertainty factor has a significant effect on risk. However, 
if the degree of uncertainty is high but the risk and/or vulnerability indices are 
relatively insensitive to changes in the uncertain quantities, then the effect on risk 
could be minor or moderate. The category classifications (low, medium, high) will be 
case-specific and subject to judgment by the analyst, but the following descriptions 
provided in table 5.1 could serve as a guideline [6]  
 
Eventually, after discussing all the features above for each assumption, we will 
present a table with the assumption description and its corresponding uncertainty 
and sensitivity. In this table each assumption and its underlying assumptions are 
given a score according to the discussions about them. The scores and their 
descriptions are adopted from tables 5.1 and 5.2 below [6][7][8] 
We will focus on uncertainty, sensitivity and the importance factor of the 
assumption. 
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The scores are chosen from three subjective categories of Low, Medium and High. 
As mentioned above other classification is also possible but for this work we have 
chosen to consider these three categories based on Aven[6]. They are mainly 
based on the author`s opinion and our background knowledge and the discussions 
we have provided for the example. 
 
   Table 5.1 . Degree of uncertainty rankind checklist [6] 
 
 
    Table 5.2 Degree of sensitivity ranking checklist[6] 
 
 
The uncertainty- and sensitivity factors’ grading (low, medium or high) are scores 
of how significant the particular components are in relation to the entire system. A 
summarization of these factors’ importance is performed. The importance is the 
average of the score from the uncertainty and sensitivity. [9] 
 
The suggested approach introduced above is how we will rank the assumptions 
upon with respect to their degree of uncertainty and sensitivity. According to 
Aven [8] combining the uncertainty score with the results of the sensitivity 
analysis, the importance score is obtained. When the scores for the two 
dimensions are say H and M we just indicate the average importance score as H–
M. It is different than M–H. The point is not to make a precise ranking of all factors 
but to identify the factors that are most critical for the result of the quantitative 
analysis.[8] 
And finally that is how we answer the question of “how important” an assumption 
could be considered. But for reaching to this point i.e. assigning scores to 
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uncertainties and sensitivities, we need to evaluate the assumption establishment 
based on proposed sources, impacts and our own background knowledge. 
 
5.3. Supply vessel visits (Example1) 
In this section, we will evaluate the assumption related to the number of supply 
vessel visits from the different aspects we mentioned in 5.2. 
 
Table 5.3 Annual Number of Supply Vessel Visits to Valemon [18] 
 
 
 
Table 5.4 Annual number of supply vessel visits to jack-up rig[18] 
 
 
Both tables can be represented as in one with respect to different activity levels. 
The results are shown in table 5.5 below: 
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Table 5.5. Assumed number of vessels with respect to activity levels  
 
 
 
 
 
5.3.1 General Aspect of the assumption 
About the tables 
From the table above we can see that the number of vessels to Valemon in manned 
levels (52 visits) of activities (1-5) is more than twice the number of visits in 
unmanned level 6(24 visits). The numbers are given per year period and as in 
manned levels the basic assumption has been that one vessel trip is being carried 
out weekly during the whole 52 weeks in a year resulting in the assumed number 
of 52 visits per year.  In activity level 6 a twice per month visit has been 
considered.  The numbers are based on historical data and similar experiences 
giving a coarse amount of the required supplies and the information source is 
stated to be Statoil database. This statement seems vague, as it might not be clear 
which exact source at Statoil is meant. According to the size of the platform and 
other descriptions mentioned in the system description section, the values seem 
reasonable. But the values are not necessarily true. For example a once a week 
visit to Valemon during activity levels 1-5 might change in later phases of 
production. In addition, in our opinion, it would have been better to distinguish 
between activity levels 1,4, 5 and 2,3 due to a jack up rig being present in activity 
levels 1, 4 and 5. However, one might claim that this effect has been added by a 
total number of 120 visits to the rig annually but still the two topsides are 
integrated and the suggestion, as a more conservative assumption, is to consider 
higher values vessel visits during activity levels 1, 4 and 5.  
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On the other hand, one should pay close attention to the difference of values in 
normally manned and unmanned phases of the platform. Compared to activity 
level 6 (unmanned phase), there are more activities that are required during 
simultaneous production, drilling, well intervention, etc. (activities level 1-5) such 
as numerous lifting and transportation due to there are personnel being present 
on the platform and different activities being carried out.  
The number of supply visits to jack-up drilling on the other hand has been 
assumed to be annually 120 visits, based on another assumption that an average 
of 2-3 visits per week are required for drilling and workover operations. The 
assumed numbers would be in a range of 104 to 156 and here an average of 120 
has been considered. Once again, the numbers are only assumptions based on 
some background knowledge and uncertainties are always present in 
interpretation of the results of past experiences. 
About the general consequences 
Having reviewed what the assumption it in itself and what grounds for such 
assumed numbers, it is time to answer how important he assumption is by 
considering what the possible consequences might be if the mentioned numbers 
of supply visits deviate from the presented and estimated numbers above. 
It seems that the decrease in the numbers of visits in reality would have no or at 
least fewer unwanted consequences rather than a dramatic increase in number of 
supply vessels. The increased number of vessel visits could cause a lot of 
consequences the first of which would be the possibility of collision risk both 
between the vessel-platform and vessel-vessel collision in the vicinity of the 
platform. It is worth mentioning that there are different types of vessels such as 
passing, fishing, supply, as well as different types of collisions such as vessel-
vessel and vessel-platform., vessel-rig, etc. The main focus for this example would 
be supply vessel-Valemon and supply vessel- jack up collision risk. 
In case of a collision to the Valemon jacket, another potential consequence could 
be the extra load that will be imposed upon the Valemon jacket due to impact 
energy of the probable collision between the vessel and the platform. The same 
explanation applies for jack up rigs while being present. This would be related to 
impact loads caused by either ship collisions or dropped objects that are 
considered one of the contributors in defining the design accidental loads and 
would be discussed further in the examples 2(Lifting operations)  and 3 (Design 
load for Jack up rigs) 
Another issue to be considered in case of increased number of supply visits is the 
increased probability of dropped objects since more lifting activities are then in 
action due to increased number of supply visits. Increased lifting activities 
increase the risk for dropped objects, which are considered one of the impact 
loads and have several other consequences, which we shall discuss in the next 
section (example 2) 
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In addition, supply vessels serve as ignition sources due to the fuel and engine 
system they sail upon. So if there would be any leakages in the vicinity of the 
platform, with these vessels being on site, the probabilities of potential fires 
and/or explosions are enhanced. 
 
5.3.2 Interrelated Aspect of Assumption 
The impact (relation) of this assumption with respect to other parts of the total 
risk picture/level and with other parts of the TRA itself has been discussed in the 
following sections. 
 
5.3.2.1.Framework 
 
This framework is general and applies to all parts of the assessment as discussed 
earlier. The main concern is that it is necessary the assumptions made be in line 
with the framework i.e. they should not contradict any of the applied standards 
and regulations. 
  
With respect to framework for this example one could claim that the assumed 
numbers of visiting vessels are acceptable and not conflicting any regulations. It is 
known that supply vessel visits are necessary for different purposes during the life 
of the platform and the assumed numbers are then based on past experienced 
numbers of visits to platforms with more or less similar conditions. 
 
5.3.2.2HAZID 
We have introduced the HAZID phase and its different methodologies as part of a 
QRA in chapter3. Now we would like to mention how/if this assumption of 
number of supply vessel visits being not valid or misinterpreted would be 
identified as or associated with a potential source for some hazardous event. 
As we can remember from section 4.3 one of the hazardous events listed in the 
HAZID section is defined as follows: 
 
 Collision risk  
 Supply vessel traffic to Valemon and Jack-up rig  
 Passing vessels- and fishing vessels traffic to the field  
 
It can be shown that the collision risk due to increased number of visiting, passing 
and fishing vessels is one of the contributors to the major accident risk.(see figure 
4.5)This example, however, is limited mainly to supply vessels only. These vessels 
are important due to their intended approach towards the facility and their being 
present on site for some time. The speed is normally not the main issue for supply 
vessel but the importance generates from the fact that in case of a supply vessel 
being on a collision course, the probability of evacuation before the collision is 
very low. From this point of view collision risk appears to be one of the dominant 
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risk contributors based the FAR value pie diagram presented in the risk picture of 
Valemon. (Figure 4.5.) 
 
The main hazard associated with this assumption would then be the impact it has 
on ship collision risk (collision frequency) as the risk of collision is greatly 
influenced by any major alteration in the assumed number of vessel visits. The 
increased number of vessel visits to the platform will directly influence the 
potential frequency of vessel collision, as we will see through the rest of sections 
of this assumption. 
Another important hazard that could be derived from this assumption is the 
structural failure or any kind of damage to the asset (Valemon platform, jacket, 
jack up rigs,..) due to collision impact energy. This is mainly a design issue and we 
will discuss this further in example 3. 
As a recommendation, it would be better to list another hazard of supply vessel-
vessel collision risk to be identified if the number of visits is increased due to 
higher ingress of vessels in the area. The potential hazards depend on not only the 
number of supply vessel visits but also to their speed and size. But they are not 
relevant for this case here. 
 
For identifying hazards, focus should normally be on major accidents risk and the 
basic goal for HAZID therefore is to identify accidental events with the potential 
for personnel risk and impairment of main safety functions.  
 
Identified hazardous events regarding vessel collisions were:  
 
jack-up rig 
(when present)  
 
lifeboats  
 
5.3.2.3.System Description 
For the system description, it should be noted that the change in values of the 
assumed numbers of visits of supply vessel does not change the system 
characteristics. The effect is somehow in the opposite way, meaning that the 
system description might have an impact of defining the required numbers of 
visits due to the size and other properties of the system. 
 
The assumption that the number of visits to jack up rig is considerably higher than 
the annual visits of to the platform itself can be justified with the fact that there 
exists more required activities during the drilling phase which requires more 
lifting and supplies. However, the increase in number of the vessels could cause 
collision and dropped objects risks which should be avoided to an acceptable 
extent. 
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We refer to different activity levels assumed for Valemon once again, in support of 
the statement  that : “ 6 different activity levels have been defined but only activity 
level 1, 4 and 5 are assumed dimensioning for supply vessel risk.” That is mainly 
due to jack-up presence for drilling, well intervention or workover purposes. If we 
consider the above statement as another assumption for the vessel collision risk, 
the impact of it would be on defining the number of supply vessel visits per year 
for each activity level and thereby the supply vessel collision frequency, in other 
words, the number has to be defined according to the activity levels and the 
assumed amount of work which has to be estimated depending on the definition 
of each activity level. This is exactly the description of our assumption in this 
section. 
 
The assigned numbers are based on background knowledge of the analysts, 
therefore there is a possibility that they might deviate from what actually will 
happen and in that case, the main concern would be to predict the different 
consequence scenarios. 
 
In order to be better able to detect the effect of the assumption to collision risk, a 
partial system description is presented related mainly to supply vessel locations 
and the corresponding collision risk. [20] 
 
According to the system description of Valemon field, there are several 
approaches for the vessels to come in the vicinity of the jack-up drilling rig and 
Valemon itself. (Figure 5.1) The location of supply vessels with respect to each 
other could be another matter in determining whether the vessel is on the 
collision course or not. But that is not. This aspect is not quite relevant to the 
assumption at this level. 
 
On Valemon, there is one main pedestal crane, located on the south side of the 
installation. Supply vessels to Valemon will therefore be operating on that side. 
Supply vessels to the jack-up rig can operate on two different sides of the jack-up. 
Figure 5.1indicates the possible positions of the supply vessels. [19][20] 
 
Another point to be mentioned is that in case of a collision, the conductors and 
risers are located within the jacket structure, therefore a protection has been 
provided against ship collision. There is still a risk that they could be hit by a 
supply vessel, so this is considered in this analysis.  
 
As, one can see system description has a considerable effect on how the 
assumption of number of vessels would lead to different consequences. 
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Figure 5.1 Supply vessel positions relative to the installations [20] 
 
 
5.3.2.4 CAUSE ANALYSIS (Including a hazard frequency analysis) 
 
It is normally the case for each cause analysis of a QRA to investigate the 
requirements for the initiating events to occur or in other words, to point out the 
causal factors.  
Having developed a general idea of the causal factors, the frequencies or 
probabilities of the hazards (in this example the collision frequency) can be 
estimated. Often the analyses have a main focus on this estimation.[2] 
 
By defining the vessel collision as a hazard, in this section of the assessment, one 
should be able to track and sort out the different causation of the mentioned 
hazard. As for this specific assumption we are discussing, the increased number of 
the vessel visits is then serves as an important cause of the collision risk. And 
therefore our assumed values have a direct influence on the cause analysis; the 
more vessels on the collision path, the higher the frequency of the collision risk. 
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There is a methodology used in this report for collision frequency calculation [18] 
and according to the equation 5.1, the direct impact of assumed numbers of 
vessels on collision frequency can be observed. 
 
For supply vessels the collision frequency is established from historical data 
instead (background knowledge), achieving a probability of collision per supply 
vessel visit. The factor P collision per visit of 2.0∙10-4 is then included in this 
historical based probability. (This is also another assumption)[18][20] 
 
F collision = N visits per year ∙ Pcollision per visit ∙ P2          eq.5.1  [20] 
 
A value of P2 being 1.0 has been considered for vessels maneuvering nearby 
Valemon. Note that all these assigned probabilities are knowledge-based 
probabilities and therefore cannot be objectively calculated. (another calculation 
assumption) 
 
5.3.2.5. Consequence Analysis 
 
In the consequence analysis we study the effects the initiating events may have on 
human beings, the environment and financial assets (or something else that 
humans value). [2] 
In this example, we would like to study the possible consequences of alteration of 
the assumption in the QRA. The main question is: What would happen if the 
number of supply visits increase/decrease? What are the possible consequences? 
To answer this question, we should one more time consider the main hazard 
identified with this assumption which was the ship collision risk.  
 
Increased Collision frequency 
 
As it has been presumed in this study the increased number of supply visits to 
Valemon contributes directly to ship collision risk in terms of increasing the value 
of assigned probability of collision per visit and eventually increasing the collision 
frequency. (eq. 5.1) 
 
Collision frequency variation seems to be the most common consequence 
associated with this assumption. According to the report for ship collision risk 
provided for Valemon, the method for calculating collision frequencies is as 
follows: 
 
Combining the historical collision frequencies (background knowledge) with 
number of visits (this assumption) and conditional probabilities of hitting 
Valemon (knowledge-based probabilities) and jack-up rig, the resulting 
frequencies can be estimated.[19] 
In Table 5.6 the collision frequencies for activity level 6 has been mentioned. 
 
95 
 
 
 
Table 5.6 Collision impairment frequencies for Valemon and jack-up rig, activity 
level 6 [19] 
 
 
 
 
Once again, one should note that the values presented in the tables are based on 
historical data and some other underlying assumptions applied. The noticeable 
point is they might look quite accurate in a value, but there is high probability they 
are not correct. The values are accurate in terms of mathematical calculation not 
in terms of uncertainty description. 
 
It might be useful to refer to this statement: 
Probabilities are expressions of uncertainty based on particular background 
knowledge. There is a great deal of uncertainty in terms of interpretation of this 
background knowledge and relating it to future events between different 
individuals. However, for a given background knowledge the probabilities are not 
uncertain. [6] 
 
 
Impact to risers, conductors and underside of deck  
 
In addition to structural impairment, vessel collisions can also lead to severe 
consequences if hydrocarbon risers or other critical equipment is impaired. It has 
been identified a potential of visiting supply vessels hitting the risers and 
conductors even though they are located within the jacket. The gas export and 
condensate export risers are mostly routed inside the jacket, but also routed 
underneath the cellar deck partly outside the perimeter of the jacket. 
In addition to the number of vessels, the size and shape of them are also important 
in potential consequences.  
Many supply vessels have become larger during the last 10 years. The HAZID 
identified a possible risk for supply vessels to hit underside of topside deck, 
including risers routed underside the process deck (outside the jacket perimeter), 
and also possibility of hitting the lifeboats. Figure 5.6 shows an example of such a 
situation. [19][20] 
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Figure 5.2 Supply vessels at Statfjord A, [19] 
 
Size of the supply vessels determines the displacement of vessels, which directly 
has an effect on collision impact energy. Larger displacement gives increased 
impact energy given a collision, and thereby increased risk. 
Of other factors related to supply vessel visits that could influence the collision 
risk, one might refer to the presence time of supply vessels as well as their arrival 
speed at Valemon or the jack-up. There are specific assumptions listed with 
respect to this matter, but we limit our discussion only to the number of supply 
visits that influences the frequency of collisions. 
 
Oil spill to sea 
 
One of the consequences could be collision to risers and pipelines and therefore 
considerable oil spill to sea. 
In the event of a riser and pipeline leak, the full inventory is assumed released.  
Availability of rescue vehicles 
 
An increase in number of supply vessels visits can have a positive consequence as 
well; should there be an accident on the platform or the rig, since there is always a 
vessel present it means that there is always a rescue boat (vehicle)  present and 
the chances of survival of personnel is accordingly higher. The supply vessels can 
also help get people out of the water and they are much safer and bigger than the 
simple lifeboats on board. 
 
Usually, in consequence analysis relevant for each accident scenario, different 
methods are used such as modeling, estimation, assigned probabilities, etc. for 
establishing event trees. During these steps a lot of assumptions and simplification 
are made that are not included in the main reference list. 
 
As an example, through some calculations and modeling of ship collision risk, 
appears to be some knowledge-based probabilities conditional assigned for 
simplification and the modeling of collision risk. These assumptions are only are 
mentioned implicitly in vessel collision risk calculations. See appendix E. As a 
recommendation, in our opinion, it would have been an option to include another 
category to the main categories for stating the calculation assumptions. 
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5.3.2.6. RISK PICTURE 
 
With respect to this section of the TRA, Risk picture of the Valemon has been 
presented in terms of Personnel risk (PLL and FAR) values as well as Impairment 
of main Safety Functions. 
For the personnel risk we can compare the calculated (and estimated) values of 
FAR and PLL for different activity levels and compare it with the values presented 
in the assumptions for the number of supply vessel visits. We could see that the 
FAR and PLL values are far less in level 6 than those of related to activity level 5 
and so is the number of supply visits. We may then coarsely conclude that the 
number of supply visits might be one of the main FAR contributors. 
If we take a look at Figure 4.5, we could trace the consequences of increased vessel 
visits in vessel collision (main contributor according to the picture), Dropped 
objects (indirectly and more relevant to the second example) , Blowouts, riser and 
pipeline leaks, structural failure.(all indirectly). 
 
Impairment Frequencies 
As for Impairment frequencies for main load bearing structure, it is also 
observable that collision impacts of 2.36 *10E-4 per year is considerable compare 
to other accident scenarios.[20] 
In both cases the consequence of vessel collisions due to increased number of 
vessel appears to have an important impact in all parts of the TRA.  
 
The increased number of supply vessel visits adds up to FAR value and frequency 
of impairment of safety functions on a facility as shown in table 5.6. 
 
Table 5.7 Impairment frequency of main load bearing structure on Valemon[20] 
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Personnel risk  
 
Personnel risk due to passing vessels and supply vessel collisions, causing total 
loss of Valemon is presented in the tables below for activity levels 1, 4 and 5, 
activity levels 2 and 3, and for activity levels 6. For supply vessel collisions, it has 
been conservatively assumed that all personnel are killed. It is assumed that for 
passing vessels, all personnel will have evacuated before impact, i.e. no fatalities, 
which is a very non-conservative assumption, since 100% evacuation might not be 
possible at all.[20]Ensuring that the vessels reduce the speed within the safety 
zone is determining for reducing the consequences associated with collision. [19] 
 
The contribution to personnel risk associated with collisions is determined by 
whether the installation has been evacuated prior to the impact or not. For 
collisions with attending vessels it is not likely that personnel have evacuated 
prior to impact, as the vessels are supposed to be approaching the installation or 
operate in the vicinity of the installation and a collision may come as a result of 
some fault in the vicinity of the installation without pre-warning or without 
leaving sufficient time to muster and evacuate. For these collisions, the personnel 
risk contribution may be rather high. 
That is the reason why even if the speed of the attending/visiting vessels to the 
facility is not considered to be dangerously high, the fact there is in fact no time for 
evacuation of the personnel adds up to the other fact these vessels usually travel 
considerable to/from the facility (adding up to the collision frequency) and then 
as a result, there would be a considerable potential risk to personnel.[20] 
 
 
Table 5.8 PLL and FAR due to passing vessel and supply vessel collisions causing total loss 
of Valemon - activity level 1, 4 and 5 [20] 
 
 
 
Table 5.9 PLL and FAR due to passing vessel and supply vessel collisions causing total loss 
of Valemon - activity level 2 and 3 [20] 
 
 
 
Table 5.9 PLL and FAR due to passing vessel and supply vessel collisions causing total loss 
of Valemon - activity level 6 
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As a result, one could see that based on many assumptions and underlying 
assumptions the FAR value for activity levels 1,4 and 5 is the highest and has the 
least value in activity level6 due to platform being NNM. The PLL has also the 
lowest value in activity level 6, which is acceptable given the discussions above. 
 
 
5.3.2.7.Risk Acceptance Criteria 
 
We will only comment on this section of the TRA that the effect of increasing 
number of vessels will cause the FAR values to reach or even be higher than the 
set acceptance criteria. 
According to the Valemon main report RAC mentioned in section 4.4, the criteria 
for FAR value have been presented. Comparing the results of personnel risk the 
previous section with the RAC mentioned here, one could see that the FAR values 
related to supply vessel collision risk is within accepted region 2.96< 10. 
 
 
5.3.2.8 Uncertainties /Sensitivities 
There are uncertainties in the underlying assumptions for vessel impact loads. 
Such uncertainties may be operational assumptions, like the number of supply 
vessel visits per year, or whether any other risk reducing measures to prevent 
collision with the jack-up or the jacket can be used. [17] 
 
Taking into account the uncertainties of the results of the QRA (Expected values, 
assigned probabilities, assigned numbers and distribution and etc.), it should be 
noted that the final results of any QRA are not always the ultimate results and 
therefore cannot be the mere basis for decision-making. In other words, safety 
related decision-making is risk informed, not risk-based. [2] 
 
A good risk analysis is not complete without a sensitivity analysis part. During the 
process of risk analysis, one is confronted with a great deal of uncertainties about 
the input to the system. There have been made a lot of assumptions, and a great 
deal of subjective and knowledge and experience-based probabilities have been 
applied to set the basis for the inputs of a QRA in order to fill in the gaps for 
unknown events and give a baseline to the necessary calculations. 
Among all these different inputs with assigned probabilities, distributions or 
assumed values, some of them are considered more important, i.e. have a greater 
role in the overall results of risk picture. These variables are called the most 
sensitive ones. Any small alteration in the value of these variables as an input to 
the system, results in a great alteration as an output (the risk picture results in 
this example). 
 
100 
 
 
Therefore, sensitivity analysis is required to find the more “important” inputs or 
assumptions to be better prepared in managing the corresponding uncertainty 
factor or maybe dedicating a greater value in terms of budgeting and time to that 
area.  
 
Sensitivity analysis is usually considered to be one of the main parts in economic 
risk assessment such that the variable with most critical influence on the 
economic measure would be identified such as oil price so on. However, there are 
different methods in standard QRAs that sensitivity analyses are being carried out, 
such as presenting spider diagrams, or radar diagrams or some semi-quantitative 
criteria we have chosen to comply with in this work. For more information on 
sensitivity analysis see section 2.6. 
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5.3.3. General discussion on this Assumption 
 
Underlying Assumptions 
Based on table 5.5, one could claim that the number of supply vessel visits per year for each 
activity level and thereby the supply vessel collision frequency is directly defined based on 
the 6 activity levels considered for Valemon making the activity level assumption the 
underlying assumption for this number of visits assumption. 
According to the report [17], 6 different activity levels have been defined, but activity levels 
1,4 and 5 are dimensioning for supply vessel risk. 
 
In many cases the assumptions itself are interrelated or based on another assumption, we 
would like to call them an underlying assumption. In this case, for example, the numbers 
assigned to supply vessel visits are based on the assumption of considering 6 activity levels 
for the lifetime of Valemon field. This assumption, may later need to be updated when 
Valemon is actually going to be operated and so it will necessary to update all the 
assumptions and input data to the whole analysis 
 
The selected assumption presents an estimation of the required number of supply vessel 
visits to Valemon and to the jack up rig based on different activity levels.  
Activity levels 1, 4 and 5 are when jack-up is present due to some drilling, well intervention 
or workover. Therefore a n average number of 120 vessel visits per year adds up to the 
number of assumed supply vessel visits to Valemon and that contributes directly to the 
increased collision frequency and the also takes effect in the total FAR value related to ship 
collisions in the mentioned activities( discussed in risk picture section). Another effect on 
the risk picture is that the increased number of vessels would also increase the collision 
frequency of both Valemon and the jack-up rig. 
 
Background Knowledge 
The important thing we would like to emphasize on is as we have observed some 
calculations (collision frequency, impairment frequency, impact energy…) and therefore 
estimations are based actually on these assumed numbers and the historical data. If the data 
is misinterpreted or the assumed numbers are not valid for the case, all the calculations will 
be flaky and would not be a wise choice to rely on the results. So assumptions might be just 
some numbers or values, but they serve as a starting point for all the calculations done in 
the assessment such as the role the initial conditions play when solving an equation of some 
order. If they are not valid, so will not be the results! 
 
 
Assumption Presentation 
Additionally, one can conclude that this assumption seems to be completely documented 
and all the relevant parts that may be affected by the assumption are also listed, basis for 
102 
 
 
background data has been documented and the results are clear in terms of presentation. 
One of the recommendations to be considered in the way the assumption has been 
presented would be the row that is labeled as “lifetime variation”. It might not be crystal 
clear for the reader which lifetime is the case. If only the lifetime of Valemon is meant, it 
could have been better had it just been mentioned so. 
Another recommendation is to include another group of assumptions, probably labeled as 
calculation assumptions and in there all assumptions with respect to calculations such as 
simplifications, safety factors, and correction or compensation factors should be 
documented. 
One unclear item seen in the assumption presentation of number of supply visits is that it 
has been write `Statoil` as the source. Yet it has not been exactly stated what/who is meant 
by Statoil. It could be a person, a database, a suggestion and etc. But the source of 
information should be clear so that the information can be verified if necessary. 
 
Impact on Other Parts of the Analysis 
One conclusion is that the number of supply vessel visits contributes directly to the 
increased frequency of collision and normally increases the risk of ship collision in terms of 
frequency. On the other hand, the increased number of supply vessels means increased 
lifting activities and therefore creating more possibilities for risk of dropped objects and so 
on. The advantage of having more supply vessels in the vicinity of the platform, however, is 
the increased number of lifeboats present (and possibly escape vessels) in case an 
emergency evacuation is required. 
 
Based on the discussions above, this assumption of number of supply vessel visits serves as 
an underlying assumption for vessel collision risk and even indirectly for dropped objects 
risk and therefore serves as an underlying assumption for the rest of the assumptions as we 
will observe it in the next examples. In that case the assigned numbers are considered to be 
important in that case.  
 
Moreover, one should always bear in mind that although assumptions are listed separately 
with their corresponding areas being defined, it is almost always the case that alteration to 
an assumption requires some other considerations and modifications to be done with 
respect to other assumptions.  In simple words, all assumptions are related to one another 
and some of them act as an underlying assumption for the others and the combination of 
these assumption serves as the whole input to the system and in case of a hazard, any 
wrong input or any wrong combinations of inputs could have been identified as a cause.  
 
From the argument above, one could realize the importance of clarity and traceability 
criteria for assumptions presentation that was mentioned in Statoil`s GL 0282. 
The close correlation between all the assumptions in a QRA should always be considered in 
all aspects. 
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Finally, we would like to present the `importance ranking table` for this assumption based 
on all the discussions above. 
 
Table 5.10.  Importance ranking of the assumption example 1 
Assumption 
Description 
Degree of 
Uncertainty 
Degree of 
Sensitivity 
Degree of 
Importance 
Number of supply 
vessel visits 
H M H-M 
 
Based on the discussions above and according to criteria mentioned in table 5.1, the degree 
of uncertainty for this assumption is considered to be high since it is based on strong 
simplifications (once a week visit) and lack of agreement among experts have been noted as 
well.  
In case of sensitivity, the immediate effect of relatively inconsiderable changes do not seem 
significant but if the alterations are large enough then the impacts of this assumption n total 
risk picture is considerable. This is because of this assumption is closely related to other 
assumptions we will discuss in the following sections. Therefore a medium sensitivity has 
been assigned for this assumption. 
Finally an overall index of H-M has been considered for this assumption based on the 
arguments we have presented for evaluating this assumption. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
104 
 
 
5.4 Lifting activities (Example2) 
In this section we will discuss the assumption regarding lifting activities to/from supply 
vessels to Valemon. This example belongs to the first category of assumptions i.e. 
operational/organizational assumptions. The description of the assumption is presented in 
table 5.9. 
 
Table 5.11.Assumed Lifting activities are shown in tables below [18] 
 
It is also worth taking a look at the total external and internal lift distributions presented in 
tables 5.13 and 5.14 below. The tables have been presented for two activity levels 5 and 6. 
Activity level 5 has been assumed to be the dimensioning activity level due to multiple 
numerous and simultaneous activities (see 5.4.1). Activity level 6, on the other hand, is 
normally not a manned phase and has been presented for comparison. 
 
Valemon activity levels and lifting activities 
Activity level 1:  
Simultaneous production and drilling. Jack-up drilling rig present (no well intervention 
operations are included in this activity level).  
Activity level 2:  
Normal production phase. No jack-up drilling rig. No well intervention operations.  
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Activity level 3:  
Simultaneous production and well interventions. No jack-up drilling rig.  
Activity level 4:  
Simultaneous drilling, production and wireline well intervention (including jack-up drilling 
rig)  
Activity level 5:  
Stand-alone production including all known future modifications. Jack-up drilling rig at 
times present for Workover.  
Activity level 6:  
Stand-alone production and normally not manned installation. 
We will use activity levels as basis for developing further assumptions. The table 5.12 might 
give us an insight about the activities going on in different levels and thus justify the 
assumed and assigned lift numbers for each activity level to some extent. 
 
Table 5.12. Activity levels and different operations 
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   Table 5.13External and internal lifts for activity level 5 
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Table 5.14 Internal and External lifts for activity level  
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Comments on the tables of assumed numbers of lifts: 
As one can observe from the tables above, the assumed number of lifts are based on the first 
example we have discussed; the number of supply vessel visits. This is because normally an 
increase in the number of vessel visits leads to more lifting activities. The underlying 
assumption that has not been defined here is that the size of the vessels has been assumed 
the same. Since the number of lifts could change for vessels of different size due to their 
various capacity for equipment that are intended to be lifted.  
Considering this relation and referring to the assumed number of vessel visits for activity 
level 5 (52 vessel visits a year per; once a week during a year), we can see that most of the 
assumed numbers of lifts are basically multiplications of the number 52. That shows the 
relation between this assumption and the number of vessel visits. Based on the operational 
activities required for different parts of the platform, different routes have been considered 
in the assumption and different ratios of 52 have been assigned. 
For example if we look one lift route from the vessel to laydown area on main deck east of 
workshop which has the highest number of lifts in the table in activity level 5 (1040 lifts), it 
is based on the assumption that there would be 20 lifts per week (20*52 weeks per year). 
That is 20 lifts of each vessel visiting Valemon is assumed to belong to this part. Finally, 
almost all numbers in columns have been based on a weekly supply vessel visit, which in 
our opinion seems a very coarse and rough basis since there are also challenges and 
uncertainties with assumed number of vessels as we had previously discussed. 
In tables 5.13 and 5.14 categorization of lifting routes have been mentioned which is 
normally a good point for giving a more clear and detailed view for the assessment of lifting 
activities. Lifts have been categorized as both internal and external that is inside the 
different layers of the platform itself and from/to the supply vessels to/from the platform 
respectively. The possibility of drop to sea is also considered (probability not assigned) 
Lifts have been divided into to categories according to their mass; over and under 20 tons. 
This is mainly due to the different hit energy the possible dropped objects could create. But 
one recommendation would be to narrow the weight of lifting objects further down maybe 
into 3 categories of 0-10, 10-20 and over 20 in order to provide better and more detailed 
insights into the consequences the dropped objects would lead to. However, with respect to 
this assumption we are more interested in the frequency of dropped objects rather than the 
hit energy they might lead to.  
 
5.4.1General aspects of the assumption  
The study of dropped objects analysis for Valemon is mainly based on Valemon activity 
levels and lifting activity levels. The activity levels could therefore serve as an underlying 
assumption for lifting activities (the selected assumption here) here.  
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Dropped Objects 
The direct and immediate impact of increase in number of lifts would normally be increased 
dropped object frequencies. It is usually the case that the more lifting activities and simply 
the higher number of lifts would eventually result in the increased frequency of dropped 
objects. The indirect effect of the assumption would be the impact on the design accidental 
loads for relevant areas due to hitting energies of dropped objects. 
In other words, the numerous numbers of lifts usually leads to higher frequencies of 
dropped objects, which will have other consequences such as the influencing the main load 
bearing for relevant areas that are subject to numerous lifting activities. The hit energy 
would be of concern in the design load case. 
The number of lifts contributes directly to the calculated frequencies of dropped objects as 
we see in the formula below: 
Frequency of dropped objects = Probability of drop per lift *Number of lifts     eq.5.2 
 
However, we should always take into consideration that the increased number of the lifting 
operations for example up to twice the value assumed does not necessarily double the risk 
(here frequencies of dropped objects ). What we are trying to convey is that the relation is 
not totally linear. As lifting activities become more in number, there are other interactions 
between the cranes, vessels, loads, etc that affects the result. Hence, the system does not 
work as a linear system. The main point is these activities are all related and therefore 
cannot be considered as independent phenomena. They influence each other. 
Underlying Assumptions 
There are some underlying assumptions with respect to this lifting assumption that might 
not be clear enough in the first glance. We could for example trace back and relate 
estimated number of lifts to the number of supply vessel visits to Valemon presented in 
example 1. Again there are underlying assumptions such as : 
The assumption has been based on the fact that all vessels are of the same size and shape. 
Additionally, the number of equipment included in each vessel and the crane capacity per 
lift has been assumed the same for all lifting activities. 
These assumptions are necessary to be mentioned when we use the supply number of 
vessel visits as the basis for estimating the required number of lifts. (which is the case for 
Valemon as we will further discuss.) 
And in situations like this, when these assumed numbers of lifts serve as building blocks for 
the rest of calculations for establishing the risk picture for dropped objects, care should be 
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taken for considering the underlying assumptions as well.  
Undocumented Assumption 
The following assumption regarding dropped objects have been made and it is very 
important to base the probabilities upon but has not been listed in the main part for 
assumptions and we have encountered it during the calculation and estimation of dropped 
objects in an appendix for the main report. In our opinion it should have been stated 
separately as well. According to Valemon report for dropped objects [25], we have the 
following assumed data: 
For main crane lifts from e.g. supply vessels to the installation a 30% probability of hitting 
the sea and 70% of hitting the installation is proposed. All internal lifts and from other 
lifting devices are assumed to hit the installation. The drops distributes among dropped 
load (90%), falling crane boom (8%) and fall of crane (2%). [19] These are conditional 
probabilities based on background knowledge of the analyst(s). 
It is worth mentioning that out of the assumed 70 percent probability of drops hitting the 
installation, one might consider drop onto the supply vessel as well, but since the most 
unwanted consequences happen when dropped loads hitting the platform itself, probably 
that is why I has not been mentioned.  
 
                                             Sea (30%) 
Dropped objects                                                        Supply vessel 
                                 Structure (70%) 
                                                            Platform structure (main concern) 
Figure 5.3. Dropped objects falling diagram 
Each of the mentioned possible drops could lead to different consequences, which we will 
later define. But since the main concerned has been assumed to be the drops onto the 
platform structure, in the tables above, we can see that the affected areas have been listed 
as `Platform area affected` 
 
In general in analysis of dropped objects, is involved with frequency of dropped objects 
(probabilities) and consequences. We will discuss this further in the following section. 
5.4.2.Integrated Impact of the Assumption on the QRA[25][26] 
We will continue our discussion according to the Risk Assessment Process as in the 
previous example. 
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5.4.2.1 Framework: 
There are several rules, standards and guideline established for marine lifting activities. 
And therefore, all activities should be within that framework. Relating the number of lifts 
to/from supply vessel visits, it seems that the assumed numbers are complying with the 
standards. 
5.4.2.2 System Description 
In order to help visualize the following assumption (especially for the lifting routes 
mentioned above), the reader is encouraged to take a look at the main areas on Valemon 
Platform: (See figure 4.3) 
And further to better understand this example of assumed lifting numbers assumption, we 
would like to introduce briefly lifting facility and lay down areas on Valemon. Based on the 
Valemon report, we have: 
Pedestal crane  
The Valemon platform is equipped with one pedestal deck crane, located on the south side 
of the platform as illustrated in Figure 5.8. 
 
Figure5.4. Valemon with pedestal crane at the south side [25] 
 
This pedestal crane will mostly be used to on/off loading between Valemon and supply 
vessels. 
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Laydown areas on Valemon  
Dropped object hazard for the Valemon platform is mainly connected to pedestal crane lifts 
between vessels and laydown areas at platform. The most frequent lifting operations are 
container and tote tank lifts to/from supply vessels. [26] 
 
Supply vessels will arrive at south side of Valemon and consequently the laydown areas will 
be at the same side. There are laydown areas for each level on the platform. The roof on the 
workshop module will also be used as a laydown area, mostly for LQ containers. Waste 
handling area will be used as laydown area for containers with waste. Figure 5.6 illustrates 
the laydown areas on Valemon. 
  
Figure 5.5: Laydown areas on Valemon[25] 
 
Sometimes assumptions are defined according to the system description. Assumptions are 
actually extra added (not necessarily valid) information to some parts of the system 
description based on the assessor’s background knowledge. 
5.4.2.3 HAZID 
One of the hazardous events known in the HAZID process of the TRA has been identified as  
Dropped objects and swinging loads  
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 Dropped objects due to material handling with main crane  
 Dropped objects from the Jack-up rig  
  
The identified hazards can be the direct result of extensive crane and lifting activities. 
Therefore, the dropped object risk due to increased and/or improper lifting operations is 
one of the contributors to risk level and could cause damage to personnel, environmental 
and asset. 
In the Valemon report, potential hazards are evaluated and risks are then further assessed 
and quantified. This is done through an assessment of the crane activity, which then is 
combined with historical failure data, local hit probabilities, and an evaluation of the hit 
consequences in various locations. There are uncertainties with almost all calculations and 
information provided, therefore, a lot of assumptions have been made and need to be 
considered. 
Other hazards indirectly related to tis assumption could be riser and pipeline leaks in case 
the dropped object hits the jacket (the risers are routed inside the jacket) and structural 
failure if the hitting energy of dropped object would be above the deign load bearing of the 
structure. 
5.4.2.5Cause analysis 
Having identified dropped objects as the main hazard associated with this assumption, one 
should then be able to track the causation of this hazard according to the definition of 
required steps of risk analysis in Norsok z03 [10].The main cause of the Dropped Objects as 
mentioned before is the increased crane and lifting activities. 
Another concern in the cause analysis section of a QRA is to define a frequency for the 
hazard after having understood all the causation. Without the frequency analysis of the 
dropped objects, establishing a complete risk picture is not possible. 
In the report related to dropped objects for Valemon [25] , the frequencies and impact 
energy of the dropped objects have been calculated/estimated based on some assumptions. 
Going through the methodology of the calculations in detail is not the main focus of this 
thesis work, however these frequency and energy impact of the dropped objects loads are 
important parts of cause and consequence analysis for this hazard. Therefore, we will 
briefly introduce the dropped objects frequency estimation as part of this section and the 
impact energy of the dropped objects in the next part (consequence analysis). 
Dropped object frequencies  
For calculating the frequency of dropped objects in the Valemon report there has been 
established two parts: 
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 Historical failure data and (hard data for establishing drop probabilities) 
 Valemon lifting activity (expert judgment for establishing number of the lifts) 
And eventually: Frequency of drop = probability  of dropped objects per lift *number of lifts  
Note that the calculated frequency is then divided between the all parts of the installation 
itself, the supply vessel and the sea. Based on the assumption above drop frequency 
(probability per lift multiplied by the number of lifts) should be split between fall on the 
deck (~70%) and into the sea (~30%). (This assumption is also based on previous 
observations) [26] 
 
Historical failure data is presented  based  on previous experiences and serves as 
background knowledge to establish the new frequencies for this report. We can see the 
results in the tables below: 
Table 5.13 Generic dropped objects probabilities for NCS [26] 
 
Table 5.14 Drop probabilities for routine lifts with platform cranes (historical data)[26] 
 
This historical data serve as basis for assigning probabilities for dropped objects 
probabilities per lift. . And as we know there is a great deal of uncertainty related to 
application of this data in order to establish new data. Therefore some assumptions have 
been made that are documented and are very critical when it comes to frequency 
calculations. One of the assumptions regarding lift frequencies are dividing the lifts into two 
categories of “heavy” and “moderate” which seems a bit coarse, in our opinion. 
Assumed number of lifts is another parameter important for the formula above. We have 
discussed this part in section 5.4.1 considering the tables presented for the number of lifts. 
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Finally, combining the historical dropped object frequencies with assumed number of lifts and 
subjective and conditional probabilities of hitting different areas, the resulting newly established 
frequencies would then be estimated. 
Based on the equation above for calculating the frequency of dropped objects, one could 
observe the direct impact of number of lifts in the frequency analysis of the dropped objects 
for Valemon. 
 
5.4.2.6Consequence analysis 
The consequences of dropped objects are mainly depending on the impact energy of the 
falling loads. And in determining the impact energy of a fall, the drop height and terminal 
velocity are major factors. Dropped objects have potential of personnel injuries, material 
damage and hydrocarbon releases. In the worst-case scenario dropped objects may 
threaten main safety functions in the event of e.g. an ignited hydrocarbon release. Also 
Dropped objects to sea may hit the jacket, risers  or the subsea pipelines and lead to HC 
leaks. 
Some common consequences of dropped objects with their conditional probabilities are 
listed below. One should remember that the assigned probabilities are knowledge-based 
(based on hard historical data and/or expert judgments) and therefore the existence of 
uncertainty in them is undeniable. One should note that regarding assigning the following 
conditional probabilities, the background knowledge is usually not mentioned and simply 
some new assumptions have been made. We believe it is a wiser choice to list these 
assumptions in the relevant part as well as their information source they are established 
upon. 
 
Damage on structures (asset risk) 
According to the data dossier for Valemon [], for main crane lifts from e.g. supply vessels to 
the installation a 50% probability of hitting the sea and 50% of hitting the installation is 
proposed. All internal lifts and from other lifting devices are assumed to hit the installation. 
The probability of severe material damage could be assumed to be about 2%.[] 
 
Hydrocarbon releases (environmental risk) 
Based on previous data, the probability of a hydrocarbon release given a dropped object 
may be estimated to be between 1.5% and 2%. This low figure is probably due to 
restrictions such as no lifting over hydrocarbon equipment. In the event of a hit of a load 
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above the design load on a deck, the probability of a hydrocarbon leak and immediate 
ignition may be high.[25] 
Injuries to Personnel 
The injuries/fatalities the dropped objects may cause to personnel should be considered as 
well. We have mentioned the FAR results in the risk picture section. 
The above suggested probabilities are based on observed data on NCS and yet serve the 
basis for further calculations in the rest of the report. In other words, the past experiences 
and probabilities derived from them, serves as background knowledge for assigning new 
probabilities to future uncertain events(here dropped objects). There is uncertainty in 
applying this background knowledge and that has to be mentioned and considered. 
 
There are several scenarios that where the object being carried falls. In this report for 
example three scenarios have been considered:[26] 
 Topside : main deck above process, utility area, well intervention deck 
 Crane boom and pedestal fall, swinging objects 
 Dropped objects into the sea 
 
For each of these scenarios there has been a different calculations of frequency and impact 
energy and as a result different consequences with respect to risk to personnel, asset and 
environment. As we have mentioned before, the main approach for consequence analysis of 
dropped objects would be to calculate the hit energy of dropped objects. And the calculation 
of impact energy requires different modeling and calculations for each scenario. One 
limitation to modeling methods according to Vinnem []is that available models for the 
assessment of dropped objects hazards are generally too simplistic in the sense that 
differences in operational procedures and crane protection are not usually taken into 
consideration. 
Eventually, each scenario would then come up with different consequences and eventually 
different impacts on risk picture.  
As we can conclude the number of lifts does not affect the impact energy directly. It 
however, has great influence of frequency and the therefore affects the risk picture by 
influencing the frequency of the hazard (dropped objects).  
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5.4.2. 7 Risk Picture and Risk Acceptance criteria 
One of the very important features of a risk analysis is presenting the risk picture and we 
would like to present how the assumption of number of lifting activities would influence the 
total risk picture for Valemon 
With respect to the impacts of the assumption on the risk picture, we are concerned in the 
following three areas: 
 Personnel Risk 
 Impairment frequency of main safety functions 
 Risk to environment , mainly oil spill (frequency and expected amount) 
Usually an evaluation is also included with respect to the set RAC for the project. Referring 
to chapter 4 where we have introduced the RAC for Valemon, we recall:[17] 
The probability of loss of defined main safety functions shall be estimated per year, per safety 
function and per accident category, as given in Norsok Z-013, edition 3, annex B. Accidental 
events within each of these categories having combined probability ≥ 10-4 per year shall be 
considered dimensioning. And, 
The mean individual risk, expressed by the fatal accident rate (FAR) – must meet the criteria 
FAR < 10.[17][10] 
The risk picture in the Valemon report is presented by means of: 
 Impairment of the main safety functions   
 Impairment of prevent of escalation   
 Impairment of main load bearing structures   
 Impairment of rooms of significance to combating accidental events  
 Impairment of safe area o Impairment of escape 
 
 Personnel risk in terms of FAR  
 Material damage  
 Oil spill to the environment  
And we would like to know about the impacts the assumption on these mentioned areas. 
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Impairment frequency 
All dropped objects exceeding the dimensioning loads are assumed to cause 
impairment/penetration of the deck and hydrocarbon leaks in the wellhead area due to 
accident escalation. For Waste handling area, Workshop roof and Laydown area east of 
workshop impairment/penetration of the deck could result in fatality amongst employees 
working underneath the exposed area. However, the probability for penetration of process 
area is negligible all the time we only have lifts of tote tanks with maximum weight of 6 
tons. The frequency of crane boom fall is higher than 1.0E-04 for all the above mentioned 
areas. But is assumed that main deck is dimensioned for crane boom fall. [25][26] 
Comment  
Based on the discussions provided, one could observe that this assumption in number of 
directly affects the impairment frequency due to the dropped objects consequences and 
from this perspective is considered critical. As we can see, there are some assumptions 
stated about dimensioning and design during presenting the risk picture. 
 Personnel Risk 
The total FAR value corresponding to dropped objects fatalities, according to figure 4… has 
been estimated to be 0.13 out of the total FAR of 6.73 for Valemon in activity level 5. 
We will not go through the details of calculations of FAR value for this example. Yet, it 
should be noted that for considering the risk to personnel it is important to notice where 
the dropped objects actually fall and cause further consequences and escalation. And the 
risk to personnel then would be depending on the normal manning level of that area.  
In addition, one could consider two different outcomes of a falling object event affecting the 
potential loss of life (PLL): fatality due to ignition of released hydrocarbon and fatality due 
to energy impact from falling object. It is assumed that no employees are working beneath 
hanging load. Fatality due to energy impact from dropped object is only expected to be an 
issue in wellhead if the falling load exceeds DAL.[25] 
Due to some criticalities of risk to personnel, lifting over some areas is then prohibited. In 
conclusion the increased number of lifts could affect the PLL and FAR values in some special 
areas. Manning level is very important for this mater. We will discuss this further in 
example number 5. 
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Material damage  
Another impact of the increased number of lifting could be the damage to material (asset). 
According to table 5.10, there are 3866 annually lifts < 20 tons and 16 lifts >20 tons for 
activity level 5. All lifts > 20 tons and 3346 lifts < 20 tons have the possibility to be dropped 
to sea. Table 5.11 show the annually lifts applicable for activity level 6. Of 790 lifts, 634 have 
the possibility to be dropped to sea. The frequencies of damage to asset has been estimated 
and presented in table 5.14 below.[25] 
 
Table 5.15: Material damage frequencies due to dropped objects[25] 
 
 
 Oil spill to the environment  
Oil spill as an ultimate result of dropped objects will mainly be due to falls into the sea 
hitting the condensate export pipeline. The impact on risers compared to this one is 
negligible since risers are protected inside the jacket.[26] 
And the number of lifts in the relevant areas with a possibility of drop into the sea could 
increase the frequency of oil spill and depending on where the fall is actually taking place 
the impact energy influences the estimated leak rate and consequently amount of oil spill. 
 
5.4.3. Final remarks and discussions on this assumption 
The main hazard identified with the numerous lifting activities is the risk of dropped 
objects. We have reviewed the cause and consequences for dropped objects and observed 
that lifting heights and lifting routes will together with lifting activity have great impact of 
the outcome of dropped object risk assessment. 
The important issue to be acknowledged here is that in order to be able to perform an 
efficient analysis on dropped objects, a great deal of inputs are necessary and they have all 
been based and assumed on historical data, similar past experiences and expert judgments. 
So the assumed lifting numbers presented in tables 5.13 and 5.14 are, in a way, considered 
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as building blocks of all the calculations made regarding dropped objects to get a clearer 
picture of risk of dropped objects. Therefore it is very important that the background 
knowledge applied for establishing these assumptions be mentioned and valid to the 
possible extent.  
To comment on the tables presenting the assumption one could claim that they appear to be 
very comprehensive and informative. It has been wise to mention the affected area on the 
platform in addition to probability to sea drop. But to an expert on lifting activities, it might 
lack a great deal of necessary information and underlying assumptions. As an example, one 
could state that the size(shape) of the objects being lifted have not been mentioned though 
they are considered an important factor when considering the consequences of dropped 
objects. Also, the weight of load contributes directly to the impact energy and the impact 
energy is considered dimensioning for design accidental loads. Therefore it would have 
been better to narrow the division range down into more detailed and smaller intervals.  
 
Conclusions for example 2 
In conclusion one should pay attention to the following. The assumed numbers should not 
be deceiving.  We should consider the underlying assumption. Number of visits of supply 
vessels, number of equipment to be lifted, the size of the vessels, different areas of approach 
and lifting routes should also be considered. 
The numbers are based on some uncertain knowledge and could change during operation 
due to alterations to some underlying assumptions. 
Therefore it is essential that we do not rely on the mere numbers and calculations. One 
should be able to see beyond just the assumed numbers .The emphasis has to be on the 
source and background of the assumption. 
And eventually, the relation between assumptions has been brought into attention. As we 
have observed the number of supply vessel visits are in close relation with the assumed 
numbers of lifting. So, it is very important to bear in mind that if one of the assumptions is 
proved to be not valid, the other one is also influenced and the whole results of risk picture 
might be compromised. 
Finally, we would like to present the importance-ranking table for this assumption based 
on all the discussions above. 
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Table 5.16.  Importance ranking for assumption in example number 2 (lifting activities) 
Assumption 
Description 
Degree of 
Uncertainty 
Degree of 
Sensitivity 
Degree of 
Importance 
Lifting activity 
to/from supply 
vessel 
M H M-H 
 
Based on the discussions above and according to criteria mentioned in table 5.1, the 
degree of uncertainty for this assumption is considered to be moderate since the 
phenomena is well understood but the models used are considered simple/crude 
for calculating lifting risk especially for modeling drops to see. (see appendix G) 
However, some reliable historical data are available and have been used as generic 
dropped objects frequencies. This assumption is mostly based on the previous one 
presented in example 1. 
 
With respect to the degree of sensitivity, we have assigned a high score to this 
assumption since any minor change in lifting activities are reflected directly in risk 
of dropped objects and hence increasing fatality and impairment risk as discussed in 
sections above. 
 
Finally an overall index of M-H has been considered for this assumption based on 
the arguments we have presented for evaluating this assumption and its total 
impacts on other parts of the analysis. 
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5.5. Collision Resistance of Jack-up rig (Example 3) 
In this part, we will evaluate an example of assumptions from the design category. 
Table 5.17. Assumed collision resistance of jack-up rig [18] 
 
 
 
5.5.1 General notes about the assumption 
According to the Valemon report [17], structural failure can result from overload of the 
structure (structure exposed to loads exceeding its design loads). Such accident loads could 
be due to for example: 
 Collision impact  
 Fire exposure  
 Gas explosion loads  
 Sea bed cratering due to blowout outside casing  
 Extreme waves  
 Extreme wind  
 
 
The main concern for this example is the structural failure due to vessel collision impacts. 
One of the underlying assumptions would then be the increased number of vessel visits 
(example1) and the shape and size of the vessels that might lead to different frequency and 
impact energy of collision. 
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Generally structural response studies cover a wide variety of studies which are aimed at 
predicting the performance of the structural elements when subjected to accidental loads 
arising from accidental events such as vessel collision, explosion, extreme weather etc.[21] 
This example of assumptions varies in nature from the first two examples mentioned before 
in sections 5.3 and 5.4 since it is selected from the design category of assumptions of 
Valemon. The design load for jack-up rig legs which is the main focus of this example, is 
directly related to vessel collision study that we have discussed in example 1. However, in 
the first example, we were mainly concerned with the frequency of supply vessel visits as 
we were discussing the impact of increased numbers of supply vessel visits to both Valemon 
and the jack-up rig. In this example, on the other hand, the emphasis should be directed to 
the impact energy for vessel collisions to the rig. And this is very important because this 
impact energy is considered to be an input to DAL for the report. 
 
Note that the ship collision risk itself is based on a set of operational assumptions. For 
example an increase of number of supply vessel visits to Valemon may result in 
unacceptable risk with the current design loads. (example1) 
 
According to the assumption description the design criteria for the rig legs is to stand in 14 
MJ. [18]However, the assigned probabilities, expected values or some assigned values based 
on past experience and background knowledge are just epistemic-based expressions of 
uncertainty and conceal a great deal of uncertainty within themselves. Hence, we should 
look beyond these numbers and evaluate the uncertainties that may cause deviation from 
this assumption.  
 
 
5.5.2. Integrated effect of the assumption 
In this section we will discuss the relation of this assumption with different areas of QRA. 
Since this assumption is about design issues, the approach would be to focus on supply 
vessel potential collision impact energies. 
 
5.5.2.1 Framework and RAC 
According to the framework and set standards, structures should be able to maintain a 
certain amount of impact loads called the main load bearing (design load)for structures. 
According to the NORSOK standards z013 [10], the RAC for impairment frequency of main 
load bearing structures has been set to be less than 1E-4 per year [17]. 
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With respect to RAC, however, the assumption needs to be modified and it has been shown 
that the design load of 14MJ is not sufficient for maintaining the structural integrity of the 
jack-up and it has been provided the calculation for modifying the assumed design load to 
be 45 MJ so that the impairment frequency of jack-up legs would meet the RAC (that is the 
impairment frequency of less than10-4 per year) 
Referring to risk results of Valemon report, [17], is has been documented that : 
 
The frequency of “impairment of main load bearing structure” due to ship collisions onto the 
jack-up rig has been calculated, and it becomes 2.36∙10-4 per year. This is based on that the 
jack-up legs have been checked to withstand a vessel impact of 14 MJ, according to input 
from Statoil. As a consequence of the jack-up rig being impaired by ship collisions, Valemon 
will also be affected. Hence, the risk acceptance criterion “impairment of main load bearing 
structure” is not met for Valemon with a design impact load of 14 MJ for the jack-up rig.  
A short sensitivity on ship impact load and frequencies, shows that in order to meet the risk 
acceptance criterion “impairment of main load bearing structure” for Valemon, the design 
load for the jack-up needs to be set to 45 MJ .[20] 
 
We can easily observe that the criteria for jack-up legs impairment has not been met due to 
vessel collision impact energy. 
That is an important thing to mention about the documentation of the assumption. If one 
from a superficial observation decides to design the legs for 14 MJ as mentioned in the 
assumption description, due to other assumptions and calculations of vessel impact energy, 
(which is outside the scope of this work) the structure would collapse causing major 
destruction to both the rig and the Valemon. 
5.5.2.2 HAZID 
Reviewing the hazard identification according to FEED phase of the Valemon report, some 
related hazard identified related to these design assumptions might be: 
 Collision risk 
 Structural failure  
 Jack-up capsize 
 
The first hazard mainly serves as causation for this assumption as we have mentioned in 
5.5.1. And the rest are considered consequences of not complying with design load for the 
rig. Nonetheless, the main theme for evaluating this assumption lies in the impact energy of 
supply vessels visiting the jack-up rig. 
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5.5.2.3 Cause Analysis 
The main cause for impairment of jack up rig seems to be the collision between the supply 
vessels and the rig. The increased number of visits, would affect the impairment frequency 
that we had discussed in example one. And the calculation of Impact energy defines the 
required design load for the jack-up legs. 
Therefore, here, we briefly mention the calculation method for impact energy of vessel 
collisions. 
The basic equation for evaluating total impact energy due to a vessel collision is s follows [] 
 
           equation 5.3 
 
where 
E = total impact energy [MJ]  
m = vessel displacement [tonnes]  
dms = added mass (0.1 for bow/stern, 0.4 for sideways impact)  
v = velocity at impact [m/s] 
 
The total impact energy is distributed between collision damage of the installation and 
remaining kinetic energy for the impacting vessel (for an example where the supply vessel 
suffered large deformations). [20] 
Ensuring that the vessels reduce the speed within the safety zone is determining for 
reducing the consequences associated with collision. However, collisions that exceed the 
design accidental load for the jack-up rig legs are considered to have the potential to cause 
impairment of main load bearing structure. 
According to the equation 5.3, one could conclude that the size of the vessel is of great 
influence for calculating the impact energy which is dimensioning for the design load of the 
jack-up legs in this example and therefore needs to be acknowledged in our opinion. 
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5.5.2.4Consequence Analysis 
The focus for this section would be on design collision loads. 
The consequences of structural failure being the jack-up rig for this example, besides the 
material damage to itself, is that it might fall on the Valemon structure and cause 
impairment of safety functions and escape ways. It could also lead to damaging critical areas 
such as the process areas and eventually cause fire or explosions. In addition, it is a threat to 
personnel risk as well. In the worst case scenario, the whole structural impairment would 
be the loss of main support structure (Valemon) and it is a major risk resulting in damaging 
all the safety functions and eventually capsizing the platform. Some experienced jack-up 
structural failure has been shown in table 5.18. 
Table 5.18.Experienced jack up failures [ 21] 
 
According to the Valemon report [17], as one ultimate consequence it has been stated: 
Failure of jack-up leg is assumed to result in structural impairment of the Valemon Platform. 2 
out of 3 legs will give 100% impairment, whereas 1 out of 3 will give 50% impairment. 
The above explanation is also considered another assumption which has not been 
documented in the main assumptions list. This could be important in clarifying what is 
meant by “impairment” of the rig in the report. This assumption then serves as an 
underlying analytical assumption. 
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5.5.2.5 Risk Picture 
For evaluating the relation between the design assumptions, we are interested in its possible 
impact on the impairment frequencies, personnel, asset and environmental risk. 
  Impairment of main safety functions 
Vessel-structure collisions may occur from different types of vessels with various 
frequencies of occurrence and consequence potential. The risk contributions from each type 
of vessels are summed up and presented in the following and represent the total risk ship 
collision risk. 
Vessel collisions on the jacket or the jack-up legs above the design loads are estimated to 
give impairment of main load bearing structure. In such cases, it is not considered of 
interest to at the same time sum up impairment of the other main safety functions, since the 
whole installation is lost in such cases. 
The total impairment frequency of main load bearing structure on Valemon due to ship 
collisions for the different activity levels has been presented in the table 5.19. 
 
Table 5.19 Impairment frequency of main load bearing structure on Valemon[20] 
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Personnel risk 
Personnel risk due to passing vessels and supply vessel collisions, causing total loss of 
Valemon is presented in the tables below for activity levels 1, 4 and 5, activity levels 2 and 3, 
and for activity levels 6 separately.  
According to Valemon report, for supply vessel collisions, it has been conservatively 
assumed that all personnel are killed. It is assumed that for passing vessels, all personnel 
will have evacuated before impact, i.e. no fatalities. [20] 
One should note that again this is an assumption not listed anywhere else but has been 
implied indirectly in an appendix. This is based on degree of belief of the analyst(s) and is 
therefore necessary to be documented for other reviewers in order to shed light on the 
calculations of fatalities. 
 
Table 5.20. PLL and FAR due to passing vessel and supply vessel collisions causing total loss of 
Valemon - activity level 1, 4 and 5[20] 
 
 
Table 5.21. PLL and FAR due to passing vessel and supply vessel collisions causing total loss of 
Valemon - activity level 6 [20] 
 
 
Calculation of FAR value Valemon with jack-up present [20][19][27] 
According to the previous data and calculations provided in data dossier for Valemon [19] a 
frequency of structural failure of 8.9∙10-5 per year has been documented for jack up rig. 
Conservatively assuming that all structural failures of the jack-up rig also leads to collapse of 
Valemon, the impairment of main structure due to structural failure becomes:  
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1∙10-5 + 8.9∙10-5 = 9.9 ∙10-5 per year  
 
The FAR value is quantified assuming 50% survivability of personnel:  
 
 
The underlying assumptions need to be noticed since they play a great role in defining the 
FAR values. Without knowing these underlying assumptions, the results are not just more 
than some numbers. 
A summary of the quantified risk for each activity level (Valemon operational phase) is 
presented in Table 5.22. 
 
Table 5.22: Risk summary – structural failures [20] 
 
 
According to figure 4.5(Valemon total FAR contributors), the FAR value contributor due to 
structural failure to the total FAR is considered the third major contributor with the value of 
0.57 out of the total value of 6.73. 
The value complies with the RAC for Valemon but the effect of underlying assumption on 
this value is not negligible due to possible major consequence of structural failure and 
capsizing which will lead to loss of main support structure and conservatively loss of all 
personnel on board. 
5.5.2.6 Uncertainties 
Impairment of main load bearing structure of Valemon is above the criterion of 1·10-4 per 
year. This is mainly due to supply vessel collisions onto the jack-up rig. The jack-up legs can 
withstand a collision impact of 14 MJ, and the impairment of main load bearing structure 
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due to impact load is not met. If the jack-up shows to withstand more than 45 MJ 
(calculations are outside the scope of this work), the risk acceptance criterion can be met. 
[20] [21] However, there are several underlying assumptions for the vessel collision risk 
which is important to follow up further, there are uncertainties in the underlying 
assumptions for vessel impact loads. Such uncertainties may be operational assumptions, 
like the number of supply vessel visits per year, or whether any other risk reducing 
measures to prevent collision with the jack-up or the jacket can be used.  
 
5.5.3 Final Remarks and discussion for this example 
 
 An important point to be considered in this assumption is again the relation and 
interdependency of assumptions to each other. If this assumption were to be evaluated 
independently, would have never been proven to be invalid. However, when one considers 
the underlying assumptions made for vessel collisions, a conclusion is reached that in 
order to comply with the RAC the assumption has to be modified. As for this example, for 
instance, the dependency between the underlying assumption, in number of supply vessel 
visits to jack-up has been considered and due to consideration of that assumption, and 
with a sensitivity analysis of impact energies and frequencies which is outside the scope of 
this work, it has been proven hat a 45 MJ resistance for jack-up legs is required rather than 
coarse assumed value of 14 MJ resistance. 
 
 
 A word on design: Finally, another point that is also worth mentioning here, when 
evaluating the design basis for structures, some information on design criteria is required. 
Normally, after several tests have been applied and the necessary experiments have been 
done, normally a safety factor is also considered for ensuring to be on the safe side. It is 
used as a measure to fill in the gap of what is calculated and expected and what really 
happens in reality; but this safety factor is also subjected to uncertainties and there are 
usually standard values defined for it according to which area of the design is being dealt 
with. 
The application of safety factor is rather conservative in most cases but it has been 
considered necessary for design issues since there are always uncertainties with the tests 
and in other inputs for calculating the design loads. This safety factor would work as a 
compensation for some of the unnoticed uncertainties. However, there have been 
arguments about the values of these safety factors for each design category and therefore 
there is still a degree of uncertainty in the assignment of the value in itself. But we are not 
intending to go further in this matter for this work. 
 For more information about design loads and limit states see APP.F. 
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Finally, we would like to present the importance table for this assumption based on 
all the discussions above. 
 
 
Table 5.23. Importance ranking of example 3, Collision resistance of jack-up legs 
Assumption 
Description 
Degree of 
Uncertainty 
Degree of 
Sensitivity 
Degree of 
Importance 
Collision resistance 
of jack-up rig legs 
H H H 
 
 
Based on the discussions above and according to criteria mentioned in table 5.1, the 
degree of uncertainty for this assumption is considered to be high since models for 
design are believed to give poor predictions. According to the report the assumed 
14MJ impact capacity has been proved to be coarsely and carelessly calculated and 
other interactions have been neglected and therefore test results of sensitivity 
analysis in the report documented that the capacity should be improved to 45 MJ for 
design basis. Additionally there has been a lack of agreement between the experts. 
 
 
With respect to the degree of sensitivity, also a high score has been assigned to this 
assumption since a small deviation from the base case could lead to excessing 
design load for jack-up legs could then cause jack-up to fall over Valemon and 
hereby impairment of the main safety functions for Valemon. 
 
Finally an overall index of H has been considered for this assumption based on the 
arguments we have presented for evaluating this assumption and its total impacts 
on other parts of the analysis. This assumption is considered to be critical in design 
criteria. 
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5.6. Equipment Count (Example 4) 
This assumption falls into the analytical category of the assumptions and hence, differs in 
nature with the three previously discussed examples.  
Table 5.24. Assumption description for equipment count [18] 
 
 
 
5.6.1. General Description of the assumption 
The main importance of equipment count in QRAs is the hazard it is associated with; leak 
frequencies. Flawed equipment especially main process equipment could be a source a 
leakage in the system. And normally, the more equipment in the system, the greater will be 
the leak frequencies simply because of the greater number of sources of errors. That is the 
reason why critical equipment contributing to leak frequency should be counted and 
documented. Now, the main question would be: how to count the equipment in a normally 
complex system like an offshore platform including process units? Is it possible for the 
personnel to actually go into the process unit for example and count the equipment one by 
one? Or are there other methods that have been applied in current industry? 
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We are going to discuss about the method used in the Valemon report for counting 
equipment and evaluating the pros and cons of it. 
According to the description of the assumption in this section, the Valemon equipment 
count has been based on P&IDs. A P&ID consists of various elements. Some special 
equipment contributes more to leak frequencies and the emphasis has been made on 
establishing an acceptable method for their count. According to the Lillleaker TRA report in 
equipment count for Valemon[24]: 
Main units, instruments and valves found are considered good estimates (for equipment 
count). Flanges and pipe lengths are quite uncertain and the following assumptions have 
therefore been made: 
Most valves are assumed flanged. Number of flanges counted has been multiplied by1.5 (to 
assure conservatism since flanged connections on piping are not seen on P&IDs. Also they are 
considered as sources of leaks. 
Length of main process piping is solely estimated based on equipment plot plans. 
Length of small bore piping is set twice number of flanges. E.g. if there are 3 off 2” flanges, it is 
assumes 6 meters of 2” piping. 
 
As one can see, there are several assumptions mentioned above such as introducing a 
coefficient of 1.5 for total calculation of number of flanges. This coefficient (or a 
compensation factor if we may call it that), has been made for the calculations to be on the 
safe side. The assumption has been claimed to be conservative meaning normally the 
calculated result is higher than what the number of flanges usually are. 
One might ask why a factor of 2 for example has not been chosen. Well, this goes back to the 
discussions we have made in chapter2; this value has been made according to some 
assessor(s) ` background knowledge on similar situations. Another more conservative 
analyst for example could have simply chosen a factor of 2. Any number assigned would in 
any case include epistemic-based uncertainties and there is no reference for these numbers 
but the background knowledge. Another important issue would then be how any possible 
alteration of these assumed numbers would affect the leak frequency and the ultimate risk 
picture in the end. 
 
5.6.2.Integrated Effect 
In this section, we are going to discuss the relation of this assumption example with the rest 
of the system. 
  
134 
 
 
5.6.2.1 HAZID 
One of the very important hazards identified in any oil/gas platform including process 
facilities is the risk of process leaks or generally leaks from any source. Hydrocarbon 
releases (HCR) may occur from the process, the wells and from the risers and pipelines. 
There could be different reasons for a release and the release could also take place at 
different locations. ‘This assumption of equipment lift is mainly affecting the process risk 
which is limited to leaks occurring inside the platform modules during normal operation. 
The above assumption has a very direct effect on leak risk in terms of frequencies as 
increased number of equipment (or increased length in pipelines etc.) could normally 
initiate more leak possibilities. The important case here is not to misjudge this effect as 
being totally linear; as if the twice the number of equipment or length of a pipe, the twice 
greater the risk (frequency) of the leak rates would be. 
Once again we should bear in mind, that in all selected examples, we are not dealing with a 
linear and independent system as there are many dynamic and integrated parts in the 
system interacting with each other. The whole system is integrated and changing each and 
every part of the system could result in other interactions.  
This interaction should to some extent be noticed and discerned by the analyst and that is 
why one of the requirements for the way assumptions in a QRA should be presented 
(according to Statoil guideline GL0282)[11] was mentioned to be traceability of the 
assumption to its possible sources and areas of influence. 
 
5.6.2.2Cause (and frequency) Analysis 
 
The number of possible leak sources per process unit need to be identified in order to 
calculate the annual leak frequencies. These leak sources include flanges, valves, 
instruments, pumps and other process equipment like pressure vessels and heat 
exchangers. The identification of these sources is mainly done by using the P&IDs. [23][24] 
The normal method for establishing leak frequencies is to multiply the probability of leak 
per equipment by the corresponding number of equipment. 
As one can infer from the mentioned method, there are uncertainties with both the assigned 
and conditional (on background knowledge) probabilities of leak for each equipment and 
the number of equipment themselves. 
For this selected example of equipment count, the focus is on the number of flanges and the 
pipe lengths since they seem to be subject to large uncertainties and need to be estimated or 
assumed. The basis for the assumption or the underlying assumption – in other words- is 
the P&ID of the platform. First a (safety) factor of 1.5 has been assumed to be multiplied by 
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the counted flanges. That seems reasonable since there are great amount of joints on piping 
which are flanged and yet are quite indiscernible from a P&ID plot. It is not a fixed and 
proven number, it is just based on the background knowledge of the assessor, and however, 
the number might be less or even more up to twice the counted number depending on 
different case.  
It is therefore quite necessary to state which assumption has been preferred and applied in 
calculating and presenting risk for leak frequencies. Since the number of flanges is 
associated directly to leak frequencies and could eventually cause irreversible severe 
damages. 
The second assumption is the length of piping in the system. In this report piping has been 
divided into the main process piping which is merely estimated on equipment plot plans 
and small bore pipes which is assumed to be twice the number of estimated flanges.[24] 
Therefore there is a direct relation to the assumed number of flanges and the small bore 
pipings; the dedicated length considered between each flange is hereby assumed to be 2 
meters (one meter from each side). (Note that the diameter should be the same of course 
for the pipe and the required flanges along the flow path). 
This seems to be a reasonable assumption assuring that there is at least a meter distance 
from each side of the flange to maintain some distance between the equipment. But what is 
this assumption based upon? Again the answer is the standard design requirements and of 
course the knowledge of the assessor in this matter. 
In all the above cases, the underlying assumption could be well challenged, should man rely 
on P&IDs to form the estimation for the required number of valves, flanges, other 
equipment and even the length of piping? 
If this assumption is not valid or for example not being approved, an alternative to P&ID-
dependent equipment count might be to carry out some manual spot checks to get the idea 
of how many equipment is really in practice. Even the compensation factor assigned to be 
multiplied by the observed number of flanges could then vary based on the inspector´s 
check results and his/her method of counting observation. 
It might however be argued that in today`s practice it is not such a wise idea to send 
personnel in the vicinity of the process area (or risers and pipelines) for a long time (since 
real counting requires time) to actually count the equipment due to risk to personnel, safety 
reasons and the process being really time consuming. In addition, the results of manual 
count would not even be 100% reliable due to involved human errors. 
According to Espen Fyhn Nilsen, Risk Analysis Specialist at Statoil, currently there have 
been some calculations and presentations of leak frequency estimates in terms of leak 
frequency per installation. The numbers are basically derived based on similarities between 
a new and previously operated installation that have been considered more or less the 
same. 
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In our opinion, even though this approach saves a lot of effort for time consuming 
calculation, the uncertainties involved with it is even higher than the previous approach of 
equipment count. Eventually a compromise has to be made to find a method that works well 
for the installation. 
 
5.6.2.3Consequence Analysis 
As discussed in the previous section, the validity of this assumption has a direct effect on 
process leaks. The more the number of flanges and valves (equipment in general) or the 
more length of piping, the more it will possible for a leak to appear in the system due to 
corrosion, required maintenance, bad joints, different pressure and temperature 
discrepancies etc. But as in the other cases discussed so far, this relation between the 
number of equipment and the probability of leak (or leak frequency) does not follow a 
linear and straightforward pattern. Interdependencies and hidden sources of uncertainties 
should also be considered in leak frequency and estimations. The events are not considered 
independent and therefore the relation can be almost close to linear to some extent with 
one by one increase of the equipment but as the added number of equipment goes higher in 
amount, some uncertainty factors represent themselves in terms of nonlinear behaviors of 
the system.  
 
Some of the common consequences and identified hazardous events due to leaks from 
process equipment and piping are:  
• High gas concentrations in the modules) 
• Jet and pool fires  
• Gas explosions  
The ultimate consequences of the leaks that would later are ignited and lead to fire and 
explosions could be loss of main support structure, personnel fatalities and even oil spill to 
sea. 
 
5.6.2.4 Risk Picture 
The influence of this assumption on risk level could be defined as : 
Flanges and pipe lengths contribute significantly to leak risk (especially frequency and 
location) and thus on all risk measures.[24] 
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 Personnel risk 
This assumption plays a considerable role in the presented risk picture for the whole 
platform. According to figure 4.5 (the Valemon total FAR distribution per accident 
category), the process leaks are major contributors to FAR and PLL values.  The Far value 
for process leaks has been estimated to be 0.72 out of the whole 6.73 FAR value for the 
whole platform in level 5 which makes the process leaks the second major contributor to 
fatality risk (after vessel collision risk). 
According to the Valemon report (process leaks) [23]: 
Process equipment may leak in different areas, all with different frequency of occurrence and 
consequence potential. The risk contributions from each main area are summed up and 
presented in the following table and represent the total risk from process accidents. 
The distribution of this .72 FAR value can be shown in the table below: 
 
Table 5.25: PLL and FAR contribution from each area (activity level 5) [23] 
 
 
 
According to the table, it is seen that the majority of loss of life occurs “immediately”, i.e. 
due to direct exposure from heat and blast. About 11 % is due impaired escape routes.  
The major contributor to risk is from leaks in the wellhead area.[23] 
 
Impairment of main safety functions  
The leaks, if ignited could lead to fire /explosions with high pressures that might cause 
structural failure and hence could also influence impairment of main safety functions such 
as escape routes, safe rooms and main support structure. 
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Oil Spill 
Condensate leaks from large process inventories can result in oil spill to the sea. All 
condensate spills related to process accidents can be assumed to have relatively short 
duration.[23] Leak frequencies are therefore very important to be estimated on a 
reasonable and reliable basis. Another assumption in this report is that only leaks with 
initial rate larger than 20kg/s are assumed to lead to spill to sea.[23] Only this scenario is 
considered which should have been stated in the assumptions list for Valemon. 
 
5.6.2.5 System Description for equipment count 
Before we further discuss the importance of this assumption, it would be worthy to take a 
look at the process diagram for Valemon to se what serves as a basis for all leak frequency 
calculations. 
A P&ID is a complex representation of the various units found in a plant. A schematic of the 
process system for Valemon is shown in Figure below. The wells are classified HPHT.[17] 
 
 
 
 
Figure5.6 The process diagram for Valemon platform [17] 
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These kinds of P&ID diagrams are currently considered building blocks for equipment 
count in order for leak frequency estimation. 
According to the report, the number of possible leak sources per process unit need to be 
identified in order to calculate the annual leak frequencies. These leak sources include 
flanges, valves, instruments, pumps and other process equipment like pressure vessels and 
heat exchangers. The identification of these sources is mainly done by using the P&IDs. [24] 
An example of equipment count sheet has been provided here in Table 5.23 below for 
consideration. 
Table 5.26 Equipment count data sheet sample [24] 
 
For further information about P&ID and equipment count, see Appendix G. 
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5.6.3 Discussions on Equipment Count Example 
So far we have identified the leak frequency estimations as the main challenge associated 
with the number of equipment and we have discussed the possible consequences and the 
influence the equipment count assumptions may have on the total risk picture. In this 
discussion part we are going to bring into attention some points about this example that 
need to be noticed. 
 
 By now, one should be encouraged enough to think of the underlying assumptions 
for this example. One common underlying assumption for almost all the examples 
mentioned so far for Valemon has been identified as the different the activity levels 
assumed for Valemon (see 5.4…..). The importance is because for each phase defined for 
the field there are different activities being implemented and the number of equipment 
changes in time according to a change in the number of wells and other modifications 
required in time. 
 
      According to the Valemon report  for process leak risks[23]: 
     The leak frequency in each area will change with time for several reasons;  
 Number of wells in production  
 Number of drilling and well intervention operations  
 Change in flowing wellhead pressure  
 Change in inlet separator pressure  
 Number of tie-in wells  
 Introduction of future compression module  
 
The personnel risk and impairment frequencies may in general be considered to increase   
with increasing leak frequency and the year of highest leak frequency should therefore be 
chosen as basis for the risk analysis (it has been chosen to be a year during activity level 5, 
2024 maybe according to the report) [23] 
 
 Another underlying assumption has been considered to be the methodology for 
counting equipment. One could challenge using P&IDs for basis of count due to several 
reasons for example not being extensive and accurate enough. We have suggested some 
alternatives and modifications for this such as spot checks and manual counts, and 
dedication of a compensation factors to critical and redundant equipment such as valves or 
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flanges. ( See sections 5.6.1 and 5.6.2.2) 
 
 Another issue to be considered in consequences of equipment count is that for 
easier equipment counting normally segmentation is being carried out and the equipment 
for each segment is counted and documented. In that case the location of the leaks is also 
detectable to some extent. And the consequences would be more predictable, if we know 
the leak frequency as well as leak location, it would be easier to predict the potential 
explosion pressure. If the leak happens in a more congested area due to the higher number 
of equipment the explosion pressure would be much higher than if an explosion happens 
due to a leak in area with very few equipment. And that is another effect of equipment 
count (complexity of system) might have on the risk level. 
 
 Finally, a comment on the presentation of the assumption of equipment count based 
on the Table 5.21(Assumption description) is that so far it has been the most detailed 
assumption presented. Almost all the fields in the table are filled out in the description of 
the assumption including the lifetime variation of the assumption, which was mentioned in 
this section as well. According to the table the assumptions have been again assumed to be 
conservative. However, there is uncertainty to what extent this assumption is reliable and 
it has not been mentioned that on what grounds the assumptions are considered 
conservative.  
 
Assuming that to be valid, being conservative with respect to this assumption, means that 
the results are most probably not going to be worse than the presented risk picture, with 
respect to great deal of uncertainty existent in the world, surprises might also happen and 
this is something that cannot be shown by the results only. One might be able to see beyond 
the results of a risk analysis. 
 
 
 
And finally, we like to present the importance score table for this assumption. 
 
 Table 5.27 Importance ranking of Equipment Count Example  
Assumption 
Description 
Degree of 
Uncertainty 
Degree of 
Sensitivity 
Degree of 
Importance 
Equipment count L M L-M 
 
Based on the discussions above and according to criteria mentioned in table 5.1, the degree 
of uncertainty for this assumption is considered to be low because the models for 
equipment count (P&IDs) are believed to give predications with acceptable accuracy. In 
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addition, assumptions with equipment count and compensation factors, which are 
mentioned in the discussions of assumption, seem conservatively reasonable. And so far 
there has been agreement on this method of count between experts though we have 
challenged this method in this work. 
 
With respect to the degree of sensitivity, a medium score has been assigned to this 
assumption since relatively large changes in base case values needed to bring about altered 
conclusions. The effect of alterations in this assumption is reflected in the risk picture by 
changing the leak frequency as discussed in previous sections but a small deviations of 
equipment count can be compensated by other measures introduced in sections above and 
dies not leak to immediate change in leak frequencies. 
 
Therefore an overall index of L-M has been considered for this assumption based on the 
arguments we have presented for evaluating this assumption and its total impacts on other 
parts of the analysis.  
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5.7. Manning level and distribution (Example5) 
In this section we will discuss the manning distributions for different activity levels for 
Valemon: 
Table 5.28. Manning level and distribution for Valemon [18] 
 
 
This example of assumption is different from many aspects with the previous four examples 
that have already been discussed mainly because it involves human beings. In addition, 
uncertainties with this assumption are considered higher. This is due to the fact that 
Valemon has not been built yet and the activity levels defined below that serve as an 
underlying assumption for manning distributions are quite uncertain in themselves. 
According to the Valemon report about uncertainties with this respect: 
There are some uncertainties with respect to manning distributions and activity levels [17] : 
 
 The input on manning level and distribution on areas is highly uncertain. The 
manning study by Statoil has not been finalized. The assumptions made for manning is 
important for calculating personnel risk: among other total FAR, Group risk and PLL (the 
latter for normally not manned phase).  
The assumed manning level and distribution and its impacts are the main issues to be 
discussed in this section. 
 
 
 
 Activity levels during lifetime: Production from the Valemon field is associated with 
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a significant uncertainty. Therefore, there is uncertainties connected with production 
profile (and number of producing wells), required well intervention activities, required  
manning etc. Hence, as many as 6 possible activity levels have been defined for the period 
2014 to 2027, considering drilling, well intervention, production profiles, number of tied-in 
wells and future installations. The combination of such activities within each activity level is 
decisive for which activity level will be dimensioning for the installation, when considering 
the risk acceptance criteria.  
This uncertainty influences the manning level and distribution, which we shall consider 
during all discussions related to this issue. 
 
It is worth mentioning that this assumption belongs to the operational/organizational 
category of assumption, however, the reason why we have chosen to discuss this after all 
the other assumptions is that to be able to see the previous examples reflections in this 
assumption. 
 
The importance and criticality of this assumption originates from the fact that the assumed 
numbers for manning serve as the direct input for calculating personnel risk in presenting 
the risk picture. And since any miscalculations or misjudgments in this matter lead to direct 
loss of lives, great care has to be taken when assuming the manning levels for different 
areas and different activity levels. Normally, the tendency should be towards choosing 
conservative assumptions due to criticality of the consequences. 
 
 In this section, first we will review the total manning for each activity level and then the 
detailed distribution of manning in different areas of the platform is considered. We will 
discuss and comment this mainly for activity level 5 which is been documented to have the 
dimensioning status (due to various simultaneous activities) and also activity level 6, which 
is the normally not manned activity level. Table 5.12 shows the total manning for each 
activity level. 
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Table 5.29. Manning level for each operational phase[18] 
 
Before further of the assumption, we shall first encourage the reader to remember the 6 
activity levels defined for Valemon (Section.5.4) due to their great influence on manning 
distribution patterns and assumptions. Once again, note that the tables presented for 
manning are associated with significant uncertainty, since the manning study for Valemon 
has not been finalized yet.  
 
5.7.1 Some comments on the assumption: 
 
Increased manning means increased fatality risk and potential loss of lives since the 
number of exposed people becomes higher. Increased manning in high-risk areas increases 
overall FAR value. It is worth reminding about FAR and PLL values which represent the 
fatality risk in the risk picture.  
PLL= The expected number of fatalities (normally) per year 
FAR= The expected number of fatalities per 100 million exposed hours 
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Note that PLL is just and indicator for group risk, while FAR represents individual risk. And 
if the manning is assumed the same for calculations of PLL and FAR, the FAR is simply a 
ratio of PLL and the main indicator would be PLL. However, it is useful and dives the 
reviewer a good insight to present both values of FAR and PLL in the total risk picture. 
Manning distribution deals with the number of people working or being present at different 
areas of on the platform. And one of the main concerns of offshore accidents is to avoid or 
reduce the risk to personnel. Therefore any assumption with respect to this matter is 
considered of great importance and has to be studied carefully and treated sensitively. 
Another area of effect of the manning level distribution would be the alterations in leak 
frequency value. It is usually the case that the more people working on different areas 
(except for LQ for this case), the higher the probability of initiating a leak due to potential 
activities in maintenance, hot work, check-ups and manual manipulation of the system 
intentionally or unintentionally by personnel. Although it might be challenging to see the 
immediate results of difference in manning distribution in leak frequency, it is more 
convenient to observe the results in presented and calculated PLL and FAR values.  
The immediate and direct effect of alterations in the manning level would lead to change in 
potential loss of lives and fatal accident risk calculations with respect to risk analysis. The 
mentioned parameters play an important role in presenting the total risk picture of any 
facilities, so care should be taken when dealing with manning distributions since they serve 
as a basis for these calculations. The challenging part here is that the Valemon platform has 
not yet been built however, the calculation of risk picture parameters is necessary for the 
preliminary TRA of the platform for the participants. As a result a totally knowledge and 
experienced-based probability distributions are assigned to manning distributions. 
In typical manning level tables of a QRA the tables have been classified according to 
working group (personnel group) meaning the role and responsibility they have in the 
system and different areas of the platform. 
A night and day shift separate sheet is sometimes included. In this report however, since the 
platform has not been built and operated yet, and there are therefore a great deal of 
uncertainty with it, as mentioned in the beginning of this section, there has been assignment 
of different activity levels which is also listed as one of the main and basic assumptions for 
the whole TRA and here therefore plays the role of underlying assumption for the manning 
distributions assigned. These levels were introduced above. 
In the section below, we will focus on manning distributions in activity level 5 which is 
considered to be one of the populated levels including both production and intervention as 
well as all future modification (jack-up present for workover only) and activity level 6 
(normally not manned production phase) 
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5.7.2.Integrated impact of the assumption 
Some issues to be considered here is that the manning differ greatly in different operational 
phases (activity levels) as well as in different areas of the platform ( Process, Wellhead, LQ 
,…) and also according to day and night shifts. 
The following tables are just solely assignments of knowledge-based values by the analysts. 
Given the numbers are basically epistemic probabilities they are quite uncertain and so 
great care should be taken while assigning these probabilities. Since they would then serve 
as a basis for the next steps in many different calculations for the QRA report and will 
eventually have a great impact on the presented risk picture of the platform. 
In this example, we will not go very deep in reviewing all the assumptions (the detailed 
percentage of manning distributed on the whole platform according to the proposed tables 
for each activity level). Our main concern would be the effect of changing this assumption 
(the assigned probabilities) on different parts of the QRA especially HAZID, cause and 
consequence analysis and more importantly the risk picture (level). 
The basis for our discussions would be table 5.12 with general manning classified according 
to activity levels. The detailed distribution is also available in the following tables 5.27-5.33. 
 
 
5.7.2.1 FRAMEWORK: 
It is necessary the manning level and distribution would be in line with the set standards. 
There have been some regulations with respect to acceptance criteria for Valemon: 
Based on the report: [17] 
The acceptance criteria for Individual Personnel Risk (Manned Phase):  
The mean individual risk, expressed by the fatal accident rate (FAR) – must meet the criteria 
FAR < 10.  
For specially exposed groups (Operation, Mechanic, Electric / automation and Maintenance  
Contractor, or as defined in TRA / EPA), the mean group individual risk, expressed by the fatal 
accident rate (FAR) – must meet the criteria FAR < 25. 
 
Personnel risk for Valemon: 
The Valemon platform shall be normally not manned. It is however required to be manned 
during drilling, well interventions, pigging activities and maintenance. Hence, both FAR 
and PLL criteria may be relevant depending on the operational phase. 
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The relevant groups for calculation of Group Individual Risk for Valemon are assumed: 
  Management  
  Operation  
  Mechanic  
  Electric and automation  
  LQ service    
  
Calculation of FAR for Valemon is based on exposure when manned, thus N (total number of 
hours of risk exposure per year) is the number of manned hours per year. The criteria shall 
apply as a mean for each 12 month period. [17] Hence, in this calculation, the PLL value is 
based on the same number of manned hours per year as for FAR calculation.  
 
5.7.2.2 SYSTEM DESCRIPTION: 
The system description has an influence on the overall manning level and also the number 
of people assigned for each position and being present at each position at specific places. 
The assumption of manning is based on the capacity of different areas and the requirement 
for work on those areas. Proper assignment of manning level in a platform would result in 
efficient use of the safety functions such as safe rooms and escape routes. Additionally, the 
number of people present at a time of an accident at different modules could contribute 
greatly to PLL calculations and contours. 
According to Vinnem [4], a risk assessment should always start with a system description. A 
precise definition of the system being analyzed assists both the analyst and more 
importantly those who will review or evaluate the study and the results. The system 
description should include: 
 Description of technical system, relevant activities and operational phases 
 Statement of the time period to which the analysis relates 
 Statement of the personnel groups , the external environment and the assets to 
which risk assessment relates 
 Capabilities of the system in relation to its ability to tolerate failures and its 
vulnerability to accidental effects[4] 
 
As we see, statement of personnel groups is considered important and part of system 
description, however, assigning the distribution and numbers is part of the assumptions. 
The purpose of the system description is to make the analysis sufficiently transparent, so 
that other participants are able to review and comment on it. 
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5.7.2.3.HAZID 
Reviewing the identified hazards for this report mentioned in section…, the manning level 
assumption could be associated with the following hazards: 
 Process leaks 
 Fire in utility areas 
 Occupational Accidents  
 Fire in Living quarters 
 
5.7.2.4CAUSE ANALYSIS 
The causes of the above hazards are either directly or indirectly associated with the 
personnel (manning). The more people are working in the area the more probable that 
different types of fire or leak occur (or any other occupational accidents). That is mostly due 
to the deliberate or undeliberate modification and interventions human beings are normally 
involved with while working. The personnel involved, are either entitled to do some 
modification/justification according to their job or it might be case that some alterations 
happen by mistake. Human error has always been an inevitable aspect in every system 
operated by/consists of humans. 
According to the report, occupational accidents are defined as accidents that are not caused 
by technical failure (hardware or operational related) of process equipment. Occupational 
accidents are accidents with no potential to cause fatalities outside the immediate area of 
the incident. They will be addressed by statistical analysis of previous accidents 
It can be gathered by the given definition of the occupational accidents that human error is 
one of the main reasons for initiating these events. And the relation between the number of 
human errors and the actual number of people present at an area (manning) should 
normally be obvious enough! 
 
 
5.7.2.5 CONSEQUENCE ANALYSIS 
Having defined the relation between the manning distribution assumption to the mentioned 
hazards and their causes, one might be then interested to evaluate the consequences of the 
mentioned hazard and the role of this assumption being relevant here.  
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The consequences for leaks and fires are quite extensive and could range from minor 
injuries, to complete impairment of safety functions, and structure failure, explosions, loss 
of lives, oil spill, etc. 
The assumption we are dealing with here, has a great influence on the consequences of 
almost all hazardous events in terms of risk to personnel. We could refer to process 
accidents, fire and explosions, leaks, structural failure, dropped objects, collision risk and so 
on. 
The effect of manning level will be recognized in the calculated/estimated PLL and FAR 
values either directly or indirectly. When an accident happens, the more exposed people 
available would certainly lead to more potential casualties. 
In the following discussion we will first review some points regarding the risk picture of 
Valemon and the role of manning in it in terms of FAR and PLL values and then review the 
manning distributions especially in activity levels 5 and 6 for gain better insight in 
understanding the results of the total risk picture. 
 
 
 
5.7.2.6 Risk Picture and Manning Distributions 
Personnel risk  
According on Valemon1 report here is the total result of the risk picture: 
The total FAR for Valemon in activity level 5 is calculated to be 6.73. [17]This is the activity 
level with the expected highest personnel risk. The total FAR for Valemon is well within the 
risk acceptance criteria of FAR <10 for personnel risk.  
 
The personnel risk, expressed as PLL, for Valemon in activity level 6 (NNM) is 8.4 ·10-4 per 
year. The PLL value for Valemon is well within the risk acceptance criteria of PLL < 0.004 
for personnel risk in NNM phases.[17] 
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Manning distribution Tables for Valemon Platform [18] 
 
Table 5.30.Personnel distribution for activity level 1: Simultaneous production and drilling phase (jack-
up drilling rig present, no well interventions) (per 24 hour) [18] 
 
 
The table above is considered for the activity level 1 which is considered to have a total 
average manning of 13. 
 
It is seen that 6 group of personnel have been distributed into the 7 divided main areas on 
the platform. The assumption is mainly based on the fact that the greatest percentage of 
manning of all groups is located in the LQ and the LQ service personnel are considered to 
be located there all the time.  
 
The process area which is considered to be the high-risk area is mostly occupied by 
operation and mechanic people which seems to be an acceptable assumption based on our 
background knowledge but still not certain at all. 
The only drill crew considered for drilling (since level 1 is a drilling phase as well) stays at 
the wellhead area on the platform for all time. The assigned percentages for the well 
intervention could have been assumed less than the ones we actually see since there 
assumed to be no well intervention at this phase. However, manning level assumptions 
should above of all be conservative assumptions. 
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Table 5.31: Personnel distribution for activity level 2: Normal production phase (no jack-up 
drilling rig, no well intervention) (per 24 hour) [18] 
For this activity level, there assumed to be no drilling activities anymore and there will be 
only normal production of the field. As one could easily observe, there has been no 
difference between this distribution and the previous one related to activity level1 except 
for the drilling crew that is not needed in this phase anymore. Still no well intervention 
considered for this phase so the numbers seen in the intervention deck column might be 
reconsidered. 
Table 5.32: Personnel distribution for activity level 3: Simultaneous production and well 
intervention (no jack-up drilling rig) (per 24 hour)[18] 
 
In activity level 3, there will be both production and intervention and as a result the number 
average manning will increase greatly due to the added intervention crew working both in 
LQ and outdoor which is considered to be 14 for both cases adding up to the total manning 
from 13 up to 40.It is then seen that the percentage of people working at intervention deck 
has been increased. The outdoor working intervention crew still spends most of their time 
(67.5%) in the Living Quarters. 
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Table 5.33: Personnel distribution for activity level 4: Simultaneous production, drilling and 
wireline well intervention (jack-up drilling rig present) (per 24 hour) [18] 
 
Activity level 4 is almost the same as level 3 with the only difference that the jack up rig is 
also present in this phase for further drilling and wireline well intervention so it might 
have been a more conservative assumption to dedicate higher percentages to personnel in 
well head area and well intervention deck for this level.  
 
Table 5.34: Personnel distribution for activity level 5: Simultaneous production and well 
intervention including all known future modifications (jack-up present for workover only) (per 
24 hour)[18] 
 
Activity level 5 is considered to be one of the most populated activity levels and 
contributing mostly to the FAR and PLL values. (According to the report, dimensioning 
level). There appears to be an extra manning of 8 drill crew working in wellhead area. 
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However, in this activity according to the main report, no drilling is being done, and the jack 
up is only present for well intervention and workover. Due to this definition, we think these 
extra added drill crew might be more relevant to be considered in activity level 4.Even 
discarding this issue, activity level 5 still seems eligible to be regarded as a dimensioning 
level. And the manning levels for this activity level serves are the basis for calculation and 
distribution of FAR values presented in the risk picture between the accident scenarios and 
areas. One should be very conservative and cautious for this distribution of manning. 
 
Table 5.35: Personnel distribution for activity level 6: Normally not manned production 
phase (no jack-up drilling rig, no well intervention) (per 24 hour)[18] 
 
This activity level is considered to normally not manned so the number of manning has 
been dramatically reduced to 7 but according to table 5.18 we should note that these people 
are only working 5 days out of 14 days at Valemon (12 hours a day). The total number of 
exposed hours is shown in the table 5.12 for each activity level. Exposed hours of all 
personnel are specifically needed in calculations of FAR values. Below we can compare the 
results of FAR and PLL for activity levels 5 and 6. 
Table 5.36 Total PLL and FAR, activity level 5 [18] 
 
Table 5.37 Total PLL and FAR, activity level 6 [18] 
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As seen the FAR value is well within the risk acceptance criteria of FAR < 10 for activity 
level 5.  
As seen the PLL value is well within the risk acceptance criteria of PLL < 0.004 for activity 
level 6. 
For activity level 6, it is worth mentioning that according to the framework defined for 
Valemon report: [18], 
Personnel Risk (Normally Not Manned Phase):  
For installations that are normally not manned, the PLL per year shall be below 4.0E-03, if 
annual manhours on the installation are less than 15000. If annual manhours exceed this, the 
FAR criteria shall apply. 
And according to table 5.15, one could see that the total exposed hours for activity level 6 
has been calculated (based on the assumptions only) to be 10,950 hours, which is less than 
15,000. Therefore the PLL criteria of 4.0E-03 shall apply for this activity level. [18] 
 
If one compares these two presented tables of the results of FAR and PLL values with the 
manning distributions for activity levels 5 and 6 provided in tables 5.31 and 5.32 
respectively, it can be concluded that the pattern the personnel distribution between the 
modules of the platform contributes directly to the risk picture since for every individual or 
group of personnel, it is very important that how much exposed hours they are working and 
how safely they are located. Eventually there are two factors that matter with respect to 
fatalities and manning patters. First, is the sole manning level (how many people) and 
second is the nature of distributions between different areas. Some areas are considered 
high-risk areas and having more personnel being exposed to those areas may lead to higher 
fatalities. In case of a major accident the personnel should be able to be evacuated through 
the escape routes and make their way to the lifeboats or be relocated to safe rooms and so 
on. Therefore having more personnel in the vicinity of process or wellhead area normally 
results in more fatalities rather than having the same number of personnel all located in LQ 
and safe rooms for most of the time. 
 
Manning level and fatalities per accident category 
Since the FAR distribution between accidents is considered to be important here for 
comparing the results of manning that we are discussing in this section, we shall once again 
present the level 5 FAR value distribution in pie diagram in Figure 5.8 below : 
 
The distribution of FAR between accident categories is shown in Figure 5.7 
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Figure 5.7. Distribution of FAR between accident categories [17] 
 
We could easily observe that the major contributor to FAR value in level 5 is the vessel 
collision fatalities. 
It is seen that the vessel collision risk is high, since as a result of a conservative assumption 
all personnel are assumed killed upon total loss of main support structure due to collision 
accidents with impact energies above the acceptance criteria that will lead to impairment of 
main load bearing structure. Given this argument, one should be able to relate the higher 
manning levels for platform to the higher fatality rates. 
 
Process leaks and structural failure are considered the second and the third (respectively) 
major contributors to fatality risks in level 5 as seen from Figure 5.8.We have discussed the 
severity and consequences of these two accidents based on examples discussions of 1,3 and 
4. 
 
 
5.7.3 Final Discussions on this assumption 
Given the discussions above, manning level has a great impact on the risk picture since the 
increases number of manning usually leads to increased fatalities. 
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According to the main Valemon report, calculation of FAR for Valemon is based on exposure 
when manned, thus the total number of hours of risk exposure per year is the number of 
manned hours per year. The criteria shall apply as a mean for each 12 month period. Hence, 
in this calculation, the PLL value is based on the same number of manned hours per year as 
for FAR calculation meaning the manning values have been fixed and locked. As a result FAR 
would proportional to PLL values. And this fact makes it easier for the reviewers to 
compare the results.[17] 
 
The main point for this manning level assumption has been that the assumed manning 
distributions are subject to great uncertainties since the platform has not been built and 
operated yet. However, the results of manning level could contribute directly or indirectly 
to the risk picture, FAR or PLL values in the sense that the more populated an area is, the 
more risk to personnel and potential number of fatalities is created. As a result the 
personnel fatality risk as a consequence for each accident scenario increases. The increased 
manning level could on a different level serve as causation in creating more leak frequencies 
that will lead to possible ignition, explosion, and structural impairment etc. Any of these 
assumed consequences would then have fatality risk.  
 
Finally, as one can see, the whole assumption on manning with respect to cause and 
consequences are interrelated. The more people involved the higher the probability of 
initiating hazards and the more hazards the more expected fatalities. 
And finally, we like to present the importance score table for this assumption. 
 
Table 5.38 Importance ranking of manning level example 
Assumption 
Description 
Degree of 
Uncertainty 
Degree of 
Sensitivity 
Degree of 
Importance 
Manning level and 
distribution for 
Valemon 
H H H 
 
Based on the discussions above and according to criteria mentioned in table 5.1, the degree 
of uncertainty for this assumption is considered to be extremely high since the phenomena 
involved are not well understood and models are non-existent and believed to give poor 
predications. This is mainly because the Valemon platform has not been built yet and thus 
the assumed numbers are very uncertain and enough data is not available. 
 
Regarding the degree of sensitivity, a high score has been assigned to this assumption as 
well since even small changes in manning distributions would directly and immediately 
alter the results of risk pictures, especially in calculations of fatality risk to personnel. 
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Therefore, an overall index of H has been considered for this assumption based on the 
arguments we have presented for evaluating this assumption and its total impacts on other 
parts of the analysis especially fatality risk in the total risk picture. 
 
Recommendations 
Regarding the presentation of the assumption and the manning distribution tables, since the 
manning distribution is subject to great uncertainties due to Valemon not being operated 
yet, the numbers are just mere assignments of probabilities by assessors and analysts based 
on their background knowledge and experience., it might be a good point to assume day and 
night shift manning activities as well for more realistic distributions.  
The information source has been stated as Statoil manning input but it is sort of not clear 
which manning input and which specific source is being considered. 
As Valemon is going to be built and developed new and more valid data on manning 
distribution will be available and that should be included to these current tables. The 
activity levels might also require modification, which also determine the alterations to input 
manning distributions. 
The criticality of this assumption could be seen in the table 5.35 in the relevant tab of: 
“relevant RA sections”= ALL !! 
As a final comment we would like to say, this assumption could be challenging, just like any 
other challenging events when it comes to human behavior, since the human behavior and 
reactions to the world could sometime be quite unpredictable and since saving the lives of 
these unpredictable creatures is of high priority especially in accordance with offshore 
safety regulation, enough care should be taken to be able to come up the best and more 
accurate results. 
The approach towards this issue is usually the cautionary one. Generally, in case of great 
uncertainties, like the case here that the platform has not been built yet, the assumptions 
should be tending toward being conservative to predict the almost worst possible 
consequences.  
 
 
A Comparison of manning level between Valemon and Kalundborg QRA 
Since this assumption is considered to be very critical and both degrees of uncertainty and 
sensitivity for this assumption has been ranked as high, we have made a comparison 
between the manning distribution in Valemon and Kalundborg refinery as well. 
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The results of risk picture differ greatly mainly because of: 
 
 The different nature of Valemon (offshore) and Kalundborg (Onshore) 
 Time of operation (Valemon has not been built yet and therefore manning 
assumptions have great uncertainty, Kalundborg on the other hand, has been in 
operation for some years now) 
 
Finally, If we compare the results of the FAR values with the FAR value results for activity 5 
in Valemon (table 5.33) we see the results in table 5.20. 
Table 5.39. Comparison of FAR between Kalundborg and Valemon 
 Calculated FAR RAC FAR 
Valemon(activity level 5) 6.73 10 
Kalundborg 9.1 5 
 
We see that the FAR value is quite smaller for the offshore facility Valemon. Normally, for 
offshore installations average FAR value tends to be considerably lower due to personnel 
being located 2/3 of time in the living quarter. [31] We should also note that although the 
accident scenarios for offshore installations are quite wide in range, the manning level for 
Valemon is considerably lower in general than that of for Kalundborg refinery. And the fact 
that Kalundborg is a refinery and mainly deals with process accidents results in the general 
more potential fatalities. 
However, as a result of manning distribution assumption, we can generally reach to this 
conclusion: 
The main point here is eventually the assigned manning distributions are just knowledge-
based and are set upon the background knowledge of the assessor and therefore there are a 
great deal of uncertainties with them as well as with the corresponding consequences and 
the number of fatalities they potentially cause. 
For a more through comparison of manning level between Kalundborg and Valemon see 
Appendix H. 
In the next chapter we will have a general overview of the examples mentioned in chapters 
3 and 5 and will compare an example between two QRAs. The main focus is on how the 
assumption has been presented and documented and how it will affect the risk level of the 
analysis if not being valid or is subject to great uncertainties. 
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Chapter 6 
6. General Discussions of the mentioned examples  
As we can infer from the previous chapters of this work, one of the important aspects in a 
QRA is to ensure a comprehensive documentation of assumptions and premises for the 
analysis. Assumptions and premises need to be documented where they belong in relation 
to calculations. In addition, there should be a summary of all assumptions and premises as a 
reference source. [4] 
In this work, so far we have discussed the role of uncertainty associated with assumptions 
in a QRA, and then we have chosen several examples of assumption documentation in 
different QRA studies. In chapter 3 we reviewed some scattered examples of assumptions 
for three not quite developed and up-to-dated QRAs and then we reviewed some 
assumption presentations for Kalundborg QRA, which is considered quite recent and up-to-
date compared to those three ones. A brief commenting has been done. 
Finally, in chapter 4, we introduced Valemon TRA, which according to the discussed 
measures, has been shown to be the most effective and relative QRA study with respect to 
our purpose of the work. Therefore, we chose to discuss 5 examples from the Valemon TRA 
assumption section in detail in chapter 5. Compared to the other four studies, Valemon TRA 
seems very recent and complies with an acceptable extent with the Statoil required 
guideline (GL0282) for documentation of assumptions. 
The individual and detailed discussion and comments after each assumption example has 
been made in the previous chapter. In this chapter we will have a general discussion and 
evaluation about general pros and cons of different examples of assumptions and finally we 
will make a comparison between them defining the more important assumptions for this 
work.  
6.1 Final discussions for all examples of assumptions 
By now we are expected to be able to reason why it is very important to document and 
present the assumptions in a QRA; moreover, the validity of them is of greater importance 
with respect to the results. In order for the assumptions to be reliable and consistent with 
the risk results, basis for calculations has to be documented.  
When it comes to decision support, limiting interpretations only to mere results and 
presented numbers could be very misleading sometimes without understanding the basis 
for them. The emphasis has been on the combination of assumptions and premises that are 
critical and interact with one another. In this section we will point to some general 
comments about the examples.  
 Basis for establishing assumptions 
In the previous section we have compared one example of assumptions between two 
161 
 
 
different QRA reports. (Manning level, see appendix. D) The comparison is possible between 
similar examples in different reports if the relevant data is available. There are always 
differences in how assumptions are established and presented in a report and the fact that 
the nature of the facilities might differ from one another adds up to these discrepancies. The 
focus here is not these differences. We are interested to know as a whole, which way of 
presenting and establishing assumptions is more useful for interpreting the risk results. 
Therefore while we are discussing a possible advantages and disadvantages of an example 
of assumptions we should try to relate to the fundamentals of assumption requirements 
that we have discussed. We should always challenge the assumption by asking questions 
like: What source is it based upon? How reliable is it? Who has assumed this? Why has 
he/she assumed this? And what are the risk results if it id not valid? In other words, WHAT 
IF the assumption is not valid?(a kind of sensitivity analysis) Given the above discussion, it 
is of value to acknowledge the fundamentals for both establishing and presenting the 
assumptions. 
 
 Gradual Improvement of Assumptions documentation in QRAs 
According to chapter 3 to the end of chapter 5 examples, one could conclude that the role of 
assumptions have been more appreciated in time. There have been guidelines and 
frameworks providing information about presenting and classifying assumptions. And as 
we could see in the last QRA report, Valemon, assumptions are comparatively well 
established and documented. There still have been some assumptions (mostly analytical for 
simplification of calculations) which were not listed yet indirectly implied in the report and 
used as a basis for further calculations. That shortcoming is recommended to be considered 
in further work. The important thing is that the justifications on documenting assumptions 
be clear and robust enough that no participants in the whole risk assessment process would 
question and challenge the requirement for the more detailed assumption documentation. 
As part of this work also, an effort has been made to emphasize on the importance of 
assumption documentation by clarifying the role they play in a QRA. 
 
 Interdependencies of Assumptions in a QRA 
Another point we would like to comment on is the effect of interdependencies of 
assumptions with each other in a QRA report. Although it has been stated several times that 
assumptions should be documented separately and in different categories, it is still wise to 
try to look beyond just separate categories. Assumptions are interrelated and invalidity or 
change in one assumption will require modifications in others as well. As an example we 
could refer to the dependencies of the first two examples mentioned in chapter 5. The 
assumed number of vessel visits could be an underlying assumption for the expected 
number of lifts on the platform, which will eventually influence the risk for dropped objects. 
If the assumption is based on one visit of vessel per week, then the lift numbers are also 
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established on that number of visits; consequently, if the assumption is changed to 2 vessel 
visits a week the number of lifts and therefore the frequency for dropped objects would also 
change. 
In order to be able to track the interrelated assumption effects on each other, it is wise to 
mention the relevant areas of influence for each assumption and always emphasize on the 
underlying assumptions as well. The relation between assumptions impacts should be easy 
to track and trace. 
 
 Independent versus General evaluation of Assumptions 
Generally, whenever one would like to investigate and assess a system it would be very 
useful to look at the system at two different levels; one by decomposition the system and 
breaking it down to separate individual components and observe and evaluate the details; 
and also on a different level with a general overview of the whole system and its inputs, 
process and purpose and outputs. 
The relation between these two levels might not always lead to the expected results and 
could be challenging. But we, as humans can develop an understanding on different levels 
based on our experiences and then use our power of reasoning and evaluation to get to the 
desired point. When the purpose is to understand a QRA system and the produced results, 
the same argument applies. And in this work, by investigating the assumptions, we are 
basically, looking through one detailed part of a QRA. And eventually we shall relate the role 
of assumptions to the purpose of the whole QRA system in a greater scale. 
 
 Impacts of an assumption on other parts of a QRA (Traceability) 
The improvement in assumptions in QRAs were observed and discussed but the main focus 
of this work from the beginning has been investigating the effects of assumptions on other 
parts of the risk analysis especially the total risk picture that serves a good basis for 
decision making. The desired achievement is that presented results of a QRA could be 
counted as being reliable in order not to be misleading for decision support. And In order to 
get there, one might challenge the underlying assumptions in each and every assumptions 
presented and more importantly the background knowledge, K, for the assumption. The 
thing to be considered during the analysis of the assumptions is that the statements about 
the assumptions, the estimated values, assigned probabilities etc., are all based on some 
background knowledge and historical data. Since there will always be uncertainties about 
the background knowledge, we would never be certain of the validity of the stated 
assumptions. The assumptions are merely based on different assessor’s background 
knowledge and hence constitute epistemic-based uncertainties. One suggested approach is 
that to hold uncertainty (according to Aven[s1]) as an inevitable component of risk and 
always be aware of its presence and then treat assumptions as some available and initial 
inputs to the system and the outputs would then be the current result of the analysis. In this 
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work, we have qualitatively discussed the effects of assumptions being varied or totally 
being invalid. (a coarse sensitivity analysis) We have then in each example outlined the 
highly affected areas by the assumptions. Here is when traceability of sources of 
assumptions would be very important. 
 
 
 Assumptions validity and presentation 
In summary, when presenting assumptions in a QRA report, we are mainly concerned with 
two aspects. First is the quality and criticality of the assumptions that is how reliable 
basically the assumptions are. This is acquired by stating the basis and the background 
knowledge the assumption have been established upon. The Second important thing to 
mention is the way of presenting the assumptions. Assumptions should be presented along 
with the risk results and are therefore important in communicating the building blocks of 
the work. They might be very reasonable and wisely established assumptions due to 
detailed and carefully selected background knowledge but poorly presented or not been 
presented at all. Referring to our discussion and examples presented in chapter 3, we could 
claim that organized and clear presenting of assumptions are very essential since if the 
assumptions are not easy to be acknowledged, the value of the whole risk analysis work 
could be influenced. One thing is what the message is, and another thing is how to 
communicate it through. According to Kimberly M. Thompson[], better characterization of 
uncertainty in the risk assessment lead to better risk communication. We will not go further 
in this aspect. However, having this fact in mind, we would like to comment on the way 
assumptions were presented in Valemon report in the next point. 
  
 
 Assumptions Presentation for Valemon 
Looking at the special tables the Valemon assumptions are presented in, one might find the 
tables seeming very informative and detailed compared with other examples. We have 
discussed this matter separately for each example, but the general comment here, is that 
although the boxes and tabs in the presenting of assumption look informative enough. In 
most of the cases they have been left empty. (According to Appendix K of the report, 
assumptions for Valemon[19]). Or it is filled out very coarsely. If we take a look at another 
example just with focus on the format of the table below: 
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     Table 6.1. An example of a presented assumption in Valemon TRA[19] 
 
 
It would be very idealistic to have all the fields filled but as far as they are included, it is a 
wise choice to make the best estimates about them. Since the choice of the titles of fields 
seem informative enough and help the reader easily understand the basis for the 
assumption as well as its validity time and more importantly the impacts and influences on 
the total risk level and other parts of QRA. As for the example in this table the information 
source is just stated as to be Statoil but according to Espen Fyhn Nilsen, risk analysis 
specialist, Statoil ASA, it is not clear enough which kind of source at Statoil is meant; it could 
be a person or a guideline or a conversation over email etc.! It is also not so much clear what 
is meant by the ´status´ field. As for ´simplifications´, it might have been a good choice to 
state the simplifications made to establish this assumption since these simplifications could 
in themselves be counted as new sources of uncertainty. 
In the end we would like to mention that the assumptions are considered an essential part 
of a QRA. Conclusively they should be as reliable as possible and presented as informatively 
as possible. In addition if assumptions are presented in detail along with subsequent hidden 
factors such as degrees of sensitivity and uncertainty associated with them, they would add 
up to the value of the risk results. Moreover, they will provide a clearer picture for 
interpretation of results for decision support purposes. For example, if the budgets for a 
project were limited, the priorities would be to apply risk reducing measures and improve 
assumptions with higher importance i.e. higher degrees of uncertainty and sensitivity. 
Given the argument above, as a final part to this chapter, we would like to present the 5 
assumptions discussed in chapter 5 in the following table. We have ranked the assumptions 
165 
 
 
according to their assigned and assumed (based on our background knowledge and degree 
of belief) importance ranking: 
Table 6.2 Assumptions ranking 
Number Assumption Degree of 
uncertainty 
Degree of 
Sensitivity 
Degree of 
Importance 
1 Manning Distribution 
(Operational) 
High High High 
2 Collision Resistance of 
Jack-up (Design) 
High High High 
3 Supply Vessel Visits 
(Operational) 
High Medium High-Medium 
4 Lifting Activities 
(Operational) 
Medium High Medium-High 
5 Equipment Count Low Medium Low-Medium 
 
 
The reasons and background information for assigning the rankings in the table above have 
been mentioned under discussion part of each assumption in chapter 5.  In this part we 
would just limit our conclusion to the results presented in the table. One can see from the 
table that attention should be given to improve manning level and the design assumption in 
this report since they have been considered to be of higher criticality should a prioritization 
be made. 
Note that in ranking place of 3 and 4, we have placed a higher emphasis in uncertainty 
rather than sensitivity for ranking assumptions as being important. It should be noted that 
there is a difference in presenting the importance of assumption as M-H or H-M. And in our 
opinion uncertainties are more challenging to deal with when dealing with an assumption 
compared with a sensitivity degree for this report, since Valemon platform has not been 
built yet, one should at this stage focus on the degree of uncertainties. However, it is always 
the combination of these two factors which defines the importance of an assumption. 
For example, a high degree of uncertainty combined with high sensitivity could lead to the 
conclusion that the uncertainty factor has a significant effect on risk. However, if the degree 
of uncertainty is high but the risk and/or vulnerability indices are relatively insensitive to 
changes in the uncertain quantities, then the effect on risk could be minor or moderate. [s1] 
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And finally the equipment count assumption has been documented to have the lowest rank 
in importance analysis of the assumptions. Consecutively, if the assigned budget for this 
project is limited, this assumption would be set aside for a while since it is not affecting the 
risk picture considerable compared to other assumptions selected. 
One should note that all discussions about ranking of assumptions are highly relative and 
based on the assessor`s background knowledge and subjective opinions. 
Another important thing to consider regarding the discussions of assumptions, is that 
almost all assumptions mentioned for Valemon QRA are based on very background 
knowledge of the 6 assumed activity levels defined for Valemon and mentioned several 
times in this work. This underlying assumption could be ranked as “high” in both 
uncertainty and sensitivity basis. This is mainly die to Valemon platform not being built and 
operated yet. 
However, we have not included this underlying assumption of different activity levels in the 
table above since according to [s1] the highlighted uncertainty factors (presented in Table 
6.10) are related to potentially observable quantities and events. 
Finally, a semi-quantitative approach offers practicality and the suggested method may 
serve as a screening of uncertainty factors. If an uncertainty factor is found to have a 
significant effect on risk and/or vulnerability, it could be selected for a more thorough 
treatment in the analysis. This may not always be possible though. In practice, a QRA will 
always have to be based on a certain background knowledge (including a number of 
assumptions and suppositions). The probabilistic analysis will not be able to reflect all 
uncertainties.[s1] 
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Chapter 7 
 
7.Conclusions and Recommendations  
  
In the beginning of this thesis work, we outlined some objectives. In the end, we would like 
to take a look at the work and see if we have answered all the questions proposed in the 
beginning of the work. 
The main challenging purpose has been to define the role of assumptions in QRAs and also 
determining how important an assumption is relative to other assumptions mentioned in 
the QRA. This objective has been achieved by a thorough investigation of impact assessment 
of the assumptions with respect to other parts of the QRA and especially the risk results. We 
applied the suggested approach and checklists suggested by Aven [s1] in order to define an 
`importance` factor to the examples of assumptions. 
Since future events are the main concern of any QRA, some uncertainties are always 
inherent about these future events and the world in general. One inevitable part of a QRA is 
called assumptions. Assumptions serve as uncertainty factors in a QRA since they are based 
on some uncertain background knowledge and will further build up new background 
knowledge for future assessments. In this work, we have focused on the role of assumptions 
in a QRA, their way of documentation and presentation and more importantly their 
importance relative to the overall risk description presented as results of a QRA. 
Throughout this work, emphasis was made on how uncertainties will play a great role in 
any risk analysis. Uncertainty is seen as a main component of risk and the risk description. 
The reason is that probability is only a tool for expressing uncertainty. Surprises relative to 
the assigned probabilities could occur if the background knowledge on which the 
probabilities are conditioned turns out to be wrong.[s1] That is why we have been focusing 
on uncertainty factors and sources while discussing the examples of assumptions. 
 
Uncertainty factors description by investigating assumptions 
By choosing to go through the details of some assumptions and trying to define uncertainty 
and sensitivity levels for them, one might argue that we are just creating more and more 
uncertainties and uncertainty sources by extensive discussions around them and hence 
confusing the results. Well, if we look superficially enough, that might be correct but we 
always have to look beyond this. This is a misconception, according to Aven[3] that there 
are large inherent uncertainties in risk analysis when the purpose of the risk analysis is to 
describe the uncertainties and not accurately measuring them. 
 
By breaking down and going through the details of one part of a QRA (assumptions), we are 
clarifying and explaining about the possible sources of uncertainty. We are not adding to 
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uncertainties about the world, we are just acknowledging them so that we would be 
prepared for potential future events to some extent. 
 
Importance of documenting assumptions 
An important aspect in a QRA is to ensure a comprehensive documentation of assumptions 
and premises for the analysis. Assumptions and premises need to be documented where 
they belong in relation to calculations. In addition, there should be a summary of all 
assumptions and premises as a reference source.[4] There have been several standards and 
guidelines published with this respect. 
As a result, initially, a detailed discussion has been made to justify the importance and the 
requirement for presenting and documenting assumptions. This has been done by 
emphasizing on the role of assumptions in QRA. And also we stated that there is a great deal 
of uncertainty both in developing these assumptions and by further using these 
assumptions for basis of future work. This was mainly due to diverse and different 
background knowledge the assumptions are based upon. See chapter 2. 
 
Improvement of Assumptions 
 
In chapters 3 and 4 and 5 which serve as the empirical part of this work, we introduced how 
these unknowns (uncertainties) are presented and dealt with in a typical risk analyses. 
There has been a great improvement over the years in presenting and documenting the 
assumptions in QRAs. And as years went by the importance and value of this quote “ risk 
analysis is simply the consequence analysis of the assumptions”  [20] seemed to be more 
and more captured by the risk analysts and parties involved in any parts of risk analyses. 
This has gone to the extent that some operator companies like Statoil published guidelines 
emphasizing on the importance of assumption section and categorization and description of 
the assumptions for their review and approval. Assumptions should be documented 
together with the influenced parts of the QRA by them so that assumption importance 
analysis could be carried out more practically and the impacts of assumption would be 
more noticeable (traceability of the assumption). 
 
Approach for evaluating and raking assumptions 
 
The main focus throughout this work has been to state there are always uncertainties 
hidden in the background knowledge of any assessor performing a risk analysis. This is 
mainly due to the unknown nature of future events to human beings. This uncertainty is 
mainly associated with assumptions made in a QRA. And since assumptions play a great role 
in a QRA, we have tried to define and address uncertainty sources with assumptions in a 
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QRA. We have discussed this matter about 5 main assumptions examples chosen from a 
recent QRA, Valemon report for Statoil. 
 
According to Aven [], we have pointed to a stronger emphasis on uncertainties. It has been 
stated that the main calculation schemes and solid analytical results used today (in 
presenting the risk results) can be kept. What is new is a more comprehensive uncertainty 
assessment to better reflect possible surprises hidden in the background knowledge that 
the probability assignments are based on. A scheme for how to judge the importance of 
these uncertainty factors have been applied in this work according to Aven [s2,3], but 
further research and development is required to find practical procedures for treatment of 
uncertainty and assumptions specifically in QRAs related to oil and gas industry.  
 
 
 
Difference in Background knowledge for establishing assumptions 
 
In this work, it has been chosen that there are uncertainties about the future phenomena 
and the purpose of a risk assessment is to describe and reveal these uncertainties. But we 
should also pay attention to the fact that a risk analysis is being made by human being(s). 
And each person’s background knowledge and degree of belief differs from those of another 
one. Uncertainties are out there in the world. However, the way we observe and describe 
them in the world could be different in many ways. 
 
This difference between human beings ways of perception has to be accepted. (See section 
2.3.3). Therefore if an assumption has to be justified by all participants in a QRA, the 
background knowledge of the analysts along with every sources of uncertainty detected 
should be mentioned and presented as well. 
 
Generally, while we are dealing with a system, there are always uncertainties about the 
inputs, the operation of the system and the possible future outputs. The more complex the 
system is the more complicated it will be to observe and understand the uncertainty 
sources (factors) in a system. 
 
While we are talking about QRAs for oil and gas which are normally very extensive and 
detailed assessment of facilities, it could be very challenging to mention and observe all 
sources of uncertainties. Additionally, one should acknowledge the role of human beings in 
the system as well.  In addition to uncertain nature of future events in a QRA, having 
different human beings as part of the system all with their own specific and “unique” 
background knowledge and free will would complicate the system even more and 
introduces more sources of uncertainty to the system.  
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The requirement to look beyond the calculated risk results 
 
In order to assess risk, we need solid calculations and results. Therefore we make some 
assumptions and base the rest of calculations in light of the assumptions. And further we 
should present the results along with their foundation; assumptions and presuppositions.  
In this work, we have emphasized on the improvement of presenting assumptions along 
with their role of corresponding uncertainty and sensitivity in determining their criticality 
in a QRA report. 
 
Solid results of a risk analysis without referring to assumptions are not useful especially on 
the long run. It is the presentation of the assumptions which makes a QRA a living study one 
could also use later on in the future.[4] 
Therefore, we should not look at any system superficially and as a very certain and 
deterministic system. We should not let the fancy results of risk analysis deceive or mislead 
us by making us simply ignore the foundation behind them. 
It is wise not depend only one possible state the system might work in. We would like to 
know and be prepared for the several other potential states of the system. And for that we 
need to know the different inputs to the system. The inputs in our work have been 
considered assumptions. In this work, we have in fact performed a consequence analysis of 
assumptions. We should be aware of uncertainties throughout the work and look beyond 
the expected values and probabilities. That is why we have presented assumptions together 
with their degree of importance according to their degree of uncertainty and sensitivity. 
We have several times mentioned that we need to look beyond the expected values and 
calculated probabilities. In this work an effort has been made on where to look beyond 
these numbers. The missing piece has been the degree of uncertainties. 
According to Aven [6], we have proposed a simple, practical method to classify uncertainty 
factors and thus characterize uncertainties that are not properly captured by probabilities 
and probabilistic risk indices. If left untreated these uncertainties could be lost and reduce 
the confidence in the analysis. The approach is based on a thinking where a broad risk 
description is reported, covering the probabilistic analysis, sensitivity analysis and the 
result of the uncertainty factor assessment, and this informs the decision maker—not 
prescribing what decision to be made.[]Presented with a risk description covering the 
components (P,S,U), the decision-maker must make an overall review and judgment.[6] 
However, some might argue that the applied approach is somewhat simple and coarse since 
the scoring criteria for the approach are mostly case and knowledge-based. Nevertheless, 
this somewhat simple approach helps develop a clearer picture for interpretation of risk 
results for managerial review and judgment. And nevertheless, developing and improving 
new criteria for ranking uncertainty factors is recommended in further studies. 
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Chapter 8 
8.Recommendations and further studies  
 
 What we have done in this work besides justifying the requirements for 
assumptions and the presentation and classification of them in a QRA, has been to 
point out the importance of assumptions in a QRA. We have done this by assessing 
the impacts of assumptions semi-quantitatively as suggested by Aven[s1,2]. We 
have stated that it is more practical to present the degree of combination of 
uncertainty and sensitivity (importance) along with the calculated and estimated 
risk results. By fulfilling this, we are practically encouraging the reader to look 
beyond just mere numbers or calculations of expected values, probabilities and 
distributions and detect the uncertainty role in the results. However, we have not 
seen this classified and extended approach for documentation of uncertainty 
factors in the reviewed examples of QRAs in this work. Therefore one 
recommendation for further work could be to focus on presenting the importance 
analysis for assumptions along with their uncertainty and importance ranking 
degree. Checklist and criteria for ranking assumptions as important could also be 
further investigated and improved. 
 
  Moreover, it is recommended for further developing a clear picture of the role of 
assumptions in a QRA, that a more detailed (perhaps more quantitative) sensitivity 
analysis for assumptions ranking is done. There are normally a great number of 
assumptions made in a QRA, hence, it might be challenging and time consuming to 
provide sensitivity analysis for all of them. Therefore we recommend that by 
investigating and comparing the results of somewhat simplified impacts 
assessments of assumptions on total risk level and the importance ranking 
introduced[6,7], only more critical assumptions be chosen for this purpose. A more 
thorough and detailed sensitivity analysis for improvement of those assumptions is 
then recommended. As a very common example of `important` assumptions in 
most QRA reports, manning level can be mentioned. It is considered one of the 
most challenging assumptions when it comes to uncertainty and sensitivity 
analysis. 
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9.Final Word 
The presentation and documentation of assumptions made in a QRA, besides all the 
advantages that will create including introducing the uncertainty sources and background 
knowledge defining the foundation for the risk calculations and thus making the 
participants see beyond the results, is just another ways of communication of risk results.  
The analyst is basically trying to inform others involved in the analysis about his ideas, 
degree of belief and background knowledge of certain phenomena. So assumptions help 
create an easier way for the message to be passed along. 
Generally, risk communication is another topic in risk management and is considered an 
important task. Discussions on risk communication, however, are beyond the scope of this 
work. But since we have emphasized so many times that the purpose of risk analysis is to 
support decision making and communication is considered to have a great influence in this 
aspect, we would like to refer to an example about different ways of presenting risk. 
According to Kahneman[51]: 
Low probability events are much more heavily weighted when described in terms 
of relative frequencies (how many) than when stated in more abstract terms of 
“chances”, “risk” and “probability”(how likely). 
In one experiment, professionals evaluated whether it was safe to discharge from 
the psychiatric hospital a patient with a history of violence, Mr.Jones. 
The information they received included an expert`s assessment of the risk. The 
same statistics were described in two ways. 
 Patients similar to Mr. Jones are estimated to have a 10% probability of 
committing an act of violence against others during the first several months 
after discharge. 
 
 Of every 100 patients similar to Mr. Jones , 10 are estimated to commit an 
act of violence against others during the first several months after discharge. 
The professionals who saw the frequency format were almost twice as likely to 
deny the discharge (41% compared to 21% in the probability format). 
Therefore, the effect of frequency format is larger and consecutively, the more 
vivid description produces a higher decision weight for the same probability.  
 
      Vivid Probabilities From the Thinking, Fast and Slow book by Daniel Kahneman[51] 
As a final word, assumptions are important in a QRA based on their degree of uncertainty 
and sensitivity, which is gained through impact (consequence) analysis of them with 
respect to other parts of a QRA. In addition to degree of validity and reliability to 
assumptions, the way they are presented is also of great importance  
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As a result, one should be aware of the way of presentation of results and assumptions. This 
is important especially when it comes to communication of risk and managerial review and 
judgment for decision support. Poor presentation of assumptions could lead to bad 
communication of results and poor judgments eventually. 
The main message is we shouldn’t be deceived by the fancy results of a risk analysis and no 
matter in what way assumptions, uncertainties or results are presented, an interpreter of 
the results should be wise enough to look and know beyond the solid results. And that is 
achieved by the power of reasoning and thinking that we humans are blessed with. It is in 
light of our experiences and reason that we gain knowledge. And knowledge is the key factor 
to victory.[38] 
However, we should accept that our knowledge is not as extensive as to foresee future 
events and therefore we just accept some uncertainties exist with any future activity and 
there is always a possibility of a surprise no matter how deterministic a system is.  
We should therefore try to understand the sources of uncertainty and try to take preventive 
measures for undesired consequences; in other words, we should be prepared for these 
surprises to the possible extent. The risk analysis is just widening this extent. It does not 
increase, uncertainties. It increases our knowledge about uncertainties. Therefore we will 
know more that we don’t know!!’ 
If we know that we still do not know much, we will try to know more and so in we learn. 
To end this work here, we would like to refer to a famous saying about different approaches 
for knowledge. The original quote is in Persian; a translation has been provided:  
The person who knows and knows that he knows, glides his horse of honor over the 
blue revolving skies. 
The person who knows but doesn’t know that he knows, awaken him or else he shall 
remain forever unaware that he knows. 
The person who doesn’t know and knows that he doesn’t know, will struggle, but he 
will get somewhere somehow. 
The person who doesn’t know and doesn’t know that he doesn’t know, is condemned 
to everlasting darkness of ignorance. 
(Attributed to Nasir al-Din al-Tusi, Persian mathematician and philosopher, (1201-
1274)) 
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APPENDIX A: Philosophers and 
Epistemology 
Aristotle (Greek, Empiricist) (384-322 BCE) 
Theory of forms cannot be proved since it cannot 
be experienced or sensed 
Essence of things, not separately in “the other 
world” but exists as an integral >> universals 
Theory of Potentiality: 
Within everything, people included exists a 
natural evolution towards fulfilling its own 
potential, in essence, becoming its own form! 
Both inductive and Deductive 
 
Spinoza (Dutch, rationalist, monist) (1632-1677) 
Metaphysical monist (one entity: God, Nature) 
Believes in one substance; other things are 
attributes, modes or modifications of that only 
substance through operation of necessity 
Truth and Falsity 
Adequate and Inadequate ideas 
Three kinds of knowledge: 
 From random experience and imagination 
 From common notions 
 From Intuition 
 
Hume (Scottish, empiricist and skeptic) (1711-
1776) 
Certainty is a vague concept 
You cannot learn something until you experience 
it 
Subjective views based on subjective experiences 
That sets different reference points in the eyes of 
the assessor, based on different backgrounds and 
experiences 
The only certainty is that nothing is certain! 
Plato (Greek, rationalist)  (429-347 BCE)                                                                                     
There exists  a ”real”, ”perfect” world                   
beyond our perception 
Ideas (opinions) vs True knowledge 
(facts, science, forms) 
Senses are good to get in touch with 
reality but REASONING needed to 
approach the forms 
 
 
Descartes (French, Rationalist) (1596-
1650) 
Deep insight into his own nature by 
thought alone; mind is simple, math is 
the solution 
People are misled by putting too much 
faith into their senses only. 
Cartesian doubt; being skeptical of 
one`s beliefs 
Everything could be questioned but 
self-awareness; I think, therefore I am! 
 
 
Kant (German, Both Rationalist and 
Empiricist) (1724-1804) 
Aimed to unite reason with experience 
Hoped to end an age of Speculation 
Opposing: Plato, Descartes, Hume 
Copernican Revolution: objects must 
conform to our cognition 
Though experience is fundamentally 
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Epistemology:[40][41][42][46] 
History and Philosophy Empricist vs Rationalisim viewpoint: 
Summary of Rationalism  
The paradigm rationalist philosophers are Plato (ancient); Descartes, Spinoza, Leibniz (modern).  
1. Don’t trust senses, since they sometimes deceive; and since the “knowledge” they provide is 
inferior (because it changes). 
2. Reason alone can provide knowledge. Math is the paradigm of real knowledge. 
3. There are innate ideas, e.g., Plato’s Forms, or Descartes’ concepts of self, substance, and identity. 
4. The self is real and discernable through immediate intellectual intuition (cogito ergo sum). 
5. Moral notions are comfortably grounded in an objective standard external to self — in God, or 
Forms.  
Kant says rationalists are sort of right about (3) and (4) above; wrong about (1) and (2). Kant would like (5) 
to be true. 
Summary of Empiricism  
The paradigm empiricist philosophers are Aristotle (ancient); Locke, Berkeley, Hume (modern).  
1. Senses are the primary, or only, source of knowledge of world. Psychological atomism. 
2. Mathematics deals only with relations of ideas (tautologies); gives no knowledge of world. 
3. No innate ideas (though Berkeley accepts Cartesian self). General or complex ideas are derived by 
abstraction from simple ones (conceptualism). 
4. Hume — there’s no immediate intellectual intuition of self. The concept of “Self” is not supported 
by sensations either. 
5. Hume — no sensations support the notion of necessary connections between causes and effects, or 
the notion that the future will resemble the past. 
6. Hume — “is” does not imply “ought”. Source of morality is feeling. 
Kant thinks empiricism is on the right track re (1), sort of right re (2), wrong re (3), (4), (5), and (6). 
 Plato 
Plato`s belief is anything you think you see is only the idea of what you think it is! 
Plato believes that we're living in the world of images and shadows and that the "real" world exists 
elsewhere. 
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   Knowledge is fourfold, according to Plato. 
 The knowledge from imagination, dreams, and what was later called the unconscious 
 Our perceptions of the outside world 
 Mathematical knowledge 
 Philosophical knowledge, which was Big Picture knowledge, an awareness of absolutes, universal truths 
in the form of those elusive Forms 
Plato called the first two mere opinions, because while perception may be reality, things are perceived 
differently by different people. The second two were True Knowledge, because Plato believed that two plus 
two would never equal five, and Forms are immutable, eternal truths not to be messed with. 
“In the visible realm things are always changing and nothing is absolute where as intellectual truths will 
always be true throughout time.” 
Plato believed that there was another world beyond this changeable and destructible one in which we live, 
one consisting of unchanging eternal Forms. He asserted that what we see and touch are only very distantly 
related to the ultimate realities that exist.[40][41] 
 
Descartes 
The French philosopher René Descartes, whose Meditations on First Philosophy defined the course of 
much philosophy from then up till the present day, stood near the beginning of the Western European 
Enlightenment. Impressed by the power of mathematics and the development of the new science, Descartes 
was confronted with two questions: How was it that people were coming to attain such deep knowledge of 
the workings of the universe, and how was it that they had spent so long not doing so? 
Regarding the latter question, Descartes concluded that people had been mislead by putting too much faith 
in the testimony of their senses. In particular, he thought such a mistake was behind the then-dominant 
physics of Aristotle. Aristotle and the later Scholastics, in Descartes' mind, had used their reasoning 
abilities well enough on the basis of what their senses told them. The problem was that they had chosen the 
wrong starting point for their inquiries. 
By contrast, the advancements in the new science (some of which Descartes could claim for himself) were 
based in a very different starting point: The "pure light of reason." In Descartes' view, God had equipped 
humans with a faculty that was able to understand the fundamental essence of the two types of substance 
that made up the world: Intellectual substance (of which minds are instances) and physical substance 
(matter). Not only did God give people such a faculty, Descartes claimed, but he made them such that, 
when using the faculty, they are unable to question its deliverances. Not only that, but God left humanity 
the means to conclude that the faculty was a gift from a non-deceptive omnipotent creator.[42][43] 
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Hume 
Hume's Philosophical Contribution: 
Hume's contribution to the development of philosophy spans across all the discipline. His skeptical doubts 
concerning the relationship between cause and effect as well as the existence of substances (including the 
first person) are to date the starting points for research on those topics: they pose some of the deepest 
challenged to the possibility of any metaphysical inquiry, as already Kant realized. But, Hume has given 
substantial contributions also to the ethical theory, in which he defended a version of sentimentalism, a 
popular view at the time in England already defended among others by Adam Smith. Hume's account of 
religion, fully spelled out in the posthumously published Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion (1779), 
also constitutes a key stone in the history of theological thinking, mining all attempts to construe 
theological knowledge on rational grounds. In general, Hume systematically criticized all those 
philosophical ideas, theories, and methodologies relying on rationalistic grounds; because of this, he is 
regarded as probably the main champion of empiricism in the history of Western thought. 
 
Spinoza: 
Spinoza was a metaphysical monist. This means that he defended the view that there is only one entity. 
According to him, that entity is God. Everything that exists is in God, is a way in which God is. More 
technically speaking, Spinoza called the ways in which God may be attributes or modifications of God. 
Let’s see more closely what they are. 
 These are the fundamental concepts with which Spinoza sets forth a vision of Being, illuminated 
by his awareness of God. They may seem strange at first sight. To the question "What is?" he 
replies: "Substance, its attributes, and modes". ” 
  — Karl Jaspers [46][41] 
 
Aristotle 
For Aristotle, "form" still refers to the unconditional basis of phenomena but is "instantiated" in a particular 
substance (see Universals and particulars, below). In a certain sense, Aristotle's method is both inductive 
and deductive, while Plato's is essentially deductive from a priori principles.[18] 
In Aristotle's terminology, "natural philosophy" is a branch of philosophy examining the phenomena of the 
natural world, and includes fields that would be regarded today as physics, biology and other natural 
sciences. In modern times, the scope of philosophy has become limited to more generic or abstract 
inquiries, such as ethics and metaphysics, in which logic plays a major role. Today's philosophy tends to 
exclude empirical study of the natural world by means of the scientific method. In contrast, Aristotle's 
philosophical endeavors encompassed virtually all facets of intellectual inquiry.[48][42] 
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Kant:[49][47] 
“Kant(1724-1804)  named his branch of epistemology Transcendental Idealism, and he first laid out 
these views in his famous work The Critique of Pure Reason. In it he argued that there were 
fundamental problems with both rationalist and empiricist dogma. To the rationalists he argued, 
broadly, that pure reason is flawed when it goes beyond its limits and claims to know those things that 
are necessarily beyond the realm of all possible experience: the existence of God and free will. Kant 
referred to these objects as "The Thing in Itself" and goes on to argue that their status as objects beyond 
all possible experience by definition means we cannot know them.  
To the empiricist he argued that while it is correct that experience is fundamentally necessary for 
human knowledge, reason is necessary for processing that experience into coherent thought. He 
therefore concludes that both reason and experience are necessary for human knowledge. 
The philosophy of Immanuel Kant is sometimes called the “Copernican revolution of philosophy” to 
emphasize its novelty and huge importance. Kant synthesized (brought together) rationalism and 
empiricism. After Kant, the old debate between rationalists and empiricists ended, and epistemology 
went in a new direction. After Kant, no discussion of reality or knowledge could take place without 
awareness of the role of the human mind in constructing reality and knowledge. 
The following important theory developed in that period is the Kantian synthesis of rationalism and 
empiricism. According to Kant, knowledge results from the organization of perceptual data on the basis 
of inborn cognitive structures, which he calls "categories". Categories include space, time, objects and 
causality. This epistemology does accept the subjectivity of basic concepts, like space and time, and the 
impossibility to reach purely objective representations of things-in-themselves. Yet the a priori 
categories are still static or given.”  
APPENDIX B : Kant`s Propositions and Assumptions in QRAs 
 
Kant`s  synthetic a priori:[43][49] 
As Kant’s ingenious solution is that synthetic a priori knowledge is possible because our 
mental faculties organize experience according to certain categories so that these categories 
become necessary and universal features of our experience. For instance, we do not find 
causation in nature so much as we cannot not find causation in nature. It is a feature of the 
way our minds make sense of reality that we perceive causes and effects everywhere at 
work. For Kant, then, the category of the synthetic a priori is the key to explaining how we 
gain substantive knowledge about the world. 
 
 
Great emphasize has to be made on distinguishing between describing facts or what has been 
accepted as facts and system description in a QRA and what cannot be accepted as facts since they 
are not universally true and they have some references to experience, those that are in turn called 
assumptions or premises in a QRA which have references directly based experience.   
 
Definition of assumptions can in a way be justified with Kant`s proposed term of  synthetic  a priori 
as a term versus analytic a priori which, on the other hand, could represent what is considered to be 
`facts` in a QRA. 
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Analytic a priori is defined by Kant as something (some statement) that the conclusion is contained 
in the definition with no reference to experience; it is basically the way it is. These analytic a priories 
according to Kant are therefore non-informative. Synthetic a priori is however when some new 
information that has its source on experience has been added to the definition of a fact; therefore 
adding new information to those already accepted facts. The definition of a priori versus a posteriori 
is as follows: 
 
A priori knowledge or justification is independent of experience (for example "All bachelors are 
unmarried"); a posteriori knowledge or justification is dependent on experience or empirical 
evidence (for example "Some bachelors are very happy"). A posteriori justification makes reference 
to experience; but the issue concerns how one knows the proposition or claim in question—what 
justifies or grounds one's belief in it.  
 
In the writer`s opinion, when referring to facts, one actually talks about analytic a priories and when 
talking about an assumptions, however, one uses a synthetic a posteriori by adding some new 
information on the basis of observations (experiences) to an already accepted a priori ( a fact). 
So synthetic truths are true in virtue of the kind of experience we have and we treat assumptions in 
this work as such statements.( Once again relate a symbiosis that Kant made between rationalists 
and empiricists.) 
 
After a QRA has been done and assumptions have been documented, it is possible that during or at 
the end of the lifetime of a facility for example Valemon here, these synthetic a priories will change to 
a posteriories since they will be known by experience. A synthetic a priori therefore, adds to our 
knowledge and is gained through knowledge. 
 
In general the truth or falsity of synthetic statements is proved only by whether or not they conform 
to the way the world is (experiences) and not by virtue of the meaning of the words they contain. 
Note that the role of deduction and reasoning has not been denied here; it has been applied in 
evaluating the added information to the accepted fact. 
 
It is worth mentioning that our knowledge would be limited to the phenomena and we may be totally 
unaware of the noumena  in itself. According to Kant, it is vital always to distinguish between the 
distinct realms of phenomena and noumena. Phenomena are the appearances, which constitute our 
experience; noumena are the (presumed) things themselves, which constitute reality. All of our 
synthetic a priori  judgments apply only to the phenomenal realm, not the noumenal one. (It is only at 
this level, with respect to what we can experience, that we are justified in imposing the structure of 
our concepts onto the objects of our knowledge.) Since the thing in itself (Ding an sich) would by 
definition be entirely independent of our experience of it, we are utterly ignorant of the noumenal 
realm.  
Thus, on Kant's view, the most fundamental laws of nature, like the truths of mathematics, are 
knowable precisely because they make no effort to describe the world as it really is but rather 
prescribe the structure of the world as we experience it. By applying the pure forms of sensible 
intuition and the pure concepts of the understanding, we achieve a systematic view of the 
phenomenal realm but learn nothing of the noumenal realm. Math and science are certainly true of 
the phenomena; only metaphysics claims to instruct us about the noumena. [46][47][49] 
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APPENDIX C: Decision Making Under Uncertainty; cautionary and 
precautionary approach  
Main challenges with Risk Management, Assessment and Analysis(chapter 2) 
The main challenge present yet most of the time hiding in all different steps of risk assessment, 
management and analysis is the issue of uncertainty. 
Uncertainty is an inseparable part of risk yet it is hidden at a superficial evaluation of any risk assessment. 
The impacts of uncertainty, however, are revealed if one takes a more close attention. 
As an example, the main challenge of risk management is Decision-making under uncertainty. 
Risk management often involves decision-making in situations characterized by high risk and large 
uncertainties, and such decision-making presents a challenge in that it is difficult to predict the 
consequences (outcomes) of the decisions. 
In high-risk situations, various decision-making strategies can form the basis for the decision. By “decision-
making strategy” we mean the underlying thinking and the principles that are to be followed when 
making the decision, 
A decision-making strategy takes into consideration the effect on risk (as it appears in the risk analysis) 
and the uncertainty dimensions that cannot be captured by the analysis. The result is thus decisions 
founded both in calculated risk and applications of the cautionary principle and precautionary principle. 
The cautionary principle means that caution, for example by not starting an activity or by implementing 
measures to reduce risks and uncertainties, shall be the overriding principle when there is uncertainty 
linked to the consequences, i.e. when risk is present (HSE 2001, Aven and Vinnem 2007). The level of 
caution adopted will, of course, have to be balanced against other concerns, such as costs. However, all 
industries would introduce some minimum requirements to protect people and the environment, and 
these requirements can be considered justified by reference to the cautionary principle. In the face of 
uncertainties related to the possible occurrences of hazardous situations and accidents, we are cautious 
and adopt principles of safety management, such as: 
Thus the precautionary principle may be considered a special case of the cautionary principle, as it is 
applicable in cases of scientific uncertainties   andin     ,  o  fstedt     ,  ven      .  here are, 
however, many definitions of the precautionary principle: 
The precautionary principle is the ethical principle that if the consequences of an action, especially the 
use of technology, are subject to scientific uncertainty, then it is better not to carry out the action rather 
than risk the uncertain, but possibly very negative, consequences. 
 
Challenges of current risk assessment: [2] 
Many researchers and analysts have questioned the scientific quality of risk assessments (Aven, 
    a,h,i . For example, O’Brien        argues that risk assessments generally serve the interests of 
business (i), as well as government agencies (ii) and many risk analysts (iii). She writes: 
 (i)  The risk assessment gives the industry the aura of being scientific. The risk assessments show 
that the activities are safe, and most of us would agree that it is rational to base our decision-
making on science. The complexity of a risk assessment makes it difficult to understand its 
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premises and assumptions if you are not an expert in the field. In a risk assessment there is 
plenty of room for adjustments of the assumptions and methods to meet the risk acceptance 
criteria.  In the case of large uncertainties in the phenomena and processes studied, the industry 
takes advantage of the fact that in our society safety and environment-affecting activities and 
substances are considered innocent until “proven guilty”. It takes several years to test for 
example whether a certain chemical causes cancer, and the uncertainties and choice of 
appropriate risk assessment premises and assumptions allow interminable haggling.  
 (ii)  Risk assessment processes allow governments to hide behind “rationality” and “objectivity” 
as they permit and allow hazardous activities that may harm people and the environment 
 O’Brien,     , p.     .  he focus of the agencies is then more on whether a risk assessment has 
been carried out according to the rules, than on whether it provides meaningful decision 
support.  
 (iii)  Risk analysts know that the assessments are often based on selective information, arbitrary 
assumptions and enormous uncertainties. Nonetheless they accept that the assessments are 
used to conclude on risk acceptability.  
This critique of risk assessment is supported by many other researchers. Reid (1992) argues that the 
claims of objectivity in risk assessments are simplistic and unrealistic. Risk estimates are subjective, and 
there is a common tendency of underestimation of the uncertainties. The disguised subjectivity of risk 
assessments is potentially dangerous and open to abuse if it is not recognized. According to Stirling 
(2007), using risk assessment when strong knowledge about the probabilities and outcomes does not 
exist is irrational, unscientific and potentially misleading. Renn (1998) summarizes the critique drawn 
from the social sciences over many years and concludes that technical risk analyses represent a narrow 
framework that should not be the single criterion for risk identification, evaluation and management. 
Tickner and Kriebel (2006) particularly stress the tendency of decision-makers and agencies not to talk 
about uncertainties underlying the risk numbers. Acknowledging uncertainty can weaken the authority of 
the decision maker and agency, by creating an image of being unknowledgeable. Precise numbers are 
used as a facade to cover up what are often political decisions.  
 he answer to this critique is, according to O’Brien       , to look for an alternative to risk assessments. 
But in our view there is no alternative to risk assessments: to support the decision-making we need to 
assess risk. The right way forward is not to reject risk assessment, but to improve the tool and its use. 
The challenge is how decision-making on risk can be informed by the best available technical and scientific 
knowledge. We need to strengthen the quality of the risk assessments and the associated risk assessment 
process, to meet the above critique. However, to be able to do this we need to be precise on the 
fundamentals of the risk assessments and we need to establish a suitable framework for being able to 
make judgments about the scientific quality of the risk assessments. Addressing the basic building blocks 
of the risk assessments, for example related to how to understand and describe risk and uncertainties, we 
can contribute to this end and are then able to study the two fundamental scientific requirements: 
reliability and validity of the risk assessments. The reliability requirement is concerned with the 
consistency of the “measuring instrument”  analysts, methods, procedures , whereas validity is concerned 
with the assessment’s success at “measuring” what one set out to “measure”.  his analysis also provides 
insights on how to manage risk and in particular how to define and use managerial review and judgment 
in a practical decision-making context. 
We may all acknowledge that safety-related decision-making should be risk-informed, but practice shows 
that it is common to apply risk-based approaches. This may be a result of a more or less conscious 
management strategy but as we will see from the analysis in the coming chapters, it is strongly influenced 
by the adopted scientific approach to risk. [2] 
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APPENDIX D: Bayesian Approach and Risk [2][4][13][14] 
Bayesian approach: 
The subjectivist interpretation of probability is often called the Bayesian standpoint, after Thomas 
Bayes (1702-1761) who proved a special case of what is now called Bayes theorem. 
Introducing two approaches towards events in universe 
A word on probability approaches  
Probability 
1) Classical 
The probability is an “objective” entity and is equal to the long-term (relative) frequency of an event. 
The probability of an event may be estimated on the basis of experience data, or based on symmetry 
arguments (e.g., for a dice) 
2) Bayesian 
The probability is a “subjective” measure of my belief about 
a situation, about the occurrence of an event, or about the truth of a statement. 
“What is the probability that San Fransisco is north of Madrid?” (This statement has no meaning for a 
classical statistician).  
 
Traditional statistical inference 
Traditional statistical inference is based on the following thinking: obser- vations are sampled from a 
large population of units. Variations within the population and sample are described using a 
stochastic model; and combining the data and the model, conclusions are made on performance 
measures related to the whole population, or specific units of the population. 
Bayesian theory 
Traditional Bayesian theory is based on the use of subjective probabilities to express uncertainties 
about unknown quantities, both observable quantities of the world and parameters of models of the 
world. Probability theory is used to manipulate the probabilities. The probabilities are updated when 
new information becomes available in a coherent way using Bayes’ formula. 
 
Bayesian decision analysis includes, in addition to this, specification of utilities for possible outcomes 
of decision alternatives, and the use of the maximum expected utility as a decision criterion. 
 
According to Vinnem[4] 
Risk quantification is often characterized by a mixture of the classical statistical approach and the 
Bayesian (subjective) approach. Most professionals are trained in the former approach. Where the 
probability of end events is considered to be independent of the analyst, and as a quantity 
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characterizing the object being studied. The classical concept of probability implies that the results of 
risk analyses are calculations (estimations) of these “true probabilities`. 
The latter is the Bayesian approach- which is the basis of this thesis work-where the concept of 
probability is used to express the analyst`s measure of uncertainty or degree of belief.  
The classical approach assumes that there is a true value of risk and that uncertainties may be 
expressed by distributions around the expected values, which then should be determined. 
The Bayesian approach is based on the premise that the risk expressions are the characteristics of 
uncertainty about what will be the future experience with respect to accidents and fatalities. 
 
 
APPENDIX E: Vessel Collision Risk Calculations (Chapter 5, Example 1)[19][20] 
Vessel Collision Risk; The main consequence corresponding to the assumption of number 
of vessel visits: 
 
Since the importance of the collision risk is considered significant, a through and total Vessel 
Collision Risk for the Valemon platform and the jack up rigs have been carried out based on the 
historical data provided in data dossier and the results have been attached and document to the main 
TRA report. Collision frequencies, hit velocity distributions and weight distributions are applied here 
based on that.  
The relevant vessel types for the Valemon field are passing vessels, fishing vessels and supply vessels 
serving Valemon. But since our assumption here mainly concerns the supply visits, we will limit our 
discussion only to supply vessels. 
Collisions onto the jack-up rig, which can affect Valemon main structure, are also considered 
 
 
 
Supply Vessel collision Risk 
 
Supply vessel collisions can occur as the supply vessel is approaching the unit, or during 
maneuvering or loading operations in the vicinity of an offshore installation. Most supply vessel 
impacts are low energy impacts while performing operations close to an installation.  
 
Some of the immediate effects caused by any potential collision of the vessel and platform were 
mentioned above. For example a collision can lead to loss of a main safety function, such as the 
control room, the evacuation/escape route or the structural load bearing capacity for the design 
basis[13,14] 
Additionally, some collisions might have very severe consequences; therefore, we will discuss the 
risk of collisions, to some extent in order to emphasize on the potential consequences. 
  
 
One of the very important aspects about collision study is the calculation of the Impact energy the 
collision will cause. As a result the calculated (estimated) value would set the grounds for design 
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basis of different parts of the structure. We will not go through the detailed method of calculation of 
these impact energies in this thesis work. 
 
But it is worth mentioning that the number of supply vessel visits (our underlying assumption for 
ship collisions) do not serve as contributors to impact energy, they only affect the collision frequency. 
Other factors such the size and displacement and added mass of a vessel as well as the velocity at 
impact are main contributors to impact energy estimation. Supply vessel collisions can occur as the 
supply vessel is approaching the unit, or during maneuvering or loading operations in the vicinity of an 
offshore installation. Most supply vessel impacts are low energy impacts while performing operations close 
to an installation because of the low speed rate which is one of the contributors to impact energy 
calculations. Although the speed of the visiting or attending vessel is not of great value, due to considerable 
visiting frequency (fair number of supply vessel visits to the platform) the risk, associated with them is not 
only negligible but also considerable according to the FAR distribution diagram of different accident 
categories (fig 4.5) 
 
Based on the argument above and also since the assumption is directly related to collision frequency 
calculation, we will briefly introduce the model that has been used in this report for visiting vessel collision 
frequency estimation [19]. Some new assumptions have been used when out of necessity. 
 
 
 
Introducing the model (method) for calculating the impaiemnet frequencies  
 
 First Step : Historical collision frequencies have been documented. Supply vessel and other 
vessel collisions can occur as the vessels are approaching the installation, or during  
maneuvering or loading operations in the vicinity of an offshore installation.  
 
 
There are some assumptions listed in this section that need to be considered: 
 The collision frequency for attending vessels is lower for fixed installations than for mobile 
installations 
 Further, it is assumed that on average, the NCS installations have 150 vessel visits per year 
(based on Statoil reference) 
 Activity levels 1,4 and 5 are treated equally, since number of visits are equal. The same is done 
for activity level 2 and 3. 
 
 
 
 Second step: Conditional probabilities given a collision  
 
When approaching Valemon or jack-up rig from onshore, the normal approach will be from east-
southeast. Valemon with jack-up as one “unit” has a somewhat larger footprint than Valemon standing 
alone, but this is not judged to significantly increase the collision frequency for approaching supply 
vessels. It is assumed that 50% of the collisions will hit the jack-up, and that the remaining 50% will hit 
the Valemon jacket. (Assumptions, knowledge-based probabilities) 
 
When operating near the platforms, supply vessels have two loading positions at jack-up rig and one 
loading position near Valemon, as illustrated in Figure 4.9. It is assumed that the conditional 
probabilities for hitting Valemon and jack-up rig are 40% and 60%, respectively. 
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Appendix E fig.1 Loading positions for supply vessels (blue boxes)  
 
 
There are some assumptions applied for this section as well: 
Assuming loading in lee position, supply vessels are 60% in west position and 40% in east position, given 
the wind data for the field, ref. /6/.(Assumption based on historical knowledge) 
 
When loading to/from the jack-up rig on one side, it is assumed that each of the two nearest jack-up legs 
have probability of 50% of being hit. The conditional probabilities of hitting each leg become:  
Leg 1 (southwest): 0.6 ∙ 0.5 = 0.3  
Leg 2 (north): 0.6 ∙ 0.5 + 0.4 ∙ 0.5 = 0.5  
Leg 3 (southeast): 0.4 ∙ 0.5 = 0.2  
 
Further, it is assumed that if the northern leg of the jack-up (furthest away from Valemon) is hit, there is 
50% probability that it will impair Valemon. If one of the other two legs is hit, impairment probability of 
Valemon is assumed 100%. If Valemon is hit, the probability of impairing the jack-up rig is assumed 50%. 
 
Based on the assumption above, some probability distributions have been formed (totally 
knowledge/experience-based). One example of the event tree for supply vessels approaching jack-up and 
Valemon becomes: 
 
Appendix E, Figure 2Event tree for supply vessels approaching Valemon 
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Apendix E, fig 3,Event tree for supply vessels approaching jack-up[20] 
 
Another assumption to be noted in here is that a collapse of one of the installations may impair the 
other installation. Valemon may be impaired due to collision on jack-up rig, and vice versa. According 
to this assumption, the hit and impairment probabilities are not assumed independently and the 
effect on one another has also been considered. 
 
 
 Third Step : Applied collision frequencies  
 
Combining the historical collision frequencies with number of visits and conditional probabilities of hitting 
Valemon and jack-up rig, the resulting frequencies become:  
 
Appendix E, Table 1,Collision impairment frequencies for Valemon and jack-up rig, activity level 1,4 
and 5[20] 
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In activity level 6, with Valemon stand-alone and normally not manned, the number of visits to Valemon is 
even lower. The frequency for collision impairment of Valemon upon approaching/attending Valemon 
becomes: 
 
 
 
Appendix E, table 2, Collision impairment frequencies for Valemon and jack-up rig, activity level 6[20] 
 
 
 
 
Once again, one should note that the values presented in the tables are based on historical data and some 
other underlying assumptions applied. The noticeable point is they might look quite accurate in a value, but 
there is high probability they are not correct. The values are accurate in terms of mathematical calculation 
not in terms of uncertainty description. 
It might be useful to refer to this statement: 
Probabilities are expressions of uncertainty based on particular background knowledge. There is a great 
deal of uncertainty in terms of interpretation of this background knowledge and relating it to future events 
between different individuals. 
However, for a given background knowledge the probabilities are not uncertain. [6] 
 
There have been some important assumptions in this modeling  which have not been mentioned anywhere 
else in the report and yet count as a baseline for such calculations seen above. 
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APPENDIX F : Design and Limit States [37] 
(Related to Chapter 5, Example 3) 
In general the problem with dimensioning is given on the following form: R S where R = capacity, and S 
= load-action 
Limit states 
The function g = R − S (10.1) 
is called a limit state function. Depending on the value of this function we have the following states: 
g = 0 g > 0 g < 0 
The limit state Allowed state Not allowed state 
In the example of chapter 10.1 we have already looked at three limit states: 
Yield Collapse Deflection 
The Oil Directorate defines the following limit states in which a construction shall be controlled: 
Serviceability Limit State (SLS) is given by criteria of functional ability, i.e. non-acceptable 
displacements, deflections and vibrations. 
Ultimate Limit State (ULS) is given by the risk of fraction, large inelastic displacements or strains which 
can be compared to a fraction. 
Fatigue Limit State (FLS) is the defined life length given by the risk of fraction due to the effect of a 
repeated load (fatigue) 
Progressive collapse Limit State (PLS) is give by the risk of a severe collapse after an abnormal or 
“freak” event such as explosion, fire, collision, earthquake or other accident which leads to fracture of an 
element. 
In Norwegian standard NS 3479 the last limit state, PLS, is called Accidental Limit State (ALS) 
Examples: 
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Appendix F, fig1. Limit State Design 
The control of the PLS is performed in two stages 
1. It must be proven that the construction only suffers local damage when exposed to an abnormal action. 
2. The construction shall, in its damaged condition, still be able to withstand the defined loads 
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APPENDIX G : EQUIPMENT COUNT and P&IDs 
 (relevant for Chapter 5,Example 4) 
 
Process and Instrument Drawings [13][14] 
 
A P&ID is a complex representation of the various units found in a plant. It is used by people in a variety of 
crafts. The primary users of the document after plant startup are process technicians and instrument and 
electrical, mechanical, safety, and engineering personnel. 
In order to read a P&ID, the technician needs an understanding of the equipment, instrumentation, and 
technology. The next step in using a P&ID is to memorize your plant’s process symbol list. This 
information can be found on the process legend. Process and instrument drawings have a variety of 
elements, including flow diagrams, equipment locations, elevation plans, electrical layouts, loop diagrams, 
title blocks and legends, and foun-dation drawings. The entire P&ID provides a three-dimensional look at 
the various operating units in a plant. 
 
Valemon Process System [23][17] 
 
A schematic of the process system is shown in Figure below. The wells are classified HPHT. 
 
 
Appendix G, fig1. The process on Valemon platform 
196 
 
 
 
Well-stream fluids (from wells which are HPHT wells) are choked and delivered through a manifold to an 
inlet separator. The gas from the top of the separator is sent to a gas cooler and further into a Wet Gas 
Scrubber. The gas from the scrubber goes through gas metering before bypassing a pig launcher for export 
to a Huldra/ Heimdal. 
The condensate from the inlet separator combines with the condensate from the wet gas scrubber and is 
piped to the Export Condensate Meter Skid. The metered condensate bypasses a pig launcher and is 
delivered to the condensate export line to Kvitebjørn Platform. 
Produced water from the inlet separator combines with the water from the scrubber and is piped to water 
injection well in the Utsira formation. 
The operating pressure in the two export pipelines is 130 barg. [17] 
 
 
 
Valemon Process Risk [23] 
 
The process including future gas compression and risers consists of 18 different isolatable segments. 
Additionally, there are up to 17 X-mas trees and wellheads. In this process risk analysis, all X-mas trees are 
considered one isolatable segment and similar for the wellheads. Therefore, a total of 20 isolatable process 
segments are analyzed separately.  
 
A process segment is usually isolated by quite a few ES/XS valves and blown down by one or two 
blowdown valves. Failure of one valve could have much more impact on the leak duration than failure of 
another valve. With several valves dedicated to a segment, there will be variety of failure scenarios and 
number of fire scenarios could then be overwhelming.  
 
 
 
 
It is also worth considering the following table with the different segments being categorized in order for 
easier failure location detection, traceability and more efficient containment .(segmentation is very 
practicable in determining the leak location) 
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Appendix G,Table1. Example of Equipment count in segments [24] 
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Now that we have reviewed the relevant drawings and segmentation, we could refer to a detailed analysis 
and tables related to equipment count[24] 
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Equipment count in Valemon 
The number of possible leak sources per process unit need to be identified in order to calculate the annual 
leak frequencies. These leak sources include flanges, valves, instruments, pumps and other process 
equipment like pressure vessels and heat exchangers.  
 
The identification of these sources is mainly done by using the P&IDs.  
Piping is also a possible source of leak and the piping lengths determine the leak frequency from these. 
Main process piping lengths have been estimated by IET and used as basis for the piping leak frequency 
calculations.  
The equipment count procedure used is summarized below.  
 
Wellheads  
The Joint between XMAS TREE/BOP stack and the well itself.  
 
X-mas trees  
Entire unit including valves, flanges, rams etc. down to the wellhead connection and up to the first flange, 
but excluding all piping, valves and fittings beyond the first flange (e.g. flowline or choke/kill connection) 
and excluding the flange itself.  
 
Flanges  
Flanged joints comprise 2 flanges normally; spectacle blinds and orifice plates count as 3. Screwed joints 
count as 2 flanges. Clamp (Grayloc) and Hammer union (Chicksan) joints also count as 2 flanges. Flanges 
shall be counted as flanged joints.  
Experience tells that number of flanges is higher than what is counted on P&IDs. Since piping isometrics 
and 3D plots have not been available, number of flanges has been multiplied with 1.5.  
 
Instruments  
One Instrument could comprise the instrument itself, plus up to 2 valves, up to 4 flanges, 1 fitting, and 
associated small bore piping (1"or less). However, instruments are counted as an instrument unit.  
 
Valves  
A valve includes two leak points in addition to the valve itself, namely the connections to the pipe in both 
ends. These connections are assumed to have the same annual leak frequency as the flanges. That is, for a 
normally open valve, two flanges are counted in addition to the valve, whereas for a normally closed valve, 
only one flange is counted.  
 
Piping  
Piping is measured in length (meters) per size category for material types (steel or flexible) excluding 
valves, flanges, and instrument fittings. Note the different size categories between piping and 
pipelines/risers. Redundant piping are not included if completely separated and isolated.  
 
Small bore piping has been estimated as 2 meter per connection. Small bore piping is usually all except for 
main process piping. So, for each connection (a flanged connection or valve welded to a pipe) two meters 
of pipe with diameter corresponding to the flange/valve diameter have been counted.  
 
Major equipment items  
These include compressors, heat exchangers, pig launchers, pig receivers, pressure vessels, pumps, storage 
tanks, and turbines.  
Each item comprises the item of equipment itself, but excluding all valves, piping, flanges, instruments and 
fittings beyond the first flange and excluding the first flange itself.  
In the pages that follow, equipment count sheets are provided for each process unit.  
 
 
The “Factor”-column indicates how many distinct units of the same type that is analyzed. For instance, if 
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there are 2 identical pumps a factor 2 is applied instead of doing two identical equipment counts. Note that 
when a factor of 1.5 is used for flanges, this is due to uncertainty in number of flanges as described above. 
 
In the above example of assumptions, we are mainly involved with flanges, valves and piping when dealing 
with equipment count as it was stated earlier in the description of the assumption. 
 
 
Below we will present an example of how equipment count tables are usually illustrated in a report. We 
will provide the table related to the segment which was introduced in the previous section. For all lists of 
segments and tables, refer to Appendix.3. 
 
 
Equipment count sheets (Example) 
Segment 1 – Production manifold  
Appendix G, Table 2. Equipment count  for segment 1 
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We have selected the first segment, production manifold description and its own specific assumptions here 
and the data sheet provide in table above is the equipment count for that segment. It is easier to do 
equipment count based on segmentations. 
 
Appendix G,Table 3. Production Manifold Segment with respect to Equipment Count 
 
 
 
 
There have been other assumptions within this segment as we can see in the description. 
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APPENDIX H : Comparison between Valemon and Kalumdborg Manning Level 
Assumption [31] [32] 
Comparison between Kalundborg and Valemon : Manning Distribution (relevant for end of chapter 5) 
Having section 5.7 in mind as a background for comparison, we will introduce the manning distribution 
assumptions for Kalundborg. 
Here will be the manning level distribution of the Kalundborg refinery and we will compare the results of 
the risk picture (in terms of FAR and PLL) with those presented in section 5.7.2 for Valemon. 
Appendix H, table 1. Manning distributions for Kalundborg [31] 
 
 
 
Here the format for the table presented is nearly the same as Valemon (tables divided by areas and 
groups) but the main difference here is that there has been a distinction between day and shift positions. 
It should be noted that Kalundborg refinery is an onshore facility therefore; it is not like that people would 
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also stay there after work for all time. Nevertheless, for some more sensitive posts, there has to be 100% 
shift present. We can see that this is the case for process units at least. Another thing to be noted in this 
table is the process and maintenance crew; they seem to be the most distributed parties all over the 
blocks, which is not the case in offshore facilities. On offshore platforms the process module 
corresponding crew for example would spend about 20% of their offshore stay in process or other related 
and usually high risk areas and spend the rest 80% in LQ. (The probabilities are merely knowledge-based 
information of the writer.) 
 
As we can see from the table the areas defined in Kalundborg and the group personnel differ completely 
from those of Valemon. We should bear in mind that the nature of these two facilities also differs. There 
are different ways of operating these two facilities, especially with the manning level and distribution that 
is so different off and onshore. For instance, we see that they are taking shifts in onshore facility 
Kalundborg, daytime and shift, which mean a position being shared between a certain number of people. 
Another different aspect on and offshore especially on night shifts is that for onshore facilities in case of 
night shift work, the personnel usually go to the facility to do some required work and then get back 
home; there is not a living quarter as in offshore facilities onboard. However, nightshifts in offshore 
means that doing the necessary job in the related area of the platform and then go directly to living 
quarters and spend the rest of night. The point is the personnel on night shift at offshore facilities do not 
necessarily spend their whole time on process, wellhead or other areas with great potential of risk or as it 
was stated in Kalundborg report in high risk areas. 
According to Kalundborg report, people working night shifts at Kalundborg, are usually considered to 
working high risk areas. 
That being said is of course the general assumption but that assumption is subject to uncertainty and is 
not always the case for offshore facilities due to the nature of the work that needs to be done. For 
instance, at offshore, if there is some immediate work required in high risk areas such as process areas or 
well intervention deck then the crew has to spend some time in those areas of course there would be a 
greater risk to Personnel but that is not always the case. 
 
Another great difference between Kalundborg and Valemon except for their nature of work and the 
geographical location is that Valemon has not been built yet and so the manning values are just mere 
assumptions and improvement will be done to the manning level and the calculations would then be 
more realistic. 
Kalundborg, on the other hand has been in operation for quite some time now; as a result the manning 
distributions are almost the case as in reality. 
Finally, the mentioned differences in pattern and structure of both facilities require different patterns of 
manning distributions which will eventually result in different total risk picture of the two facilities 
especially in calculations of FAR and PLL values. 
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Risk Picture 
According to Kalundborg risk picture results: 
The average FAR value (day and shift) is estimated to 9.1 (exclusive work accidents). 
The value is higher at night due to considerably fewer people working in low risk areas, i.e. personnel at 
night works mainly in the process areas. 
 
The criterion for Kalundborg according to the framework has been set to FAR value of 5. (table 5) The 
average personnel risk is above the criterion with about a factor of two. The main contributor is fires in 
areas where auto ignition is very likely to occur. 
 
For offshore installations average FAR value tend to be considerably lower due to personnel being located 
2/3 of time in the living quarter (FAR values are in most cases about 1 for living quarters). 
As we can recall from the Valemon risk picture the RAC for FAR value was set to be 10. 
This is another source of difference between Kalundborg and Valemon. 
 
 
 
 
 
Appendix H, Table 2. average FAR values for all workers at Kalundborg 
 
 
Some reasons to justify the higher FAR values (and not the criteria) at onshore refineries such as 
Kalundborg could be due to some main risk driving factors:[31] 
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 Large inventories that produce leaks with long durations, combined with many ignition sources 
that cause a high frequency for delayed ignitions, and consequently events that generates high 
explosion loads 
 The high ignition probability (self-ignition in particular) that cause a high frequency for fires, 
combined with equipment being vulnerable to fire exposure, cause a high frequency for large 
massive escalated fires (i.e. high economic risk) 
 Manned buildings and 3rd parties within area of exposure of significant explosion loads 
 Manned buildings and 3rd parties located within area that may be exposed to combustible gas 
due to leaks from storage tanks 
 Manned buildings and 3rd parties located within area that may be exposed to toxic gas 
Here the direct effect of manning levels on high risk to personnel and high FAR values can be observed. 
If we compare the results of the FAR values with the FAR value results for activity 5 in Valemon, we see 
the results in table 6. 
 
Appendix H, Table 3. comparison of FAR between Kalundborg and Valemon 
 Calculated FAR RAC FAR 
Valemon(activity level 5) 6.73 10 
Kalundborg 9.1 5 
 
We see that the FAR value is quite smaller for the offshore facility Valemon. We should also note that 
although the accident scenarios for offshore installations are quite wide in range, the manning level for 
Valemon is considerably lower in general than that of for Kalundborg refinery. And the fact that 
Kalundborg is a refinery and mainly deal with process accidents results in the general more potential 
fatalities. 
According to Espen Fyhn Nilsen,risk analysis specialist at Statoil ASA:  
PLL is mainly an indicator and there are different ways of calculating it and the methodology for 
calculating it is the same but the technique for modeling and calculation of PLL values varies a lot 
depending on the companies performing the risk analysis. Normally each company uses their own special 
resource to present PLL values.  
There is usually a general and total PLL presented in the result and then the contributors to the PLL 
usually depending on accident scenarios are also being presented. The same thing applies for FAR values 
as well. Defining FAR and PLL value contributors per accident category or per area, gives a reader a good 
insight through the results. 
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The main thing that we should always bear in mind is that in calculation of PLL values there are a lot of 
assumptions since the basis is usually building some scenarios with fault and event trees and assign a 
probability to the occurrence of that scenario (frequency) and then relate to the number of fatalities each 
scenario might end up with and then do the necessary calculations and several of these scenarios are 
considered before they are summed up and make the total PLL value. 
The main point here is eventually the assigned probabilities are just knowledge-based and are set upon 
the background knowledge of the assessor and therefore there are a great deal of uncertainties with 
them as well as with the corresponding consequences and the number of fatalities they are assumed to 
cause not to mention the feasibility of scenarios themselves.  
 
Comments: 
Eventually it might not be the good comparison between the Kalundborg and Valemon manning 
distribution due to the reasons mentioned above that we would summarize here as well: 
 Different nature of work 
 Different location (on and offshore) 
 Time of actual operation 
 
 
